The many and complex manifestations of contemporary armed violence have a wide array of negative—and occasionally positive—impacts on the development of states and societies, as well as on the well-being of communities. In recent years numerous studies have provided evidence of the linkages between security, violence, and development. In addition, various analyses have examined the regional, national, sub-national, and local effects of violence on development.

Although the evidence is often only partial, it highlights two important conclusions:

- that the effects of armed violence go well beyond the loss of life and physical injuries;
- that the global costs and effects of armed violence are much greater in non-conflict than in conflict settings.

The effects—and costs—of armed violence on development include, but are not limited to, spending on public order and internal security (such as police personnel), expenditure on private security by businesses and individuals, and the burden associated with forcibly displaced persons. In 2013 alone, there were an estimated 51.2 million forcibly displaced persons worldwide—the highest figure since comprehensive record-keeping began in 1989 (UNHCR, 2014). In economic terms, the welfare cost of collective and interpersonal violence is estimated to represent about 1.63 per cent of global GDP (Hoeffler and Fearon, 2014, p. iii)—or up to USD 1.4 trillion. This report estimates that the cost of homicide in 2010 alone reached USD 171 billion—roughly the equivalent of Finland’s GDP that year (see Chapter Five). Even these estimates do not capture the impact of violence and insecurity in terms of pain and suffering, or the negative impact on people’s behaviour and economic activities. In conflict situations, the destruction of physical capital and infrastructure—roads, buildings, clinics, schools—and loss of human capital—through displacement and migration—represent serious development costs. Even in non-conflict settings, where criminal or interpersonal violence does not cause widespread physical destruction:

- it is important not to understate the threat to state capacity, the business environment, and social development that can be posed by chronically high levels of violence, organized crime, and the corruption that sometimes follows it (Soares, 2014, p. 3).

Weakened institutions, poor governance, economic stagnation, and social and economic inequalities are often identified as the drivers—as well as results—of persistent violence (Beswick and Jackson, 2011; Thomas, 2008).

The ‘business case’ for reducing the cost of armed violence is strong. In Latin America, one-third of businesses identify crime as their major challenge;
in Mexico, the cost of insecurity and violence to enterprises and businesses is estimated to have reached around USD 7.7 billion in 2011 (World Bank, 2011, p. 5; INEGI, 2012, p. 17). Piracy around the Horn of Africa cost an estimated USD 5.7–6.1 billion in 2012 alone, with costs of military operations and security equipment accounting for almost half of that amount (USD 2.7–3.2 billion) (OBP, 2013). Meanwhile, the negative impact of violence and insecurity on tourism and travel has been estimated at USD 2.7 billion in losses over the first six months of 2014 in Thailand and USD 2.5 billion from 2011 to 2013 in Egypt (Johanson, 2014; Singh, 2013).

Yet despite the losses associated with unrest, only a tiny fraction of development assistance is devoted to reducing societal violence and crime (Hoeffler and Fearon, 2014); similarly, relatively small sums are spent on conflict prevention, mitigation, and post-conflict peacebuilding. Given the evidence, however, the reduction of violence does not only represent a means of achieving development goals—such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)—but also a development goal in itself.

This edition of the Global Burden of Armed Violence (GBAV) deepens and strengthens the ‘unified approach’ to armed violence presented in the 2011 edition, drawing on recent advances in our understanding of the interactions between development and violence, as well as on a variety of approaches to the security–development nexus that has emerged from economics, criminology, development studies, conflict studies, and anthropology. The availability of more comprehensive and detailed national-level data on lethal violence allows for enhanced analysis in terms of quality and scope (see Chapter Two). In the same way, sub-national data—with a focus on cities—permits an unpacking of armed violence patterns and trends within states and across borders, in conflict and non-conflict situations (see Chapter Four). New evidence on trends, patterns, and dynamics of lethal violence against women in and beyond conflict zones is highlighted in Chapter Three. In addition, this edition explores some of the latest advances regarding conceptualizations and calculations of the economic costs of violence, providing a solid modelling of costs and development impacts of armed violence (see Chapter Five).

The main finding of this volume is that estimated overall levels of lethal violence have declined slightly (by 3.4 per cent), but with significant variations within different categories and across different regions of the world. A comparison of global lethal violence rates for the periods 2004–09 and 2007–12 shows that deaths due to intentional homicide declined by almost 5 per cent, with the Americas being the only region to witness an increase in homicide rates (about 10 per cent). In stark contrast, conflict-related deaths shot up by 27 per cent (see Chapter Two). Much of this change is accounted for by two factors: an actual decrease in the estimated rate of intentional homicide in Africa, and the mounting conflict death toll in the wake of the Arab uprisings in Syria and Libya. With the exception of the Americas and Asia (especially due to conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria), all regions exhibited significant declines in lethal violence in the period 2007–12. The civil war in Syria stands out as particularly deadly and destructive: more than 80,000 people were killed between March 2011 and December 2013, pushing the figures for conflict deaths up to levels not seen in more than a decade (see Chapter Two). 4

In light of these findings, this introductory chapter provides an overview of how and why development and security interact, highlighting why this interaction matters in the context of debates about
whether to include a goal for achieving peaceful and inclusive societies in the post-2015 global development framework. The chapter summarizes the state of play (up to late 2014) regarding the integration of such a goal into the post-2015 development agenda and provides an overview of efforts to develop specific goals, targets, and indicators dealing with security, safety, and armed violence. Regardless of the outcome of the post-2015 negotiations, such efforts will be relevant to whatever new development framework emerges.

The chapter’s main conclusions are:

- Despite continued debates on the importance and directionality of the links between violence, insecurity, and development processes, there is consensus that the links do exist—and that they are negative and mutually reinforcing.

- While still limited, agreement is emerging with respect to achieving peaceful and inclusive societies as part of the post-2015 development framework, via a specific goal or goals. While this view is supported by the majority of states and several groups, it is also opposed by some important actors.

- In most versions of a goal on peaceful and inclusive societies, the measuring and monitoring of ‘lethal violence’ appears as an important and viable indicator for monitoring progress towards peace and security goals and targets.

**Armed violence and development: shifting frames**

The idea that violence, insecurity, and socio-economic development are linked is not new: from economic theorists such as Adam Smith to the crisis of the interwar period of the 20th century and the post-World War II implementation of the Marshall Plan and the Bretton Woods institutions, economic thinkers have considered that violence, security, and economic development interact negatively. The dominant understanding of the link, however, held that economic development was a *precondition* for security, and that increased economic development—and, potentially, economic integration—would reduce the incidence of conflict and violence within, and possibly even among, states. The process of development and socio-economic change was also regarded as largely distinct from the dynamics of conflict and insecurity within and between states; for some, preparations for and the fighting of wars could even be seen to spur economic growth and technological innovation (Krause, 2014, p. 382).

Economic growth, political transformations, and the increased fiscal capacity of the state arguably helped to lower levels of crime and violence, and to increase public safety and internal order, largely through the expansion of state security institutions and government services (Emsley, 1999). Western societies grew safer through the elimination of domestic threats to governments and the provision of public order through the growth and increased effectiveness of state institutions, including the police, gendarmes, and criminal justice systems (Krause, 2014, p. 381). Between states, greater economic exchange and integration—the so-called ‘commercial peace’—also arguably reduced the risk of war, at least in the long run: ‘Commerce promotes peace because violence has substantial costs, whether these are paid prospectively or contemporaneously’ (Hegre, Oneal, and Russett, 2010, p. 763; Polachek, 1980).

These slow transformations reinforced the one-way vision that economic development would—in the long run—lead to greater security and safety and lower levels of violence. Paradoxically, the
apparent inevitability of this process helped ensure that the two policy ‘worlds’—that of security provision and that of economic development—remained separate. When they did connect during the cold war, aid—mostly in the form of military assistance—was subsumed within national security agendas, with ‘client states’ receiving (often military) aid to maintain these patronage systems. As the newly independent states of Africa and Asia emerged on the global stage in the 1960s and 1970s, this relationship was maintained, with national security policy remaining a sovereign prerogative over which external donors and international financial institutions exercised no oversight, except in the context of military alliances and strategic partnerships. As a result, the international development framework and policies did not focus on violence at all until the mid-1990s (Brück, 2013, p. 1).

The end of the cold war, however, and the subsequent crises in Rwanda and Somalia, eroded the compartmentalization of security and development thinking. Geopolitical concerns and the competition between ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ models of national economic development faded as the neoliberal and ‘small-state’ model triumphed. More importantly, the Rwandan genocide—Rwanda having been a ‘donor darling’ in the early 1990s—made it clear that development policy-makers had to take into consideration not only how conflict affected development policies, but also how aid and development cooperation could adversely affect conflict dynamics (Uvin, 1998). In addition, the shifting nature of contemporary forms of violence—towards internal and communal conflicts—as well as blurred lines between collective, individual, political, and criminal forms of violence, challenged conventional development thinking to integrate these forms of insecurity and fragility into a unified framework for achieving progress in human well-being. The rise of transnational terrorism since 2001, together with growing concerns over fragile, ungoverned, and conflict-affected settings, have led international aid policy to place more weight on security and state-building agendas in the context of coordinated ‘3D’ (development, diplomacy, and defence) strategies.

As a result, the focus of research and policy regarding how and why violence, insecurity, and development interact has evolved, both in the development and the security policy communities (see Table 1.1 and Box 1.1). In the world of development policy, attention has shifted from (national) economic growth and development towards ‘human’ or ‘sustainable’ development. These changes occurred in parallel to debates about the ‘deepening’ and ‘widening’ of the concept of security, moving away from an exclusive focus on the state towards more ‘people-centred’ perspectives on security.

**Table 1.1** Security and development: shifting attention away from the state

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State-centred approach</th>
<th>People-centred approach</th>
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<tr>
<td>The focus is on national security and on maintaining public order.</td>
<td>Human security is the protection of fundamental rights, freedom from want, and freedom from fear.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building strong institutions generates development.</td>
<td>Citizen security entails democratic civic order, the elimination of threats of violence, and police and criminal justice system reform (UNDP, 2013d).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong and stable states make good neighbours (promoting international and regional order).</td>
<td>Human development and well-being are the primary goals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth is the primary goal.</td>
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A state-centred approach focuses on the capacity of the state to provide public goods, including security and justice. From this perspective, states with weak institutions often remain caught in the ‘conflict trap’ or the ‘fragility trap’, in which political instability and violence, weak guarantees for property rights and contracts, and widespread corruption perpetuate weak institutions that cannot deliver development, good governance, or security to populations (Andrimihaja, Cinyabuguma, and Devarajan, 2011; Collier, 2007; World Bank, 2011). In this context, a focus on the state is primordial, not least to ensure the development of strong and stable institutions that exercise a full monopoly over the legitimate use of violence and that can create the conditions for economic development and public order (Beswick and Jackson, 2011, pp. 9–11). On the one hand, states whose institutions are strong states can create good neighbourhoods, whereas weak states often find themselves trapped in ‘bad neighbourhoods’ (Collier, 2007; Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008). On the other hand, these same state institutions—including the security divisions—can be and in some cases are being used against the people they are meant to protect and whose well-being should be enhanced (Fritz and Menocal, 2007).

An alternative, more people-centred approach emerged in the 1990s, around the concept of human security, an idea first championed by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in its 1994 Human Development Report (UNDP, 1994). The report’s notion of human security was both deepened (from state to individual) and widened, as more threats were included (Beswick and Jackson, 2011; Rothschild, 1995). Underlying all similar approaches is the assumption that security and stability ‘cannot solely rest on the sovereignty and viability of states’ and that ‘the safety of the individual is key to global security’ (Hampson, 2008, p. 232). The state is regarded as a source

**Box 1.1 Defining ‘development’**

‘Development’ is commonly understood as positive and desirable change. If applied to societies and the economy, it ‘usually means improvement, either in the general situation of the system, or in some of its constituent elements’ (Bellù, 2011, p. 2). At the opposite end of development, there is ‘underdevelopment’—referring to an entity, state, or region that has not reached its full capacity. Promoting development hence means promoting positive change through deliberate actions within institutions, organizations, and individuals. In practice, this often takes the form of investments or transfers of public funds towards states and other organizations to implement programmes and policies that are said to favour these positive changes within one or several areas (such as economic growth, job creation, building capable state institutions, and promoting agricultural reforms) (Charnoz and Severino, 2007, p. 3).

The idea of ‘development’—as international development cooperation to favour positive social (and economic) change—appears only in the mid-20th century, with ‘Point Four’ in US president Harry S. Truman’s inaugural speech of 1949 commonly recognized as the beginning of the development age (Escobar, 2012; Rist, 2002, p. 71). The 1950s and 1960s understood development mainly as a process of structural change and economic transformation from rural, agricultural, and traditional to urban, industrial, and modern societies. Criticism of this view led to the 1970s vision of development, which focused on redistribution and human needs. The 1990s and early 2000s focused more on technical cooperation, neoliberal policies designed to reduce the role and weight of the state, and results-based programmes (such as the MDGs); more recently, the focus has shifted to institution building, sustainability, and ‘good governance’, including in the security arena (Escobar, 2012, pp. 4–5; Fritz and Menocal, 2007; Summer and Tribe, 2008, pp. 12–14).

This volume uses ‘development’ to refer to the well-being and security of individuals, and to the social, political, and economic well-being of societies.

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of protection as well as a potential source of insecurity for communities and individuals (along with war, communal conflict, and criminal violence) (UNDP, 2009, p. 13). This more bottom-up perspective places the emphasis on the need to ensure the security of individuals and communities as a precondition for achieving human and social development. Despite vast debates around the concepts, the language of people-centred security remains strong in contemporary discussions on violence and development, whether presented as ‘citizen security’, ‘human security’, ‘community security’, or a ‘people-centred approach to security’ (IADB, n.d.; UNDP, 2009; 2013d). Where the state-centred and more people-centred approaches to security often meet is in a focus on reform of the security sector, with the aim of making its institutions more accountable and responsive, or less predatory and inefficient.

Armed violence and development: approaching the evidence

The different ways in which development, security, and violence interact may be gauged using three general approaches:

- by accounting for immediate and medium-term direct and indirect costs ‘from the bottom up’;
- by assessing the dynamic effects and macro-level development impact of conflict and armed violence; and
- by examining the potential causal links between violence and insecurity, and other social or economic ‘harms’, such as poverty, inequality, barriers to education and health services, and unequal access or opportunities.
The first, the ‘accounting method’, is generally used to assess the tangible and calculable economic costs of violence, be it criminal or political in nature. Such studies address the direct physical and human costs, such as lost productivity and future income losses, medical costs for injury treatment and rehabilitation, and productive lives lost or shortened, as well as indirect but countable costs, such as household and collective security expenditures and the costs of punishing and deterring violence within the criminal justice system. They may also include calculations of the less tangible and indirect costs of violence—such as psycho-social impacts, opportunity costs, and ‘willingness to pay’ for security—in particular settings or countries.  

In high-violence areas such as Latin America, such costs can be extremely elevated. Recent analyses estimate that the costs of violence range from 7.7 per cent of annual GDP in Guatemala to 9.6, 10.0, and 10.8 per cent in Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, respectively (Acevedo, 2008); these include health system and other institutional expenditures (such as on public safety and justice) and private security spending by households and business. In South Africa, another high-violence context, the costs—including disability-adjusted life years and medical, security, and institutional costs—amount to 7.8 per cent of annual GDP (Alda and Cuesta, 2011).

In high-income countries the costs of violence and crime can also be elevated (see Chapter Five). One study finds that in the United States, hospital costs related to firearm assaults attained USD 630 million in 2010 alone (Howell and Abraham, 2013, p. 4). Another study estimates that between 2003 and 2010, firearm injury-related costs due to hospitalizations reached USD 18.9 billion (Lee et al., 2013). In Chicago alone, the social and economic costs of gunshot wounds are estimated at
USD 2.5 billion per year (Ander et al., 2009). Even in England and Wales, where the levels of armed violence are relatively low, the overall social and economic costs of crime (including major crimes beyond just violent crimes) have been calculated at more than 6 per cent of GDP—representing an estimated GBP 36.2 billion (USD 70.3 billion) in the period 2003–04 (Dubourg and Hamed, 2005, p. 13).

The second approach concentrates on the interactions between violence and ‘development achievement’. This type of work looks specifically into effects that violence can have on short- and long-term growth rates, investment, and other macro-economic indicators; it is generally based on a counter-factual question: ‘How much would a country have grown if it had not experienced armed conflict?’ Some research in this area has considered the roles that violence and especially war have played as development enablers, which may lead to positive long-run effects in terms of infrastructure investment, redistribution, or stability (Gutiérrez-Sanín, 2009; Tilly, 1992). However, the broad body of research finds that violence and conflict work as development disablers, at least in the medium term. The loss in GDP per capita in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide and civil war, for example, has been estimated at 25–30 per cent, with consumption levels six years after the violence remaining 30 per cent below pre-conflict levels (Serneels and Verpoorten, 2012; Wodon and López, 2005). The costs of a ‘typical’ civil war—of seven years’ average duration—is estimated at around 60 per cent of annual GDP (Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol, 2003, p. 7).

Even in non-conflict but high-violence settings, such as in the Caribbean, research finds that if the impact of homicides in Jamaica and Haiti were reduced to the levels of Costa Rica, these countries’ growth rates would increase by 5.4 per cent annually (World Bank and UNODC, 2007, p. 59).
This analysis suggests that high levels of violence and criminal activities increase the costs of providing security, diverting investment from other, more productive, sectors. Other studies look at the impact of violence on specific economic sectors, such as the tourism industry.

The relationship between development achievements and conflict and violence is, however, a complex one. In contrast to the negative impacts listed above, UNDP reports that significant development has taken place in Latin America and the Caribbean, despite the fact that violence has simultaneously increased (UNDP, 2013a). This finding poses important questions about how exactly violence and development interact. It suggests that analysts and policy-makers need a more fine-grained and context-specific analysis of the particular impacts of insecurity and violence on communities, a topic taken up in more detail below.

The third approach focuses on the potential relationship between violence, insecurity, and development, and in particular on the role of social harms such as inequality, poverty, and barriers to health and education services. It examines, for example, how conflict and armed violence affect the health of populations, educational achievement, population undernourishment, life expectancy, and the attainment of the MDGs. As the term ‘relationship’ indicates, these elements can interact in the opposite direction as well: limited access to education, employment, or resources such as food and water, as well as poverty, falling incomes, and inequality, can act as triggers and drivers of violence and armed conflict (Beswick and Jackson, 2011; Thomas, 2008). Indeed, evidence shows that ‘higher homicide levels tend to occur in countries that register low primary education enrolment ratios’; that relationship is almost certainly reciprocal (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2011, p. 156).

These issues represent a particularly complex field of research, for three reasons. First, it is difficult to distinguish a causal link from a simple correlation. Second, violence, insecurity, and other social harms are part of larger social systems; they can be caused by underlying factors (such as weak institutions or poor governance) and reinforce each other in negative ways. As mentioned above, a causal ‘arrow’ can point in both directions—with inequality and poverty acting as a driver of violence, and violence depressing economic production and investments at the same time. Finally, there is a great degree of variation in high-violence settings, both in the nature of the violence and in its consequences (see Chapter Two), making generalizations difficult.

Nevertheless, the aggregate studies all point in the same direction. The 2011 edition of the GBAV reports that higher rates of armed violence for the period 2004–09 were associated with lower achievement levels for specific MDGs (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2011). In its Fragile States Report 2014, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) finds that some progress has been made in recent years, and that of the 35 fragile states under review, most will be able to ‘meet at least one [MDG] by the 2015 deadline’; however:

> [o]f the seven countries that are unlikely to be able to meet any MDG by 2015, six are fragile. As a consequence, in five years extreme poverty is expected to be concentrated mainly in fragile states (OECD, 2014, p. 15).

Research on the effect of war on school enrollment and completion shows that the outbreak of a conflict reduces the chances of finishing nine years of schooling by 7.3 per cent for women and girls in affected regions, and that a rise in military
example, inequality is strongly associated with crimes such as murders, robberies, and theft (Hauner, Kutan, and Spivey, 2012).

The relationship between armed violence, insecurity, and development outcomes does not only generate debates in research circles. International organizations, development agencies, and foreign policy-makers face numerous challenges in understanding how these elements interact, and how best to incorporate them in entry-points and programmatic approaches. There is thus a need first to acknowledge that security, violence, and development do interact, and that these interactions are complex, circular, and mostly negative. Only then can analysts turn to the important question

Photo ▼ A school holds its classes outside, after its buildings were destroyed during a wave of violence in Maiduguri, Nigeria, August 2009. © Sunday Alamba/ AP Photo
of identifying cost-effective interventions that will prevent and reduce violence and reap the maximum gains for human, social, and economic development. This includes generating knowledge on how typical ‘development’ activities such as employment generation and education are part of a wider web of interventions that can reduce violence and insecurity within and across societies. Although the return on investment or the benefit–cost ratios cannot be easily calculated (both because effective violence prevention and reduction measures have seldom been scaled up, and because the data is limited, hindering analysis), ‘it appears likely that some interventions would constitute a very effective use of development aid’ (Hoeffler and Fearon, 2014, p. v). The international debates around the post-2015 development framework outlined below illustrate how the discussion has advanced, and suggest that the time is ripe to include security-building and violence prevention and reduction efforts into development policy in a coherent way.

Violence, security, and development: moving the agenda forward

The previous section discussed how development, security, and violence may interact, and considered some of the main strands of research and findings. Most studies focus on one particular form of violence, be it armed conflict, political unrest, criminal violence, or terrorism. While contemporary armed violence takes many forms, the challenge lies in recognizing how multiple and shifting forms of violence affect development and societies’ well-being, beyond the immediate effects of injuries and loss of life. The international debate around a new set of post-2015 goals to follow on from the MDGs, along with efforts to redefine a global development framework, has presented an opportunity to reflect on the inclusion of violence and insecurity within the global development agenda, from a holistic and universal point of view.

Violence and insecurity: a ‘missing’ Millennium Development Goal

The idea of including peace and security in the global international development framework is not new. At the global level, the Millennium Declaration, adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 2000, included wording on peace and security and highlighted the need to promote security in order to achieve development. In its statement of ‘fundamental values [. . .] essential to international relations in the twenty-first century’, the Declaration stresses that ‘[m]en and women have the right to live their lives and raise their children in dignity, free from hunger and from the fear of violence, oppression or injustice’ (UNGA, 2000, p. 1). The Declaration also responds to the recognition that peace and security for humanity is intertwined with broader development needs. The wide-ranging document includes chapters on peace, security, and disarmament; development and poverty eradication; protection of the environment; human rights; democracy; and good governance. The chapter on peace, security, and disarmament covers issues such as controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, stemming the trafficking in illicit substances, and controlling small arms and light weapons, as well as reducing the impact of conflict and insecurity on people around the world. Yet as the Declaration is primarily focused on traditional understandings of armed conflict, it does not adequately capture new forms of fragility or violence that affect development prospects in non-conflict or post-conflict settings.
The Millennium Declaration spawned a set of specific goals, agreed upon by all UN member states, to address the root causes of global poverty and underdevelopment. These were accompanied by a battery of targets and indicators designed to track progress towards a ‘comprehensive approach to human development’ (Picciotto, 2006). However, the MDGs introduced a far narrower interpretation of the international development framework than the Millennium Declaration itself. Although the Declaration recognizes that freedom from fear of violence, oppression, and injustice are fundamental values for development, no concrete goal regarding these aspects was included in the MDGs. The eight MDGs were traditional development-oriented goals, designed to address mainly the social symptoms of poverty, but conflict and human security were restricted to the statement of values and principles in the Millennium Declaration.

The reasons for this were both political and technical. The strength of the MDGs was their ‘focus on a limited set of concrete, common human development’ objectives, which were brought together with ‘a set of concrete and time-bound goals and targets that could be monitored by statistically robust indicators’ (UNTT, 2012b, p. 6). Yet this strength was also a weakness: the focus on a few goals ‘caused certain development dimensions to be undervalued’ (p. 6), and the inevitable pull of policy and programming was towards reaching specific targets by treating the ‘symptoms’ rather than addressing the underlying conditions that gave rise to them. As one critical report puts it, the MDGs ‘focus on measuring things that people lack to the detriment of understanding why they lack them’ (UNRISD, 2010, p. 2). And the MDG process remained blind to the ways in which persistent and large-scale conflict, violence, and insecurity represented a key reason why human development did not advance in particular regions. Without sustainable security as a background condition, achieving the goals framed in the Millennium Declaration—and the eight specific MDGs—remains a difficult challenge for countries that are affected by conflict and high rates of violence. Evidence clearly shows that high levels of lethal violence are correlated with high poverty levels, lower educational attainment, high mortality of children under five, and reduced access to water and sanitation (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2011).

**Efforts to bring violence and insecurity into the MDG process**

Since the adoption of the MDGs, several processes, conferences, and declarations have pushed to raise the profile of peace and security issues, either as a specific goal for development policy and programming, or within a revised development framework. One effort was associated with the OECD, whose Development Assistance Committee as early as 2004 started to include a series of security-related measures and programmes in its list of official development assistance-eligible elements of international cooperation. These included programmes focused on security sector reform and the control of small arms and light weapons (Trachsler, 2008, p. 2). In 2009 and 2011 the OECD produced a series of reports on preventing armed violence and enabling development, as well as on how to invest efficiently in security and on reducing the involvement of youths in armed violence (OECD, 2009; 2011a; 2011b).

Several MDG and other UN summits represented important steps—and sometimes missed opportunities—to include a more formal consideration of peace and security within the international
The 2004 UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change also provided an opportunity to ‘bridge the divide between security and development concerns’, notably with a series of recommendations that could be understood as ‘millennium security goals’ (Picciotto, 2006, p. 119; UNGA, 2004). The September 2005 UN Summit profiled commitments relating to peacekeeping and the protection of civilians, but no major agreement on reframing the international development architecture was achieved. And in 2006, the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development set out a global framework around the concept of ‘armed violence’ with the commitment by participating states to ‘achieve, by 2015, measurable reductions in the global burden of armed violence and tangible improvements in human security worldwide’ (Geneva Declaration, 2006).10

Taking up the common language around ‘armed violence’, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution in 2008, requesting ‘the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on the interrelation between armed violence and development’ (UNGA, 2008). The resulting Secretary-General’s report, Promoting Development through the Reduction and Prevention of Armed Violence, stresses the need for ‘a more coherent and evidence-guided approach to armed violence and its prevention’ (UNGA, 2009, p. 5).11 The Secretary-General also notes that ‘developing measurable goals on armed violence towards 2015 will offer the opportunity to integrate security-related themes into the possible follow-up of the Millennium Development Goals’ (p. 19). Building on these and other efforts, the Oslo Commitments on Armed Violence, promoted by the Government of Norway and accepted by 62 states in 2010, call for armed violence reduction
and prevention to be included in ‘MDG achievement strategies through to 2015’ (Government of Norway, 2010).

While some efforts engaged both developed and less-developed states and were global in nature, others (such as within the OECD) were donor-led and thus enjoyed less support in the Global South. A more partnership-oriented approach and tighter focus were advocated as part of the 2011 ‘New Deal’ for engaging in fragile and conflict-affected countries, a framework that combines political, security, justice, and development goals. The New Deal partnership—which included the G7+ group of 19 fragile and conflict-affected countries, development partners, and international organizations—established a series of peace-building and statebuilding goals that set the foundations for discussion of a peace and security goal within the post-2015 development agenda (IDPS, 2011). The UN Security Council also addressed the links between security, violence, and development when, in 2011—under the presidency of Brazil—it held an open debate on the ‘interdependence between security and development’ (Small Arms Survey, 2013). In June 2013, during an Open Debate on Women, Peace, and Security, the Brazilian permanent representative to the UN stressed that ‘the inter-linkage between security, development and sustainable peace must not be overlooked’ (UN, 2013c).

Several reports also highlight that establishing peaceful societies requires a breadth of engagement from a range of stakeholders. In 2008, for example, the World Health Organization published a report on how development agencies can help prevent violence and reduce its impact, emphasizing that violence and insecurity affects all eight MDGs (WHO, 2008, p. 11). The 2011 edition of the World Bank’s World Development Report, which is focused on conflict, security, and development, finds that ‘poverty reduction in countries affected by major violence is on average nearly a percentage point lower per year than in countries not affected by violence’ (World Bank, 2011, p. 60). Similarly, the Global Study on Homicide of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) underscores that ‘[r]educing violent crime should also be a priority for achieving the Millennium Development Goals, particularly in those countries where crime is disproportionally high’ (UNODC, 2011, p. 5). In a report to the UN Secretary-General, the UN Global Compact mentions peace and stability as providing an enabling environment for business to contribute to society, and proposes a goal on peaceful and stable societies (UN Global Compact, 2013, pp. 12–15). The Sustainable Development Solutions Network, launched by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, also highlights the need to address development through the sustainable development path, including via good governance and peace and security (SDSN, 2014).

**Peace and security in the MDG review process**

All of these interventions formed a promising background to the MDG review process, and they provided an opening to incorporate issues around violence and insecurity into the broader international development framework. The formal intergovernmental negotiations around the post-2015 development framework opened with the 69th session of the General Assembly in September 2014 (Elgin-Cossart and Slotin, 2014b); by early 2015, they were fully under way. But the informal MDG review process that paved the way for the formal negotiations started much earlier, and can be described as a complex multi-track and multi-stakeholder process. A wide range of UN
organizations, international institutions, civil society organizations, research institutes, and think tanks, as well as donor and affected states, were involved, mainly in two parallel and simultaneous processes: the official MDG review process towards the post-2015 development framework, and the Sustainable Development Goals process, initiated after the Rio+20 UN Conference on Sustainable Development in June 2012. Within the frame of these two major processes, several sub-processes have unfolded.

The UN System Task Team, established in January 2012, included around 60 UN organizations and was mandated to provide support to the UN system-wide preparations for the post-2015 development agenda. In June 2012, the Task Team published its report, Realizing the Future We Want for All, which provides a first set of recommendations to serve as a point of reference for further consultations (UNTT, 2012b). Its early vision for the post-2015 development framework reflects a more holistic approach that addresses four key dimensions, among which is ‘peace and security’. The report also recognizes that the MDG framework did not adequately address issues related to peace and security, and that this agenda ‘should also respond to a number of challenges [...] that have become more pressing since the adoption of the Millennium Declaration and [that] were not adequately reflected in the MDG framework’ (UNTT, 2012b, p. 9). The Task Team’s thematic background paper on peace and security recognizes that drivers of conflict and violence are complex and require a multidimensional approach; most importantly, it argues that development, human rights, and peace and security ‘are indivisible and interrelated’ (UNTT, 2012a, p. 7).

The UN Secretary-General’s High-level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda—whose 27 members included President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia, President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia, and Prime Minister David Cameron of the United Kingdom—was designated by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon with the mandate to advise the Secretary-General on the global development framework beyond 2015. The Task Team’s report fed into the conclusions of the High-level Panel, which suggested a specific goal on ensuring ‘stable and peaceful societies’ and a set of ‘targets that cover violent deaths, access to justice, stemming the external causes of conflict, such as organised crime, and enhancing the legitimacy and accountability of security forces, police and the judiciary’ (HLP, 2013, p. 16).

Accompanying the UN system review was the global thematic consultations process (11 thematic consultations on themes such as inequality, health, education, and conflict, violence, and disasters), which incorporated views from national governments, think tanks, civil society, and academia. The fact that 11 thematic consultations were undertaken highlights the potentially broad scope of the post-2015 development agenda and hints at intense competition to enhance the status or position of particular issues. The consultation concerning ‘Conflict, Violence and Disaster and the Post-2015 Development Agenda’ was convened by UNDP, UNICEF, the UN Peacebuilding Support Office, and the UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction Secretariat and was sponsored by the Government of Finland. A series of regional consultations in Indonesia, Liberia, and Panama culminated in a global thematic consultation in Helsinki in March 2013. In addition, expert meetings were held in Vienna and New York during mid-2013 as part of this global thematic consultation.

The Liberia regional consultation on ‘conflict and fragility’ concluded that the inclusion of a stand-alone goal on peace and security—‘entailing specific targets on many different dimensions,
going beyond the absence of violence’—was key
to addressing both drivers of conflict and of peace
(UN, 2012a). The Panama regional thematic con-
sultation highlighted the need to ‘include in the
post-2015 development framework a standalone
goal to reduce violence, and promote freedom
from fear and sustainable peace’ (UNDP, 2013e).
Furthermore, the elimination of all forms of vio-
lence against women and girls, and the protection
of children and youths from violence, were also
included as important goals (UN, 2013b, p. 12).

Parallel and potentially conflicting
processes: the Open Working Group
Alongside these efforts, the main focus of atten-
tion throughout 2013–14 was on the Open Working
Group on Sustainable Development Goals (OWG).
Established in January 2013, the OWG had seats
for 30 member states (shared by 70 member
states) from the General Assembly and held 13
working sessions before reporting to the UN Gen-
aeral Assembly in September 2014. The OWG’s
orientation was towards a broad understanding
of sustainable development, based on the Rio+20
outcome document—The Future We Want—and the
‘three dimensions’ of sustainable development
(economic growth and diversification, social
development, and environmental protection) (UN,
2012b). The Rio+20 process echoed traditional
development thinking, making a gesture towards
‘peace and security’ but otherwise excluding such
issues from sustained discussion. The Rio+20
process also lacked the MDGs’ emphasis on pov-
erty eradication and basic needs.

It was thus no surprise that the OWG discussions
on the thematic area of ‘peaceful and non-violent
societies, rule of law and capable institutions’—
one of 17 focus areas—were contested. Issues
debated under this thematic area included com-
bating organized crime and illicit arms trafficking,
promoting a culture of non-violence, reducing
crime and violence, as well as strengthening the
rule of law at all levels (OWG, 2014b, p. 165).
Deliberations within the OWG reflected four
broad positions towards the inclusion of such
issues within the post-2015 development frame-
work, with member states ranged across (and
moving between) these positions:

- reject any reference to peace in goals and
targets;
- oppose a standalone goal on peace, yet support
peace-related targets within particular goals;
- support a standalone goal on peaceful societies;
- support two standalone goals—one on peace,
and one on rule of law and governance
(Saferworld, 2014).

Given the multi-stakeholder and multi-track nature
of the post-2015 discussion, it is hardly surpris-
ing that several distinct proposals coexist, with
the main axis of disagreement being whether to
include references to peace in a post-2015 frame-
work. But does this represent emerging consen-
sus, or growing cacophony?

To some extent, the different proposals reflected
a learning process among the actors involved in
the post-2015 agenda. Understanding of the link-
ages between peace and security and development
is greater than a decade ago, as much research,
policy-making, and programming have focused
on this nexus, and as development agencies have
recognized the need to include security-related
issues—broadly defined—within development work
and agendas. The diverse propositions for goals
also reflected the disciplinary stovepipes and
fragmentation that continue to affect discussions
around development and security. The peace-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrument/institution</th>
<th>High-level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda</th>
<th>Open Working Group</th>
<th>UN Global Compact</th>
<th>UN Technical Support Team</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goals</td>
<td>■ Goal 11 is to ‘ensure stable and peaceful societies’</td>
<td>■ Goal 16 is to ‘promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels’</td>
<td>■ Goal 8 is to ‘build peaceful and stable societies’</td>
<td>■ Goal on ‘peaceful societies’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targets</td>
<td>■ Reduce violent deaths per 100,000 by x and eliminate all forms of violence against children;</td>
<td>■ Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere;</td>
<td>■ Improve access for diverse ethnic, religious and social groups to justice, services and economic opportunity;</td>
<td>■ Prevent and reduce by X% violent deaths and injuries per 100,000 by year Y;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>■ ensure justice institutions are accessible, independent, well-resourced and respect due-process rights;</td>
<td>■ end abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence and torture against children;</td>
<td>■ improve mediation, dispute resolution and dialogue mechanisms to prevent and resolve conflict and to build peace;</td>
<td>■ eliminate all forms of violence against children, women and other vulnerable groups by year Y;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>■ stem the external stressors that lead to conflict, including those related to organised crime; and</td>
<td>■ promote the rule of law at the national and international levels, and ensure equal access to justice for all;</td>
<td>■ reduce incidence of violent deaths per 100,000 by at least 20 per cent;</td>
<td>■ enhance social cohesion and ensure adequate formal and informal mechanisms are in place to peacefully address tensions and grievances by year Y;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>■ enhance the capacity, professionalism and accountability of security forces, police and judiciary (HLP, 2013, p. 31).</td>
<td>■ by 2030 significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen recovery and return of stolen assets, and combat all forms of organized crime;</td>
<td>■ prevent, combat and reduce the illicit trade in small arms, light weapons and ammunition; and</td>
<td>■ reduce by X% inequalities across social groups, amongst regions within countries and between women and men by year Y; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>■ broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global governance;</td>
<td>■ substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all its forms;</td>
<td>■ reduce the reach and extent of organized crime, especially through the provisions of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UN Global Compact, 2013, p. 15).</td>
<td>■ reduce external drivers of violence and conflict, including illicit flows of arms, drugs, finance, natural resources and human trafficking by X% by year Y (UNTST, 2014, p. 11).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>■ by 2030 provide legal identity for all including birth registration;</td>
<td>■ develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels;</td>
<td>■ promote and enforce non-discriminatory laws and policies for sustainable development (OWG, 2014a, pp. 18–19).</td>
<td>■</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
building, state-building, criminal justice, violence prevention, and development communities use different—and often incompatible—language emerging from their specific area of knowledge and intervention.

Finally, the range of proposals and options regarding peace, security, and development within the post-2015 development agenda reflect the intensely political nature of the discussion (see Table 1.2). The language of the OWG proposal under Goal 16 (‘[p]romote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels’) reflects these tensions (OWG, 2014a, p. 5). It used very broad language, avoided the words ‘security’ and ‘safety’, and linked peace promotion to sustainable development. The resulting proposal has the advantage of being politically more acceptable, while still capturing the particular and significant impacts of armed violence and physical insecurity in specific targets and indicators (such as violent deaths or violence against women and children). Table 1.2 lists the various targets under Goal 16.

Given the difficulty in achieving this outcome (negotiations over this goal on the last day of discussions lasted until 4 a.m. on 19 July), it remains highly uncertain whether these different policy worlds (and vocabularies) can be reconciled around a consolidated and consensual proposal (FES, 2014, p. 4).

Politics and practicalities of peace and security goals

In early 2014 the post-2015 debate re-entered the UN General Assembly with the publication of the UN Secretary-General’s synthesis report on the post-2015 agenda, The Road to Dignity, and the modalities for the negotiations (UNSG, 2014). Negotiations will be based upon the Open Working Group’s proposal and will follow the rules and procedures of the General Assembly; the International Conference on Financing for Development in July 2015, as well as the Special Summit on Sustainable Development Goals in September 2015, will provide the opportunity to ‘chart a new era of sustainable development’ (Kamau and Donoghue, 2014; UNSG; 2014). Although the OWG proposal—which included 17 goals and 169 targets, compared to 8 goals and 21 targets for the MDGs—was the basis of work, the discussion entered a different phase. Prime Minister David Cameron of the UK, for example, proposed ten or 12 goals, while others focused on trimming the list of targets (Guardian, 2014). Although there are political obstacles and practical considerations regarding a peace and security goal, this section concentrates on the practical considerations around targets and indicators for such a goal, after briefly highlighting the political dynamics.

To begin, many states in the G-77 argued that an explicit security-oriented goal could be interpreted as a foundation for greater international oversight and even potentially intervention on matters essentially within their domestic jurisdiction, thereby possibly undermining state sovereignty (Elgin-Cossart and Slotin, 2014a; FES, 2014). Other states feared that the securitization of development assistance would result in a more ‘geopolitical’ focus for aid delivery in the future, for example if security interests were to exploit development cooperation for political gain, or if development assistance were to find itself in direct competition with security expenditures (Trachsler, 2008). The absence of any reference to disarmament or military spending reductions—principally Northern responsibilities—also raised concerns in some quarters. Similarly, at the domestic level, security, conflict, and violence
are highly political topics that link directly to the state’s relationship to its population, state capacity, and legitimacy. Such politics of security can already be observed in several cases, as Box 1.2 shows. Any language that uses ‘security’ is sensitive among member states, whereas issues such as sustainability, peace, and safety seem to trigger less resistance among the parties involved in the discussions (FES, 2014).

Countries such as Brazil, China, India, and South Africa play an increasing role in shaping the post-2015 development framework, yet none of these countries has, for example, endorsed the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (Saferworld, 2012). These countries also oppose outright the inclusion of a goal on peace and security in the post-2015 framework. There is a strong call upon states from this group of countries to focus on the core of the post-2015 framework, which should be poverty alleviation. States with such concerns also tend to highlight that the Rio+20 outcome document does not have a peace, security, and governance pillar; they fear that a debate around these elements will ‘deviate our focus from dealing with the essential social, economic and environmental challenges of sustainable development’ (Saferworld, 2014, p. 8). There also seems to be a strong belief among some states that peace and security are a result of development, with statements during the OWG sessions reflecting the idea that ‘conflicts start from poverty and inequalities’ (Saferworld, 2014, p. 10). Such statements fail to recognize the circular and mutually reinforcing relationship between peace, security, and development—and the role that safety and security promotion can play in achieving sustainable development.

Despite these complexities, many states—probably a majority—agree on the need to include a goal on peaceful and stable societies within the new development framework. As noted by Uganda, ‘addressing conflict prevention, post conflict peacebuilding, and promotion of durable peace, rule of law and governance is critical for the achievement of sustainable development’ (Saferworld, 2014, p. 11).

**Box 1.2 The politics of security and violence data**

It may come as no surprise that data on peace and security is politically sensitive, even in countries that are not experiencing armed conflict (see Box 2.1), as recent cases show. In Venezuela, for example, the government stopped publishing crime statistics, including homicide data, in 2005 (Ramsey, 2011). Moreover, shortly before legislative elections in 2010, the Venezuelan press was forbidden to publish violent or gory photographs for one month, as the government claimed that such visuals could affect the psychological well-being of youths and adolescents (CPI, 2010; Economist, 2014; Reuters, 2010).

In Honduras, a difficult relationship between the violence observatory at the National Autonomous University of Honduras and the Security Ministry persists. Data checked by the observatory’s technical working group does not appear to correspond with the data published by the National Police—and the discrepancies seem to be growing (El Heraldo, 2014b). In 2013, the official homicide figure for the first half of the year was 2,629, whereas the observatory’s figure stood at 3,547 (Southwick, 2013). As a consequence, the police no longer shares data with the observatory, jeopardizing the latter’s capacity to publish up-to-date and verified data on homicides (Cáceres, 2014; El Heraldo, 2014a; Southwick, 2013).

In El Salvador, the gang truce initiated in March 2012 triggered debates not only concerning the acceptability of government negotiations with criminal organizations, but also regarding the impact of the truce. The Forensic Institute published information on homicide and disappearances that differed starkly from the figures released by the Ministry of Security, and that called into question the impact of the truce. Differences between authorities and the Forensic Institute resulted in the firing of the statistical director and other members of the team at the Forensic Institute, which had been ordered not to publish data on homicides and disappearances (Valencia and Arauz, 2012). By no means is the debate resolved. The years 2013 and 2014 saw the discovery of mass graves and the current government is very critical of the truce (see Box 2.4).

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The practicalities of peace and security targets in the post-2015 framework

The MDGs remain the most widely accepted example of a development initiative that links goals with concrete targets, agreed benchmarks, and indicators. Over the past 15 years, they have spurred governments around the world to move from ‘opinion-based’ towards ‘evidence-based’ policy-making and programming around national and global development objectives. Whatever the outcome of the post-2015 process, it is crucial to assess the utility of the various potential targets and indicators that have been proposed.

If a peace and security goal is accepted in some form close to the Open Working Group goal of ‘promot[ing] peaceful and inclusive societies’, how could a security, safety, and violence reduction-related target be formulated, and what kinds of indicator would be feasible and measurable?

While targets and indicators have not given rise to political debates such as those around goals, there has been extensive discussion—based in large part on the experience with the MDGs—around the requirements for their effectiveness. Among the proposed targets listed in Table 1.2, reducing violent deaths (and all forms of violence) is a recurrent element—and it is the focus of this section. The measurement of and indicators for all proposed and agreed targets is important, yet these issues are beyond the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, the focus on measuring violent deaths will highlight some of the challenges in developing appropriate indicators for the general goal of peaceful and inclusive societies.

At the outset, there is some ambiguity in the OWG proposal to reduce all forms of violence and associated deaths significantly. This would logically include deaths from conflict, terrorism, homicide, and so on, which this report addresses in
Chapter Two. However, ‘associated deaths’ could also refer to ‘indirect deaths’, such as deaths that occur in conflict- and high-violence-affected settings because of a lack of access to basic medical care, clean water, or adequate food and shelter (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008, pp. 33–39). It could also include forms of violence against women and children that are not lethal but nonetheless have a serious impact on societies (see Box 5.2.) or non-lethal injuries from violence (see Box 2.6), neither of which is covered in the discussion below. This expansive vision of reducing ‘all forms of violence’ clearly has a wider coverage than intentional or direct deaths due to violence.

One of the most important shifts in the period from the Millennium Declaration (2000) and the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004) was the move away from a narrow focus on violence and insecurity related to armed conflict, towards a more holistic focus on armed violence. In both of these early statements, goals focused on reducing conflict between and within states, promoting disarmament, or developing strategies to combat terrorism and transnational organized crime (Picciotto, 2006, p. 119). As Table 1.2 shows, however, today’s language clearly focuses on the broader phenomenon of armed violence and recognizes that only a small proportion of victims of violence die in conflict zones. The Global Burden of Armed Violence reports have been elaborating such an approach since 2008, drawing together all forms of violent deaths, without distinguishing between criminal and conflict-related violence, and including categories usually overlooked, such as manslaughter and legal interventions. Table 1.3 presents the different indicators and sources as they are used in subsequent chapters to explore data, trends, and patterns of contemporary armed violence.

A consensus has thus emerged that the ‘concept of violence is clear, it is concise and it is measurable’ (UNTT, 2012a, p. 9). The ‘violent deaths’ approach to measuring progress towards one aspect of a peace and security goal—the measurable reduction of violent deaths expressed as a rate per 100,000 people—thus reflects some important strengths, but also faces some challenges. In general, indicators for measuring progress towards peace and security should:

- be applicable to, and comparable across, all countries;
- be clearly linked to the goal and target(s);
- be collectable, within the capacity of states and other relevant organizations;
- be timely (states should report at the minimum annually on changes and progress);
- be based on a well-established methodology; and
- ‘go beyond advocacy to policy, providing support for the debate, implementation and assessment of policy’ (UNDP, 2013c; UN, 2014).

Putting violence and insecurity at the centre of monitoring and measurement means the indicator is generally applicable to, and comparable across, all countries, whatever forms of violence they endure. Within a field cluttered by a range of concepts and definitions (fragility, state collapse, conflict-affected and fragile settings, and criminal violence, among others), a holistic focus on the violent act without regard to its motives is a comparative strength. Such an approach has also been deemed ‘collectable’ by a variety of authoritative actors. As the Task Team on the post-2015 Development Agenda concluded:

much progress has been made in measuring violence and insecurity, particularly regarding the
In the criminal justice system, intentional homicide is meant to illustrate a range of different sources that can be used (and that are used in this report) to measure the human impact of violence. Not mutually exclusive and sometimes overlap; for example, ‘direct conflict deaths’ include ‘battle-related deaths’, ‘one-sided violence’, and ‘non-state violence’. The table provides definitions of deaths due to armed conflict only, though the term casualty can also include people who are injured. This approach focuses on documenting either ‘the deaths of individual people from conflict violence (e.g. listing individual victims and the circumstances of their deaths)’ or ‘separate events or incidents in which deaths from conflict violence occurred (e.g. listing dates and places of separate incidents of violence and the numbers killed in each)’ (Minor, 2012, p. 4).

In counting direct conflict deaths, the GBAV approach is to record victims of lethal violence in different settings affected by collective or organized forms of violence or armed conflict. Various incident-based reporting sources are integrated in this process; the applied methodology is to choose the best available estimate for each country identified as suffering from armed conflict. For more information, see the online methodological annexe of the 2011 edition of the GBAV (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2012).

**Table 1.3** Available indicators for violent deaths explained

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>International organizations that provide definitions</th>
<th>Possible international sources</th>
<th>Possible national sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intentional homicide/assault leading to death</td>
<td>UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Health Organization (WHO)</td>
<td>UNODC, WHO, international crime and violence observatory data</td>
<td>Police and crime statistics, public health statistics, national crime and violence observatories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-intentional homicide</td>
<td>UNODC, WHO</td>
<td>Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), UNODC, WHO, observatory data</td>
<td>Police and crime statistics, public health statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal intervention deaths</td>
<td>UNODC, WHO</td>
<td>PAHO, UNODC, WHO, observatory data</td>
<td>Police and crime statistics, public health statistics, national crime and violence observatories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle-related deaths</td>
<td>Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)</td>
<td>UCDP</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-sided violence</td>
<td>UCDP</td>
<td>UCDP</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-state violence</td>
<td>UCDP</td>
<td>UCDP</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties of conflict</td>
<td>Every Casualty</td>
<td>Iraq Body Count, Syria Tracker, UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
<td>Casualty recorders such as Conflict Analysis Resource Center, Syrian Observatory for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct conflict deaths</td>
<td>GBAV</td>
<td>Multiple sources approach, best estimate</td>
<td>Multiple sources approach, best estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism victims</td>
<td>GBAV 2011</td>
<td>Global Terrorism Database, International Institute for Strategic Studies, National Counterterrorism Center (US)</td>
<td>Various national reporting systems</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

This table presents indicators currently available to measure violent deaths occurring in different settings and representing different definitions of such deaths. They are not mutually exclusive and sometimes overlap; for example, ‘direct conflict deaths’ include ‘battle-related deaths’, ‘one-sided violence’, and ‘non-state violence’. The table is meant to illustrate a range of different sources that can be used (and that are used in this report) to measure the human impact of violence.

In the criminal justice system, *intentional homicide* is defined as the ‘unlawful death purposefully inflicted on a person by another person’ (UNODC, 2014, p. 9). *Deaths due to assault* (or homicides in the public health system) are defined as ‘injuries inflicted by another person with intent to injure or kill, by any means. Excludes injuries due to legal intervention and operations of war’ (CDC, n.d.).

*Non-intentional homicide* can be divided into two categories: ‘killing through recklessness or negligence (as for example for dangerous driving or professional negligence) and a de facto intentional killing that is not considered as such due to certain specific mitigating circumstances such as provocation (non-negligent manslaughter)’ (UNODC, 2011, pp. 87–88).

*Legal intervention deaths* include ‘killings by the police or other law enforcement agents in the course of arresting or attempting to arrest lawbreakers, while maintaining order, or during other legal actions where they are caused by use of force by law enforcement acting in accordance with the United Nations […] Basic principles on the use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials’ (UNODC, 2014, p. 102). In the public health system, deaths due to legal intervention are defined as any injury sustained as a result of an encounter with any law enforcement official, serving in any capacity at the time of the encounter, whether on duty or off duty. This includes injury to law enforcement officials, suspects, and bystanders (Dalgleish, 2013, p. 268).

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program provides a series of categories of deaths that occur in so-called conflict settings. These include: *battle-related deaths*, which involve ‘the use of armed force between warring parties in a conflict dyad, be it state-based or non-state, resulting in deaths’; *one-sided violence*, defined as the ‘use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organised group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths in a year’; and *non-state violence*, defined as the ‘use of armed force between two organised armed groups, neither of which is the government of a state, which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year’ (UCDP, n.d.).
Several other analyses have also underlined the advantages of a unified approach to armed violence and endorsed a ‘violent deaths’ indicator as a plausible pathway towards measuring progress in the reduction of violence (Denney, 2012; HSRP, 2014). The violent deaths approach can—at least in principle—capture a range of acts that are not otherwise captured in more narrowly focused data, maximize comparability, avoid undercounting, and remain feasible, even though it focuses on one element of the overall target.

In practice, however, there are some limitations to the methodologies currently being used or under consideration, although these are surmountable with careful analysis and improved data collection. At the global or aggregate level, the focus on ‘homicides’ plus ‘conflict-related deaths’ as an indicator that covers all countries and captures all forms of lethal violence, entails some significant gaps and omissions, as highlighted in Boxes 1.3 and 1.4.

In addition, large regions of the world lack national data collection efforts and capacities to record and report on violent deaths, including homicide statistics. Conflict-affected or fragile settings often suffer a deterioration of state institutions and priorities shift away from data collection towards more urgent needs. Coverage can also be patchy in countries that lack a strong state presence (such as where police presence is weak). All of these factors can weaken the quality or even availability of data needed to count violent deaths. Finally, data on security and crime is highly political. Data collection can be hampered due to diverse political interests, and some institutions or states may simply stop reporting on certain crimes and

**Box 1.3 Monitoring lethal violence**

Measuring and monitoring progress towards the reduction of violent deaths is a challenging but feasible task. Various reports that fed the debate around the post-2015 framework and associated targets have presented different proposals regarding how to measure violent deaths. For example, the UN Task Team proposal suggests measuring violent deaths via battle-related deaths and homicides (UNTT, 2012a, p. 3); it adopts a unified approach to armed violence, yet does not fully incorporate the wide array of sources that record violent deaths from public health statistics, criminal justice sources, and data produced on deaths in crises and conflict settings.

Other proposals go beyond that of the Task Team: the UN Technical Support Team and the UN Statistical Division provided proposals that referred to the Institute for the Economics of Peace Global Peace Index and the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicator basket, among other potential sources. Yet many of the different approaches proposed risk undercounting violent deaths in crisis situations that do not meet certain criteria for full-scale conflict, but that are not captured by a country’s homicide statistics, criminal justice system, or conflict and political violence databases. In Egypt, for example, homicide figures are generally low, but recent events have proven particularly lethal, with a high number of deaths concentrated in the 2011 post-revolution instability affecting the country. Homicide records for 2011 capture approximately 990 deaths, whereas in January and February 2011 at least 841 people were killed in unrest (ANHRI, 2012; Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2014). The battle-related deaths recorded for this time period only amount to 31 (UCDP, 2014); if the ‘homicide plus battle deaths’ focus were applied, around 800 deaths in Egypt alone would thus go unaccounted for.

The use of lethal force by state agents is not counted as homicide either. In some jurisdictions, police and extra-judicial killings account
for a significant proportion of lethal violence, contributing to general insecurity among a population. In Nigeria in 2008, for instance, close to 2,000 homicides were recorded, yet another 857 deaths are registered as killings during legal interventions and are not included in homicide data (CLEEN Foundation, n.d.). If these killings were included in the homicide count, the number of violent deaths would increase by nearly 50 per cent for Nigeria alone. Similarly, in Venezuela, about 19,330 homicides were reported for 2012, whereas another 3,400 deaths were recorded as fatalities due to legal intervention (OVV, 2011; PROVEA, 2013, p. 405). If killings during legal interventions were to be excluded from lethal violence statistics, more than 4,000 deaths would go unreported for Nigeria and Venezuela alone.

In addition, ‘homicide’ is a legal category that is often linked to specific decisions within a criminal justice system (such as the likelihood of a successful prosecution). Whether a killing qualifies as a homicide in the criminal justice system (such as in police statistics) can depend on the motivations and involvement of perpetrators, as well as on the degree of responsibility of the persons involved (Smit, de Jong, and Bijleveld, 2012, p. 5). A mapping study of definitions and typologies of homicide shows that within 35 countries in Europe, there is considerable variation as to what is included and excluded under homicide and that ‘in fact, almost no pair of countries uses the same homicide definitions’ (p. 15). Efforts to standardize criminal justice definitions and statistics will certainly constitute an important part of global target setting.

An analysis of GBAV data suggests that if the monitoring of violence relied only on homicide and battle-related deaths data, the overall estimate would exclude approximately 93,000 violent deaths per year worldwide (or about 18 per cent of the total) (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2014). At the country level, the number of deaths omitted would vary between a few dozen to hundreds or even thousands in the most extreme cases.

Table 1.4 shows the potential gaps in coverage if violent deaths comprised only ‘homicide’, only ‘battle-related’ deaths, or both. In contrast, the more comprehensive GBAV approach captures not only homicides, but also killings during legal interventions, manslaughter (due to violence), deaths in political or social crises, and conflict deaths beyond battle-related deaths (see Box 2.1).

Monitoring lethal violence is not a simple task, yet it is clearly a feasible undertaking. As goals and associated targets ‘get more ambitious, the quality, frequency, disaggregation and availability of relevant statistics must be improved’ (UNTST, 2014). Although common statistical standards on measuring ‘peaceful societies’ do not yet exist, the acceptance of a goal on peaceful and stable societies would catalyse conceptual development; it would also represent a significant step forward in compiling and reporting data on ‘key conditions and governance structures associated with most development indicators in the MDG framework’ (UN Statistics Division, 2014, p. 181).

Violence observatories across the world record a wide array of data on violence—mostly focusing on violent deaths rather than deaths that fit the legal definition of homicide; in Venezuela, for example, the human rights organization PROVEA tallies killings that result from assaults, legal interventions, and other lethal violence to generate one final figure for all forms of violent deaths (PROVEA, 2013). The Geneva Declaration Secretariat—through its GBAV database—has recorded lethal violence data since 2003. Such unified approaches are valuable in the assessment of global, regional, and national progress towards the reduction of violent deaths.

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**Table 1.4** Estimating annual lethal violence figures using GBAV data for 2007–12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Homicide only</th>
<th>Battle-related deaths only</th>
<th>UN Task Team proposal (homicide and battle-related deaths)</th>
<th>GBAV database</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>377,000</td>
<td>37,941</td>
<td>ca. 415,000</td>
<td>508,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2014)
Casualty recording strives to achieve a comprehensive, systematic, and continuous documentation of individual deaths and injuries from armed violence. It involves documenting as much information as possible about incidents and individuals, including: dates and locations of incidents; numbers of and demographic or other identifying details about casualties; descriptions of the means of harm to individuals, such as weapons used; and a record of the sources used to document these details. Governments, intergovernmental organizations, and civil society can and do undertake this work in various challenging contexts.

Casualty recording’s core premises are that every violent death must be acknowledged and that all the victims of armed violence (including survivors and the families of those killed) should be acknowledged in a way that upholds their rights and dignity. Signatories of the Geneva Declaration have committed to recognizing and ensuring the rights of victims of armed violence. Without a comprehensive understanding of who these victims are, effective action cannot be taken. In this context, casualty recording is an essential first step. Detailed, systematic casualty recording also contributes to the measuring and monitoring of armed violence, which informs policy designed to address and reduce it.

The UK-based NGOs Oxford Research Group and Action on Armed Violence have researched the casualty recording practices of states, the UN, and civil society, demonstrating the benefits of this work to these different actors, to policy-makers, and to violence-affected populations (Minor, 2012; Miceli and Olgiati, 2014; Beswick and Minor, 2014). Documented uses of casualty recording include: supporting victims’ rights, providing information useful for the provision of assistance as well as acknowledgement through memorialization; contributing information to accountability procedures and transitional justice; informing the assessment of conflict environments for action by humanitarian responders; contributing to the research and analysis of violence; and informing effective advocacy with conflict parties, in order to change policies and better protect civilians.

An analysis of methods used by 40 different casualty recorders—predominantly NGOs focusing on conflict—found that useful casualty recording can be undertaken even in difficult conditions (Minor, 2012). Casualty recording can be approached in a variety of ways, depending on its purpose and on external circumstances, including the sources and investigative techniques available; the intensity of violence or degree of accessibility; and the political space available for casualty recording. Different approaches are associated with varying levels of certainty, confirmation, and detail. Nevertheless, all approaches to casualty recording have their uses or benefits; they can be conceptualized as summarized in Figure 1.1. Two brief case studies of casualty recording by different types of actors follow.

An example of UN casualty recording on the ground is the work of the Human Rights Unit of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, which has systematically recorded the civilian casualties (deaths and injuries) of the armed conflict in Afghanistan since 2007 as part of its protection of civilians work. Under UN Security Council Resolution 2096, the Mission is ‘to monitor the situation of civilians, to coordinate efforts to ensure their protection, to promote accountability’ (UNSC, 2013, para. 7(c)). The Human Rights Unit meets these responsibilities through advocacy with parties to the conflict on actions and policies that harm civilians, relying on the evidence base of detailed, systematic, and credible casualty data. Its efforts have borne the most fruit with respect to the International Security Assistance Force, which revised tactical directives in response to Unit data that revealed which policies or tactics were causing the most civilian harm.

The Human Rights Unit’s methodology for casualty recording involves the active investigation of incidents by field staff, according to centrally standardized procedures. Source material, including eyewitness accounts, is assessed for credibility and reliability, incidents are verified through three independent sources, and information is checked at the regional and central levels. The procedure places emphasis on consistency and accuracy, despite challenges of underreporting due to access and safety issues.

While the Human Rights Unit’s casualty recording is relatively well resourced, civil society groups with limited resources are also able to record casualties, including where state or other entities’ capacities or will to collect information about violence is lacking. These civil society groups are sometimes among the few data sources available that can provide insight into patterns of violence over time. Frequently, such groups’ existence is precarious due to their lack of resources.

The Mali Casualty Count is an example of an effort to record casualties using a civil society network. The goal was to contribute...
facts that could serve as a starting point for a comprehensive public record of the human cost of violence in Mali, particularly since—but also prior to—1990. Growing out of a long-standing engagement between a UK-based development practitioner and a Malian contact, the project was coordinated by British and Mali-based volunteers. The focus was on Tuareg areas, mainly covering Tuareg civilians who had allegedly been killed by state forces. Although the project sought to be inclusive, the researchers acknowledged that their data was partial.

The Malian coordinators collated reports of civilian casualties from networks of individuals and organizations, whose coverage dictated the extent of the data. The data was cross-checked as much as possible and drawn from sources with which the coordinators had long-standing relationships. Analysis of the data published in March 2014 showed a trend of increased civilian harm following the arrival of international peacekeeping forces in areas previously under the control of non-state armed groups. The authors suggest that the presence of international forces facilitated the movement of Malian troops into areas long held by their adversaries, resulting in retaliation and increased civilian casualties.

Notes:
1. For a discussion and examples, see Casualty Recorders Network (n.d.a).
2. For further information, see Casualty Recorders Network (n.d.b).
3. This case study is based on Beswick and Minor (2014).
4. This case study is based on conversations between the NGOs Mali Casualty Count and Oxford Research Group, 15 October 2013 and 16 December 2013.
events for political motives (see Box 1.2). The inclusion of a goal on peaceful and stable societies and associated targets would undoubtedly have a positive impact on data collection capacities in settings where such information is not available, catalysing more efforts in this area, as occurred with the MDG process.

Despite the utility of ‘violence reduction’ as a target, associated pitfalls should be borne in mind. For instance, while investments in better data-gathering and public awareness can allow for enhanced reporting and recording of victimization, these improvements can inadvertently create the impression that rates have increased (Baumer and Lauritsen, 2010). Conversely, rates can appear to decrease in response to reductions in funding for data collection or changes in classification procedures. Some of the reported drops in El Salvador’s homicide rate after the 2012 gang truce, for example, may have been the result of altered classifications of suspicious deaths. A spike in disappearances may also have masked the actual number of homicides (Valencia and Arauz, 2012; see Box 2.4).

Conclusion

Despite ongoing debates, there is growing evidence and recognition of the negative—and reciprocal—interactions between development, insecurity, and violence. Violence and insecurity affect societies beyond human loss and injuries, as people are forcibly displaced, businesses close, investments fall, and people migrate or are displaced. Development achievements are undermined or rolled back by insecurity, as evidenced by the fact that the majority of countries failing to realize at least one MDG are fragile or conflict-affected. On the flip side, failing to achieve development and greater equality is recognized
as a significant driver of conflict and insecurity. This growing body of evidence points towards the need to acknowledge the centrality of a goal on peaceful and stable societies within the post-2015 development framework to ensure sustainable development. It also highlights that achieving reductions in the human cost of armed violence and insecurity constitutes a development goal in itself. The growing agreement and support of states and organizations for the inclusion of a goal on peaceful and stable societies within the post-2015 development framework is a promising step forward.

Measuring and monitoring progress with respect to such a goal is not without challenges for states and the international community. Harmonization, standardization, and capacity- and institution-building will be necessary to provide the grounds on which progress can be monitored towards building peaceful societies. However, the catalysing force the definition of a peace goal would entail, along with the generation of new and more fine-grained data, would not only help states and the international community to report on progress towards specific targets, but would also contribute to establishing security promotion and violence reduction policies on a stronger, more ‘evidence-based’ footing. The foundations for standardized indicators and harmonized practices do exist, at least for a ‘lethal violence’ indicator.

This chapter focuses in particular on one potential target—the measurement and monitoring of progress towards reducing violent deaths (or lethal violence, as defined in Chapter Two). The measuring and monitoring of lethal violence—if approached carefully and holistically—appears as a strong candidate for an indicator (as opposed to ‘homicide only’ or ‘conflict deaths only’) for measuring how a country or a territory advances towards peace and security goals and targets. The chapter also shows that such an indicator already exists and that its feasibility has already been tested in the Global Burden of Armed Violence reports.

Violence and insecurity are not issues whose impact is confined to least developed countries, although they may suffer from the most severe consequences. All societies deal with forms of insecurity that could be addressed with programmes and policies to achieve measurable reductions in violence, and improvements in security and public order. Many of these programmes and policies could benefit from being scaled up and cross-fertilized to other regions and countries. International targets enshrined in the post-2015 process would facilitate this process and would help the donor community to focus its efforts on evidence-based policies and programmes that have a proven record of reducing violence and fostering peace and stability, coupled with an increased capacity to monitor the effectiveness of national and international policies.

Regardless of whether the post-2015 development agenda incorporates, in the final analysis, a goal on peace and security (with specific targets and indicators), the challenge of overcoming violence and insecurity to improve human well-being and social, political, and economic development will remain an important one for the international community to tackle.

List of abbreviations

GBAV  Global Burden of Armed Violence  
MDG  Millennium Development Goal  
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  
OWG  Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals  
PAHO  Pan American Health Organization  
UCDP  Uppsala Conflict Data Program  
UNODC  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime  
WHO  World Health Organization
Endnotes

1 Following usage introduced in the first edition of the *Global Burden of Armed Violence* (GBAV), this volume defines armed violence generally as ‘the intentional use of illegitimate force (actual or threatened) with arms or explosives, against a person, group, community, or state, that undermines people-centred security and/or sustainable development’ (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008, p. 2). The definition focuses on the physical use of force and violence; it excludes concepts such as structural, cultural, and psychological violence, however important they may be in other contexts. This volume also follows the ‘unified approach’ to armed violence, its causes, and its consequences, as initiated in the 2011 edition of the GBAV. Its estimates of violent deaths (lethal violence) are presented in an aggregated fashion and reflect data from different sources, covering ‘non-conflict deaths’ (intentional homicide, unintentional homicide, deaths resulting from legal interventions) as well as ‘direct conflict deaths’ (battle deaths, civilian deaths, and deaths resulting from terrorism) (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2011, p. 11). For a full description of the data compiled, see the online methodological annex at www.genevadeclaration.org.

2 See, for example, UNDP (2013a); UNGA (2009); UNODC (2011); and World Bank (2011).

3 Among others, see Aboal, Campanella, and Lanzilotta (2013); Ajzenman, Galiani, and Seira (2014); CICS (2005); Dupas and Robinson (2012); Justino (2013); Ksoll, Macchiavello, and Morjaria (2011); Livingston et al. (2014); Pino (2011); and World Bank (2012).

4 One recent report suggests that the Syrian conflict claimed more lives during that period, estimating that 92,000 people were killed between March 2011 and March 2013 (Price et al., 2013).

5 According to the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, states are fragile when ‘state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations’ (OECD–DAC, 2007, p. 2).

6 The term ‘development’ had of course already been used to refer to economic change and societal transformation, such as in the writings of Karl Marx and Joseph Schumpeter, or in the Covenant of the League of Nations (Rist, 2002, p. 73).

7 Note that the literature on the costs of violence and the relationship between violence and development is a complex field and that this review is an over-simplification. For good reviews of some of the literature, see Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2008, 2011), Gutiérrez-Sanín (2009), Skaperdas (2009), and World Bank (2009).

8 See, for example, Soares (2006) on welfare costs of crime and violence (the value of reducing violent deaths to zero expressed in GDP); for a summary of the accounting method approach, see UNDP (2013a, p. 102) as well as Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2008). Hoefler and Fearon (2014) and Soares (2014) explore a comprehensive exercise of the accounting method and apply it to different forms of violence—conflict and non-conflict as well as lethal and non-lethal.

9 Note that El Salvador is the country with the highest spending for public security and justice in relation to GDP in the Central American region, with the rate at 2.4 per cent in 2010. Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Panama spent 2.3 per cent that same year, and Honduras and Guatemala spent 2.0 and 1.7 per cent of their GDP, respectively (World Bank, 2012, p. 39).


11 This focus on the interlinkages between armed violence and development is also a hallmark of the Geneva Declaration and associated processes.

12 For a full list of participant states and organizations, see IDPS (n.d.).

13 For a full list of the Task Team members, see UNTT (n.d.).

14 See Beyond 2015 (2014) for the full list and specific links to each of these thematic consultations. A series of regional and national consultations were also held.

15 For all the background papers and outcome documents for each of these regional and global consultations, see The World We Want 2015 (n.d.).


17 ‘The Member States have decided to use an innovative, constituency-based system of representation that is new to limited membership bodies of the General Assembly. This means that each seat in the Group is shared by 1–4 Member States.’ See UNDESA (n.d.).

18 The Outcome Document from the 68th UN General Assembly (2013) is where states agreed to bring the post-2015 and Rio+20 processes together. See UN (2013a) on the role of Rio+20 and the initiation of the intergovernmental negotiations on post-2015 during the 60th UN General Assembly.

19 Indirect deaths could represent upwards of 4–10 times more deaths in conflicts (depending on the context) than violent deaths alone, according to previous estimates (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008).
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