Chapter Four
Unpacking Lethal Violence

This chapter examines how disaggregated data on lethal violence can serve to inform effective evidence-based policy-making to prevent and reduce armed violence. In addition to providing quantitative information, this type of data can provide insight into qualitative factors such as the socio-economic characteristics of victims and offenders, locations, motives, methods and weapons used, and circumstances leading to a lethal outcome. Moreover, it allows for the generation of diagnostics, the identification of targets for interventions, and assessments of programme efficiency. Yet such data-based processes represent only one of the two complementary components that enable effective policy-making. The other component is political will—not only to promote the collection and processing of data and its public dissemination, but also to make use of evidence to develop and implement policies and programmes.

The past few years have witnessed a significant increase in the availability of systematically disaggregated data on lethal violence. This trend is clearly reflected in successive editions of the Global Burden of Armed Violence (GBAV): while the 2008 edition offers only broad regional estimates based on limited data, the 2011 edition is able to produce a global overview at the national level (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008; 2011; see Box 2.2). By the latter edition, more countries were making relevant information available, encouraged not only by advances in data collection technology, but also by an increased awareness of the importance of sharing data on crime and violence in the context of monitoring trends and measuring the impact of crime and violence prevention policies.

Like the 2011 GBAV, this volume takes a ‘unified approach’ to armed violence, meaning that it considers both conflict and non-conflict settings or, put differently, that it covers all conflict, criminal, and interpersonal forms of lethal violence (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2011, pp. 11–42). While data from conflict situations largely documents casualties, data from non-conflict environments is generally focused on homicides, as recorded by law enforcement, criminal justice systems, and public health authorities. Wealthy countries tend to have the greatest capacity to establish and maintain efficient recording systems on violent deaths, and thus to collect detailed and disaggregated data; in contrast, limited recording capacities tend to prevent effective data gathering in middle- and low-income countries, including ones that suffer from high levels of violence.

When disaggregated, comprehensive national data can reveal useful information about the distribution, intensity, and impact of lethal violence, which may be significantly higher among specific demographic groups, at particular times, or in certain areas, such as border zones or urban areas. Indeed, detailed local information can shed light on perpetrators and victims, as well as on armed actors and communities at risk (Florquin, Kartas, and Pavesi, 2014; Wepundi and Lynge, 2014).
Mis- and underreporting can weaken the reliability of data on lethal violence. ‘Honour’ or dowry-related killings, or mob killings of alleged ‘witches’, mostly targeting females, may not be reflected in homicide statistics because they are not considered by law, public consent, or prevailing cultural norms to be homicide (Alvazzi del Frate et al., 2014; Dziewanski, LeBrun, and Racovita, 2014, pp. 13–14). With families of the victims and close members of the community often involved in the killing, cases may not be reported—adequately or at all. Furthermore, law enforcement and criminal justice actors may tacitly endorse the crimes or downplay their severity, for instance by failing to carry out a proper investigation or by meting out lenient sentences (Alvazzi del Frate et al., 2014). Meanwhile, some victims of lethal violence may not be acknowledged due to inefficiencies in the criminal justice or public health sectors or because a state is experiencing destabilizing hostilities that complicate casualty recording (Minor, 2012a). To some degree, the establishment and maintenance of sub-national data frameworks that capture multiple forms of violence can help to prevent such underreporting.

This edition of the Global Burden of Armed Violence is able to rely on significantly more disaggregated data than the previous editions. Consequently, it broadens the scope of analysis, capturing manifestations of lethal violence in a multitude of settings.

This chapter finds that:

- The geo-localization of lethal events is an analytical tool that can assist policy-makers in setting priorities and designing interventions to target high-risk areas and groups, as well as in monitoring their effectiveness.

- In addition to shedding light on local dynamics in lethal violence, sub-national data allows for the detection of transnational patterns, such as increasing violent death rates in border areas of neighbouring states.

- Institutions that collect disaggregated data on casualties—be they criminal justice and public health agencies or civil society organizations in non-conflict settings or casualty recording systems in conflict zones—currently use varying definitions, methods, and degrees of coverage. Efforts are under way to establish international standards on casualty recording.

- Observatories on crime, conflict, and violence can mobilize a large number of stakeholders and can also raise the bar regarding quality standards for collecting, processing, and disseminating local and national disaggregated data on violence.

- In the context of violence reduction programming, municipal-level and other sub-national data on violent deaths is particularly relevant in that it reveals drivers of violence that are not discernible at the national level and allows for more accurate assessments of the effects of interventions.

- The collection and dissemination of disaggregated data can help to shed light on inequalities across groups and communities and can serve to inform violence reduction programming in response to changing dynamics in lethal violence. In particular, details on violent events and data disaggregated by sex, age, and other socio-demographic characteristics of victims and perpetrators can be of key significance in tracking progress towards the post-2015 development goals.

Local dimensions of lethal violence

National-level data on lethal violence tends to mask variations within countries. In contrast, sub-national data can provide details regarding the distribution of lethal incidents, armed groups,
**Box 4.1 Mapping lethal violence**

Geo-referenced technology can provide insight into spatial and temporal features of crime and violence. In particular, geographic information systems (GIS) enable the mapping of institutions, services, events, and other points or activities of interest for analytical purposes. By attributing spatial and temporal coordinates to data on lethal violence, GIS mapping allows for a better understanding of the distribution and patterns of crime (Chainey and Ratcliffe, 2005). Recent developments in this technology have resulted in low-cost software and hardware, including web applications that provide public access to open-source satellite maps. This type of technology forms the basis of approaches such as intelligence-led policing, which uses diagnostics to assess and manage risks (Ratcliffe, 2008).

One of the functions of GIS mapping is the identification of ‘hot spot’ areas, which are characterized by elevated rates of violence and a high risk of victimization. Inversely, ‘cool spots’ exhibit low rates of violence (Eck et al., 2005, p. 2). Hot spots correspond to concentrations of violence, regardless of their physical or population size; as a result, they can be analysed at the micro, meso, or macro level. At the micro level, the unit of analysis is the street corner and event data is disaggregated on the basis of addresses or GPS locations. The meso level corresponds to neighbourhoods; community mobilization, social control and prevention programmes, victim profiling, local police stations, and accountability are of relevance at this scale. At the macro level, the urban area serves as an entity that allows for strategic analysis of factors such as policy-making, the allocation of resources, levels of crime, public transportation safety, and disaster management (Quéro, 2009).

The geographical localization of violence provides key information for policing. Indeed, crime mapping has become a common component of policing strategies in many countries. A growing number of law enforcement agencies are making up-to-date street-level crime maps available online. In addition to serving as representational tools, such maps offer layers of information—including the locations of police stations or public facilities such as schools—to allow for further interpretation and cross-referencing of violent events.

The Jamaican government, for one, has been incorporating GIS technologies in its evidence-based programming and prevention activities for more than a decade (Lyew-Ayee and Greene, 2013). The Violence Prevention Alliance brings together a number of stakeholders—including government representatives, law enforcement, the Kingston West Crime Observatory (KWCO), and experts in social mapping—to plan, implement, and evaluate prevention strategies. The KWCO operates within one police division based in Kingston and involves multiple stakeholders, including the Jamaica Constabulary Force, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of National Security, and non-governmental organizations (Weekes, 2013, p. 6). The observatory collects data on serious crime and injuries from police and hospitals and uses geo-referenced information to track crime distribution and to inform the design of security interventions.

KWCO’s approach makes use of ‘asset mapping’, which involves the plotting of services, buildings, and street characteristics; crime and violent incidents are then layered over the assets, allowing for assessments of ongoing law enforcement activities and the planning or adjusting of responses to evolving needs. In Kingston, these mapping exercises revealed that police stations were unevenly distributed among city districts and that their responsiveness to crimes was consequently inadequate, highlighting the need for a redistribution of resources (Lyew-Ayee and Greene, 2013).

While the work of the KWCO has raised awareness of the need for standardized data on violence among local authorities, progress in the area has been impeded not only by a reluctance to manage and share data, but also by a scarcity of resources (Weekes, 2013). Nevertheless, in 2009, the Jamaican government established a National Crime Observatory in the Ministry of National Security, which, in September 2013, signed a memorandum of understanding with several government agencies to promote the standardization, accessibility, and sharing of timely and reliable data to support prevention and reduction efforts (Saunders, 2013).

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and communities at risk across regions, municipalities, neighbourhoods, and even streets.

A variety of actors—from law enforcement to humanitarian agencies and early warning systems—are increasingly relying on local data to conduct geo-localization. This tool can assist policy-makers in setting priorities and designing interventions to target high-risk areas and groups, as well as in monitoring their effectiveness (Eck et al., 2005; see Box 4.1). While the provision of local data and the availability of tools to analyse it are crucial to the design and implementation of evidence-based policing and programming, political will is needed not only to ensure that evidence is used to support policy decisions, but also to promote its dissemination to mobilize stakeholders involved in implementing policies and programmes (OECD, 2011). At the local level, municipalities and affected communities can play a decisive role in supporting evidence-based policing.

Map 4.1 Localization of conflict-related deaths in Syria, March 2011–September 2014

Source: Humanitarian Tracker (n.d.)
Local hubs of violence

When plotted on a map, lethal incidents tend to appear as clusters. Many armed conflicts are concentrated in spaces that do not correspond to that of national territories; indeed, these spaces can be smaller than the states themselves or extend beyond the national borders.

Map 4.1 shows that most of the conflict in Syria over the period of 2011 to 2014 was concentrated in the western part of the country. The majority of clashes occurred around the urban areas of Aleppo, Damascus, and Homs (Humanitarian Tracker, n.d.b; BBC, 2014a). The crisis in Syria has also affected neighbouring countries, where existing tensions between ethnic minorities in the cities along the border with Syria have been fuelled by the conflict (Dziadosz, 2014; Johnson, 2014).

The localization of lethal events in non-conflict settings can also be instructive. Map 4.2 shows homicide rates in the departments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, which together form a region known as the Northern Triangle. With national homicide rates exceeding 30 per 100,000 population, these countries are experiencing higher violent death rates than some conflict zones (see Map 2.1). The distribution of homicides at the sub-national level reveals large variations within...
the national territories—as well as transnational patterns. The highest levels of lethal violence have persisted along the Honduran coast on the Caribbean Sea and along the border between Honduras and Guatemala.

As reflected in Map 4.2, levels of lethal violence are acute along the three countries’ national borders, which are considered porous and prone to illegal border crossings (Espach and Haering, 2012). Along the northern border between Honduras and Guatemala, for instance, neighbouring municipalities such as Copán (Copán department, Honduras) and El Florido (Chiquimula department, Guatemala) serve as crossroads for cocaine shipments, which apparently pass through official checkpoints on the way from Colombia and Venezuela to the United States (UNODC, 2012, p. 37). Other hot spots can be found in port cities, such as La Ceiba, in the Atlántida department on the Caribbean coast of Honduras, or Puerto Quetzal, in the Escuintla department on the western coast of Guatemala (p. 38).

The geography of lethal violence in the region can largely be linked to former Mexican president Felipe Calderon’s hard-line policies to stem cartel activity. From 2006 until 2012, the drug enforcement operations involved the capturing and killing of cartel leaders, which resulted in the fragmentation of the Mexican drug trade and the establishment of new cocaine trafficking hubs and routes in the region (Lessing, 2012, p. 54; UNODC, 2012, pp. 18–19).

In addition to drug cartels, the Northern Triangle is also home to gangs: in 2012, there were an estimated 20,000 members in El Salvador, 22,000 in Guatemala, and 12,000 in Honduras (Ribando Seelke, 2014). The extent to which gangs in the region are involved in transnational drug trafficking depends on traffickers’ needs. While the Mara Salvatrucha (or MS-13) seems to have the strongest relationship with drug traffickers in El Salvador, the gang is barely involved in the trade in Honduras, where trafficking occurs mostly by air (Farah and Phillips Lum, 2013, p. 9).

To what degree the extreme levels of lethal violence in the Northern Triangle are linked to gang activities is difficult to ascertain, partly because gang-related homicides are not necessarily reported or, if they are, the circumstances of the killings may not be known. In many cases, the perpetrator remains at large, the investigation is dropped, or the killing is simply recorded on the basis of the victim’s characteristics, such as age, clothing, or tattoos. Gang-related disappearances and the clandestine dumping of bodies in mass graves further complicate the recording of homicides (Nowak, 2010, p. 53; Wolf, 2012, pp. 76–79).

In 2012, a truce negotiated between the government of El Salvador and the Mara Salvatrucha and Mara 18 resulted in a significant drop in homicides at the national level, suggesting that a large portion of the lethal violence experienced in the country had indeed been due to gang-related activities (see Box 2.4). Yet the distribution of homicides at the sub-national level reveals that the truce did not have the same impact everywhere. The comparison of municipal homicide rates 14 months before and 14 months after the truce indicates that there was no net change in homicide rates in one-fifth of all municipalities, a number of which are located along the trafficking corridors connecting Honduras and El Salvador. This implies that while gang activities may have appeared to account for the bulk of lethal violence in the country, a host of other factors may be at play, including drug cartels and organized criminal groups active in those areas (Garzon, 2013).
Data collection, protection, and dissemination

The availability of information for the geo-localization of armed violence depends on numerous factors. The most relevant is the existence of data collection mechanisms, which are often contingent on governmental and non-governmental institutions with the capacity to record and disseminate detailed contextual data on crime and violence.

In non-conflict settings, data on lethal violence is generally collected by the criminal justice system—including by the police, prosecutors, courts, and prisons—and by the public health sector, via hospitals, morgues, and vital registration systems.

The criminal justice system typically focuses on criminal cases as reported to or discovered by law enforcement, and on alleged perpetrators in investigations. Consequently, crime and criminal justice statistics generally provide information on cases, suspects, and persons who are charged, convicted, and sentenced (Alvazzi del Frate et al., 2013, p. 7; UNODC, 2014, p. 91; Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2011, p. 48). Information on victims, which tends to appear in police and court records, is rarely published in police and criminal justice statistical reports, which may, however, provide information on the circumstances or motives of killings. Meta-information on definitions, counting rules, and methodology are hardly ever provided.

In contrast to criminal justice statistics, public health data concerns mainly the victim and the causes of death. This data generally captures demographic characteristics and details on the mechanism of death, such as intentional interpersonal violence.4

In conflict settings, where the criminal justice and public health sectors may be unable to record casualties effectively, other agencies, organizations, or individuals may take on that role, either by collecting information in real time during a conflict or once hostilities have ceased (Minor, 2012b, p. 19). Casualty recording systems systematically gather data from incident-based reports produced by state agencies or intergovernmental organizations, as well as from reports produced by the press, social media, and NGOs (Sloboda and Minor, 2012, p. 6; see Box 1.4). The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, for example, gathers disaggregated information on political violence events in developing countries from a variety of sources, recording details such as the date, location, and type of event (battle, civilian deaths, or riots), the number of casualties, and the types of perpetrators. Such disaggregated data offers insight into key characteristics of violent events and episodes, such as their scale, distribution, and dynamics, as well as the motivations of active armed actors.

At the international level, manuals and guidelines have been published for the development of both criminal justice and health statistics (UN, 2003; WHO, n.d.). Nevertheless, the harmonization and comparability of statistics across countries is still limited, largely due to differences in definitions, data collection mechanisms, and coverage (Alvazzi del Frate et al., 2013; Bhalla et al., 2012; Minor, 2012b). While international standards on casualty recording have yet to be established, the preparatory work has already begun. Every Casualty, for example, have reviewed existing casualty recording practices with the aim of developing common standards for practitioners (Every Casualty, n.d.; Minor, 2012a).

In addition to the application of standards, guidelines, and good practices, the quality of statistics also depends on the availability of human, logistical,
technical, and financial resources of the involved institutions or organizations (Alvazzi del Frate, 2010).

In the process of collecting and disseminating data, the protection of the safety and rights of victims of violence, their families, and their communities is of utmost concern. The release or leaking of sensitive information may heighten the risk of harm to individuals and communities. If, for example, information on a victim’s or a perpetrator’s clan affiliation, ethnicity, or religion is not properly stored and protected, with the consequence that it is stolen, lost, or leaked, it may be used in renewed or retaliatory violence. Similar concerns apply with respect to the dissemination of street-level crime data through real-time maps, as individuals who have been victimized may become exposed to reprisals. In order to protect victims and avoid revealing sensitive information, anonymization processes can be put in place. In the mapping of crimes, for example, authorities can truncate the date of an incident to reveal only the month and the year, just as they can provide an approximate location of an event—rather than a precise address (Home Office, n.d.b).

Only when they are gathered ethically and systematically can raw numbers on violent deaths serve as useful information. Such systematic collection calls for a consistent methodology that allows for the tracking of trends and patterns against a baseline. When disseminated to target audiences, such details on violent deaths—including on the victims, perpetrators, and local characteristics of violence—can serve to inform the development of prevention and reduction strategies.

Overall, however, only a small proportion of subnational statistics on lethal violence is publicly accessible, most of it in developed countries (Alvazzi del Frate, 2010; UNODC, 2014, p. 101). Notably, the quality and completeness of police reports varies greatly across countries, ranging from simple tabulations on the frequency of events at the national level to in-depth analyses that provide details on perpetrators, victims, instruments, and circumstances of killings as well as charts and maps illustrating the sub-national distribution of violence (UNODC, 2014, pp. 99–102).

The flow of data on lethal violence should be transparent, sustainable, and cross-sectoral—from the primary sources to the institutions tasked with the collection and analysis of the data as well as the dissemination of findings, to the policy-makers who use the research results to inform their programming. Among the institutions in this chain, observatories on conflict, crime, and violence can play a key role, as they typically work within a network of stakeholders and can assist policy-makers in designing effective violence reduction and prevention strategies (Gilgen and Tracey, 2011; see Box 4.2). Observatories can engage various actors by establishing bodies such as boards, ethical committees, and scientific working groups. These bodies help to guarantee the legitimacy of an observatory, ensure the security of data, and set common priorities (Quéro, 2013b). When properly equipped and supported financially, these monitoring systems can supplement official data, enhance awareness of lethal violence in the local context, and serve as think tanks (Gilgen and Tracey, 2011, pp. 19, 51).

The urban factor

Among researchers and policy-makers, urban space has emerged as a key unit of analysis and potential site of interventions (Beall, Goodfellow, and Rodgers, 2011; ICRC, 2010). Large urban settings and capitals act as social, political, and financial hubs; the convergence of assets, services,
Box 4.2 Observatories on conflict, crime, and violence

‘Observatory’ is the term applied to a variety of institutions that deal with data on conflict, crime, and violence. They typically collect and analyse raw data for the purposes of monitoring trends; generating information for violence reduction programming and policy-making; and evaluating the impact of violence-related programmes and policies (Gilgen and Tracey, 2011; Quéro, 2013b; Wennmann, 2013). Observatories are established by or in close collaboration with local, regional, or national governments, often in private–public partnerships or with support from various donors and international organizations; they tend to engage with institutions in various sectors, including law enforcement, criminal justice, health, and education (Gilgen and Tracey, 2011).

Observatories may be grouped into different categories based on their governance structures. Some are government-led and serve as public-access or closed-access data management systems, usually providing systematic official data; others are based in university departments; and a certain number are completely independent (Quéro, 2013a). In addition to these basic models, there are observatories with hybrid governance structures, in which governmental and non-governmental components collaborate at various levels (Gilgen and Tracey, 2011, p. 30).

Some observatories operate at the local level—be it within a city, municipality, or community—while others function at the state, national, regional, or even international level (Gilgen and Tracey, 2011, pp. 31–32). Evidence shows that the impact of observatories established at the sub-national level is greater than that of those operating at higher levels, largely because the interaction with local stakeholders is more immediate and partly because the proximity allows for greater awareness of the local context (see Box 4.1).

Observatories have a variety of objectives, ranging from the centralization of information to the facilitation of cross-sectoral collaboration (OAS, 2009, p. 22). They can disseminate information to policy-makers, the media, researchers, and the broader public, enabling access to security and justice information that is generally difficult to obtain or understand. By producing baseline data and indicators, observatories can also assist governments, donors, and civil society in monitoring and evaluating crime and violence prevention policies and programmes (Gilgen and Tracey, 2011). In addition, they can help to raise the bar on the quality of local and national data on violence (Wennmann, 2013). To provide such services and have an impact in the long term, however, observatories must be able to rely on steadfast political commitment and ongoing financial support (Quéro, 2013b; Hinton, 2013, p. 2).

One example of a city-level observatory of crime and violence is that of Ciudad Juárez in Chihuahua, Mexico. Established in 2008 as a joint effort of the Juárez municipal government, the Autonomous University of Ciudad Juárez, and the United States–Mexico Border Office of the Pan American Health Organization, the observatory serves to monitor and measure the magnitude and characteristics of various forms of violence suffered by the residents of Juárez. To promote and inform local evidence-based violence reduction programmes, the observatory produces and disseminates periodic reports that provide details on homicide rates and weapons used, as well as indicators on youth violence and violence against women (OSCC, n.d.).

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and institutions lends urban areas the characteristics of key public spaces, where power resides. As a result, cities represent opportunities—for crime and violence as well as for prevention and reduction of the same (OECD, 2011, p. 13).

The strategic importance of cities also means they are likely to be hubs for conflicts and ‘target[s] for political, symbolic, propaganda, economic, or logistical reasons’ (ICRC, 2010, p. 439; see Box 4.3).
Box 4.3 Nairobi: a hub of conflict?

Like many other large cities, Nairobi suffers from many different forms of crime and violence. At the end of December 2007, as the presidential elections drew to a close, the Kenyan capital was overwhelmed by an unprecedented escalation of violence, fuelled by allegations of irregularities during the electoral process. Minutes after the results were announced, violent demonstrations poured onto the streets (KNCHR, 2008). In the aftermath, official statistics reported that nearly 1,200 people had been killed and 3,500 injured, that property damage was extensive, and that well over a quarter of a million people had been displaced from their communities. At the same time, there was a dramatic hike in domestic violence against women. The Gender Violence Recovery Centre at the Nairobi Women’s Hospital recorded 524 cases of rape, nearly 60 per cent of which occurred in the capital (McEvoy, 2012, p. 11).

Nairobi hit the headlines again in September 2013, when Al Shabaab attacked the Westgate mall, claiming the lives of at least 61 civilians and six security officers, while injuring many more (BBC, 2013; Karimi, Almasy, and Leposo, 2013). Since then, a series of fatal attacks have shaken the city (BBC, 2014b–e).

Survey data shows that city dwellers in Kenya reported feeling somewhat less safe than did residents in rural areas, including with respect to the likelihood of becoming the victim of a burglary (UNODC, 2010, p. 6; Pavesi, 2013). A recent survey on small arms and security issues in Kenya reports that people’s perceived need for protection from a range of dangers and fear of attacks by neighbouring clans have driven a demand for small arms (Wepundi et al., 2012, pp. 22, 40). Indeed, almost two out of three self-declared firearm owners indicated personal protection as one of the main reasons for owning a firearm (Pavesi, 2013).

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Urban sociologists have long been studying crime in cities by analysing the organization and social texture of urban areas (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981; Byrne and Sampson, 1986; Shaw and McKay, 1942). Recent research has provided evidence that violent events tend to ‘cluster’ in urban areas; moreover, it has shown that, compared to violence in rural areas, urban violence tends to be ‘more concentrated, more lethal, more variable, and less detectable’ (Frost...
and Nowak, 2014, p. 2). At the same time, cities have been at the vanguard of violence reduction strategies as they bring together resources and stakeholders, thereby facilitating outreach to affected communities (OECD, 2011, pp. 17–18).

A number of methodological issues should be taken into consideration with respect to city-level data on violence. While lethal violence rates may indeed be higher in cities than in rural areas, they may also be a reflection of more efficient and

Box 4.4 The fast growth of Karachi

Research shows that Pakistan’s rate of urbanization is the most rapid in South Asia. Yet although half of the country’s population is expected to live in urban areas by 2030, an urban policy has yet to be developed to support the process (UN-Habitat, 2014). Karachi, the largest city in Pakistan, has grown so fast that the size of its population is difficult to estimate, with figures ranging from 18 to 24 million inhabitants (Amer, 2013; UN-Habitat, 2014; Yusuf, 2012, p. 3).

Since the early 1970s, following the separation of Pakistan into east and west and the subsequent crisis in Afghanistan, migrants have been flowing into Karachi (Memon, 2005, p. 2). Since around the year 2000, Karachi’s industry sector has drawn economic migrants from the poorest districts of southern Punjab (Amer, 2013; Memon, 2005, pp. 16–17). Today, the multi-ethnic city accounts for a considerable proportion of the national gross domestic product (Yusuf, 2012, p. 4; ICG, 2014, p. 24). 6

Like other megacities, Karachi is experiencing high levels of inequality, with almost half of the population living in informal settlements (ICG, 2014, p. 27). Rapid, unplanned urbanization is at the root of local power vacuums, a near or total absence of basic services in many areas, and resulting competition over resources. These issues have fuelled crime in Karachi, which exhibits higher levels of lethal violence—be it political, ethnic, sectarian, or criminal—than other large urban agglomerations (p. 24).

Starting in 2006, the number of political killings began to increase, with ‘target killers’ on motorbikes carrying out hits on individuals on the basis of their political or ethnic affiliations (ICG, 2014, pp. 10, 26). In 2010, the assassination of a member of parliament triggered violent riots and targeted attacks, causing at least 90 deaths and more than 100 injuries, mostly among Pashtuns (CBC News, 2010; Imitiaz and Walsh, 2010). Law enforcement officers were reportedly granted permission to shoot on sight in an attempt to restore order (CBC News, 2010). The event marked the beginning of a steady increase in ethnic and political violence, which peaked with 2,700 reported fatalities in 2013 (ICG, 2014, p. 24; see Figure 4.1). As the exact size of the city population is unknown, those killings translate into a violent death rate of 11–15 per 100,000 population, or much higher if only residents of the city centre are taken into consideration.

An estimated 200 criminal gangs are operating in Karachi, contributing to crime and insecurity. These gangs, a large number of which are affiliated with political parties, also act as suppliers of illicit firearms (Yusuf, 2012, pp. 11–12).

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sophisticated data collection systems (OECD, 2011). Furthermore, the comparability of violent death counts in urban areas may be undercut by methodological discrepancies or shortcomings. If, for example, the law enforcement and public health sectors apply inconsistent district boundaries, their recording systems will register varying numbers of incidents for different areas that are known by the same name, consequently complicating cross-sectoral calculations and comparisons (Eurostat, 2004, p. 9; Skogan, 1975; Weisburd, Bruinsma, and Bernasco, 2009).

Another challenge inherent in measuring urban violence is the difficulty of estimating the size of a population in a specific territorial unit, especially if it has undergone rapid urbanization, as have many informal settlements (see Box 4.4). In India, the census office and another survey agency recently applied two different methodologies to estimate the size of slum populations in the country; due to definitional discrepancies regarding what constitutes a ‘slum’, their results differed by more than 20 million people: 65 million vs. 44 million, respectively (Varma, 2014). This example demonstrates that population survey practices can have a direct impact on lethal violence rates—and on their reliability.

Even in cases where population estimates are considered reliable, no direct correlation has been established between city size and levels of lethal violence. In the United States, however, municipalities with more than 100,000 inhabitants experience rates of lethal violence that exceed the national level, which is 4 per 100,000 (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2014; see Figure 4.2).

Mid-sized cities with between 500,000 and 1 million inhabitants exhibit the highest incidence of lethal violence, followed first by smaller cities of 250,000–500,000 inhabitants and then by cities of more than 2 million people. Consequently, it could be expected that the homicide rate is higher in Boston (which is home to more than 640,000 inhabitants) than in New York (which has a population of roughly 8.4 million); indeed, their respective homicide rates for 2013 were 6 and 4 per 100,000 population. In the same way, the homicide rate for that year was higher in New Orleans (with more than 375,000 inhabitants) than in Chicago (which has more than 2.7 million inhabitants)—namely 41 vs. 15 per 100,000, respectively (FBI, n.d.a).

In 2013, among US cities bearing a population of more than 100,000, the highest homicide rate—45 per 100,000 population—was recorded in Detroit, Michigan, a city of roughly 700,000 people that witnessed 316 homicides (FBI, n.d.a). Since 1985, the list of cities with the highest homicide rates has featured Detroit along with Birmingham, Flint, New Orleans, Richmond, and Washington, DC (Desilver, 2014). With the exception of Washington, DC, all of these cities have been undergoing a process of depopulation, with high rates of violence driving out wealthier residents. In contrast, the US capital has grown as its homicide rate has dropped (Capps, 2014).

While medium and small cities seem to account for a considerable proportion of lethal violence,
the data does not suggest a causal relationship between city size and homicide rates. In fact, a host of other factors affect the rates and patterns of lethal violence, including changes in socio-economic and demographic characteristics of urban agglomerates, migration flows, the availability of firearms, and the implementation of security reforms, as discussed in the following brief case studies on cities in Colombia, Brazil, and Mexico.

**Colombia: the case of Bogotá**

After Bogotá, a city of 7.6 million, the cities of Medellín and Cali—each with about 2 million inhabitants—are Colombia’s second- and third-largest urban areas, respectively. In 2012 the homicide rates were 17 per 100,000 in Bogotá, 53 in Medellín, and 81 in Cali (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2014).

Series data shows that Bogotá has witnessed a significant decline in its homicide rate since 1993, when the rate was 81 per 100,000 (FIP, 2013, p. 16). Since then, crime and violence prevention policies at the municipal level have helped to change the nature of violence in the city.

By the 1970s, Bogotá’s central area—comprising Santafé, Los Mártires, and La Candelaria—formed a hotbed of drugs, prostitution, and smuggling. In the early 1990s, the Medellín cartel made inroads into these areas, which saw a dramatic rise in the use and distribution of crack cocaine as well as armed violence (FIP, 2013, pp. 30–35). Initial interventions designed to reduce violence focused largely on implementing urban renewal programmes, which foresaw the conversion of the most affected areas into parks and other public spaces. In 2003, for example, the Cartucho neighbourhood was demolished and replaced by the Third Millennium Park in an attempt to eradicate crime, violence, and disorder and to promote security (Zeiderman, 2013).

This transformation of the urban space essentially lowered the rate of armed violence in the central area of the city by displacing it to the peripheral areas of Tunjuelito and Rafael Uribe (FIP, 2013, p. 41). In north-western areas of the city, such as Kennedy and Corabastos, the deterioration of security started in the early 1990s and persists to this day, mostly due to the concentration of criminal networks and disputes related to the drug market (pp. 42–43).

A study on the distribution of homicide in Bogotá reveals that most firearm homicides in 2011 were concentrated in peripheral areas such as Ciudad Bolívar, Kennedy, and Tunjuelito, neighbourhoods where criminal groups are active (CEACSC, 2012; FIP, 2013, pp. 33, 43). These findings suggest that levels of lethal violence decreased in areas where urban renewal programmes and other interventions were implemented.

**State capitals in Brazil**

Among the state capitals of Brazil, the city of São Paulo has the lowest homicide rate (Waiselfisz, 2013, p. 48). From 2007 to 2011, the city experienced an average of more than 1,600 homicides per year, which corresponds to roughly 15 victims per 100,000 population—much lower than the national rate of 26 per 100,000 (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2014; Waiselfisz, 2013, p. 46; see Chapter Two). But this has not always been the case. Figure 4.3 presents homicide trends for Brazilian state capitals whose homicide rates increased or decreased by at least 50 per cent between 2004 and 2011.

The series data indicates that the highest levels of armed violence migrated from the south-eastern
to the north-eastern area of the country. A steep surge was evident in Natal, a city of about 800,000 inhabitants on the north-eastern coast of Brazil, where the homicide rate rose by around 270 per cent between 2004 and 2011. At the same time, São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, the largest urban areas in Brazil, both located in the south-east of the country, witnessed decreases of 70 and 56 per cent, respectively. Analysts have also identified a process of ‘internalization’ of armed violence in Brazil, referring to a shift of high concentrations of violence from state capitals to other municipalities within states (Waiselfisz, 2013, pp. 70–72).

Over the past 15 years, two interventions have had a considerable impact on violence trends in Brazil: the National Plan for Public Security, adopted in 2000, and the Disarmament Statute of 2003 (Cerqueira, 2010, p. 52; Brazil, 2003). While the National Plan increased the deployment of security forces throughout the country, the Statute led...
to the seizure of more than 200,000 firearms and the surrender of another 130,000 in São Paulo, as well as the destruction of almost 2 million weapons nationwide (Mack, 2014; Instituto Sou Da Paz, 2010, p. 11). At the same time, inequality was becoming less pronounced in Brazil, partly as a result of growing employment and an increase in per capita income (World Bank, 2013, p. 32; Cerqueira, 2010, pp. 36, 53).

The impact of these factors on homicide rates has not been uniform across Brazil. In particular, the increase in wealth has created new poles of development in the north of the country, which have consequently attracted people and investment as well as crime and violence (Waiselfisz, 2013, p. 65). Furthermore, the increased availability of cash has created the conditions for new drug markets in northern Brazil, generating competition and resulting in an upsurge of armed violence (Cerqueira, 2010, pp. 55–62).

The marked decrease in São Paulo’s homicide rate has largely been attributed to a more efficient criminal justice system, improving socio-economic conditions, and the reduced availability of firearms (Cerqueira, 2010, p. 55; World Bank, 2013, p. 58). In comparing homicide patterns in São Paulo recorded in 1995 and 2012, a recent study finds a change in the profiles of perpetrators and victims of armed violence. In particular, a large number of perpetrators are no longer 19–25 years old, but rather 30–44; meanwhile, the proportion of female homicide victims has increased, not only in relation to domestic violence. The study also notes that firearms are now used in a smaller proportion of homicides in which the victim knows the perpetrator, as is often the case in domestic and intimate partner violence. Finally, it observes an increase in the number of cases in which the perpetrator is identified, especially
those related to disputes and domestic violence (Bento and Rechenberg, 2013, pp. 37–38). While these findings may be indicative of shifts in lethal violence dynamics, it should be noted that they rely on incomplete data for 2012, a year for which only 50 per cent of homicide perpetrators were identified (p. 9).

Cities in Mexico

As noted above, national data on lethal violence can mask variations within a country. Mexico is a case in point. In the period 2007–12, the country exhibited an annual average of 15 homicides per 100,000 population. During that same time, its lethal violence rate doubled; within the region, only Honduras experienced a similar increase in violent deaths, although its homicide rate is almost five times higher than Mexico’s (see Chapter Two).

Sub-national homicide trends reveal that, between 2007 and 2011, violence rates shot up in nine out of ten Mexican states, more than two-thirds of which experienced increases of at least 50 per cent (Pavesi, 2014). In 2012, however, nearly half of the states witnessed a decrease in homicide rates, even in states that had been affected by very high lethal violence rates. Among these states was Chihuahua, which had previously attracted international attention due to extremely high levels of lethal violence in Ciudad Juárez (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2011, p. 64; Corcoran, 2013); between 2011 and 2012, the state’s homicide rate dropped by almost 40 per cent (see Figure 4.4).

Nevertheless, Ciudad Juárez remains affected by very high levels of violence, with 49 homicides per 100,000 population in 2012 (see Figure 4.5). In 2012, Juárez was one of only two municipalities
Figure 4.4 Variations in homicide rates in Mexican states, 2011–12

Note: The states are listed in the order of decreasing homicide rates for 2012.

Source: INEGI (2014)
with more than 1 million inhabitants whose homicide rates exceeded 30 per 100,000 population, the other being Monterrey, in Nuevo León state. Overall, a significant portion of Mexico’s lethal violence is concentrated in a small number of municipalities. Indeed, the cities that exhibit at least 30 homicides per 100,000 population account for 44 per cent of all recorded homicides, even
though they are home to a mere 13 per cent of the national population (Pavesi, 2014). Five of these municipalities are located in Guerrero state while another four are in Morelo state, suggesting an emergence of new clusters of violence in the southern part of the country (BBC, 2014f).

Who is at risk?
Disaggregated statistics on perpetrators and victims of lethal violence—including their age, sex, ethnic origin, and religious affiliation—as well as on the means of killing, motivations, and circumstances of incidents can shed light on the drivers and enablers of violence. Negotiations on the post-2015 development framework have emphasized the need to enhance the quality, coverage, and availability of disaggregated data to monitor the implementation of the future sustainable development goals so as to 'ensure that no one is left behind' (UNGA, 2014, para. 17). In this context, disaggregated statistics can serve to inform and evaluate interventions aimed at

**Figure 4.6** Age of homicide victims by sex in England and Wales and Honduras, 2012–13

Male victims in England and Wales

Female victims in England and Wales

Male victims in Honduras

Female victims in Honduras

**Legend:**
- ≤4 years: 7%  
- 5–15 years: 4%  
- 16–29 years: 28%  
- 30–49 years: 41%  
- ≥50 years: 21%

**Legend:**
- ≤4 years: 11%  
- 5–15 years: 5%  
- 16–29 years: 16%  
- 30–49 years: 33%  
- ≥50 years: 34%

**Legend:**
- ≤4 years: 0%  
- 5–14 years: 1%  
- 15–29 years: 50%  
- 30–49 years: 39%  
- ≥50 years: 10%

**Legend:**
- ≤4 years: 1%  
- 5–14 years: 5%  
- 15–29 years: 43%  
- 30–49 years: 39%  
- ≥50 years: 12%

**Sources:** ONS (2014); UNAH–IUDPAS (2013)
reducing and preventing violent acts and to identify individuals and groups that are at risk.

Age and sex
A person’s likelihood of being killed varies depending on numerous factors, including age. Almost half of all homicide victims around the world are aged 15–29, with young men most likely to become victims of armed violence (UNODC, 2014, p. 14). In Colombia and the United States, for instance, one-third of all victims of lethal violence are under 24 years of age (FBI, n.d.b; Mancera, 2012, p. 124). In Brazil and Honduras, one in three homicide victims is between 15 and 24 (Waiselfisz, 2013, p. 24; UNAH–IUDPAS, 2013, p. 3).

In contrast, homicide victims tend to be older in European countries, which are home to older populations than the Americas. In Italy, fewer than 12 per cent of victims are under 24, while almost 60 per cent are 25–54 years old—nearly equally distributed in the age groups 25–34 (19 per cent), 35–44 (20 per cent), and 45–54 (19 per cent)—and the remaining 30 per cent are 55 or older (EURES, 2013). In England and Wales, 39 per cent of all homicide victims are 30–49 years of age (ONS, 2014).

Figure 4.6 compares the age structure of male and female homicide victims in England and Wales, which registered 1 homicide per 100,000 population in 2012, and Honduras, whose rate stood at 73 per 100,000 that year (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2014). The comparison reveals that while youths aged 15–29 accounted for nearly 50 per cent of the victims in Honduras, they comprised only about 25 per cent of homicides in England and Wales. Another divergence is evident among victims over 50, who account for about 10 per cent of homicide victims in Honduras but roughly 25 per cent in England and Wales.

The comparison highlights even more marked variations in the victimization rates of women of different ages. In Honduras, the age structure of victims is similar across the sexes, with 15–29-year-old men and women accounting for the largest proportion of victims. Among the women, more than two out of five victims are in that age group. In contrast, women over 30 form the greatest proportion of female homicide victims in England and Wales, with one-third in the 30–49 category and another third being 50 or older. Moreover, while girls under five account for only 1 per cent of homicide victims in Honduras, one out of ten female homicide victims in England and Wales is a young child.

Sex disaggregation of sub-national data
Disaggregated data by sex of victims at the sub-national level can highlight variations in victimization rates of women and girls within a country. In Germany, which exhibits the very low national homicide rate of 0.8 per 100,000 population, about 685 people are killed per year (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2014). Figure 4.7 shows what proportion of homicide victims are women.
in German municipalities of varying sizes. It reveals that the smaller the city, the higher the percentage of female victims. While on average, women account for 36 per cent of all homicide victims in small cities, they account for about 22 per cent of homicide victims in cities with more than 1 million inhabitants. This analysis indicates that women may be at greater risk in small cities, raising questions as to what factors may help to mitigate that risk.

Research has found a strong relationship between levels of urbanization and women’s risk of experiencing intimate partner violence: the greater the degree of urbanization, the lower the incidence of such violence (Gallup-Black, 2005; Lanier and Maume, 2009). One recent study shows that in the US state of Wisconsin, small towns exhibit the highest rate of intimate partner violence against women. As potential explanations for this relationship, it suggests factors such as geographical and

Box 4.5 African pastoralist communities and armed violence

Pastoralist communities in Africa inhabit regions where their cattle can survive, but whose limits do not necessarily match the administrative borders of any nation. They can be found in the green belts that traverse parts of West Africa and in the Central African Republic, Chad, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as farther east, in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, and Uganda.

They generally lead nomadic lives, migrating seasonally with their cattle. Tensions with other pastoralist groups as well as local residential and farmer communities often result in cattle rustling, robberies, and other forms of physical aggression. If firearms are easily accessible, such clashes can escalate into open conflict (Wepundi and Lynge, 2014).

Even if they last just a few hours, conflicts between pastoralist communities and other groups may be highly lethal. On 8 February 2013 in Jonglei state, South Sudan, a large group of armed men attacked pastoralists who were migrating to a grazing area, killing an estimated 85 people—the majority of whom were women and children—and injuring another 37, while leaving 34 unaccounted for. The subsequent UN investigation revealed that the attack had lasted 6–7 hours (UNMISS, 2013, p. 9). It had come on the heels of a series of other incidents in South Sudan, including clashes that took place near the border between Lakes and Warrap states in 2012, claiming the lives of more than 40 people who had attempted to raid cattle (Mayom, 2012).

In Kenya’s Tana region, at least 48 people died in 2012 as a consequence of an escalation of violence over land and resources between the Orma and Pomokos groups (UCDP, 2012). In Nigeria, on a single day in December 2009, a clash between pastoralists and farmers in Nasarawa state left 32 people dead and saw the burning and destruction of several houses and farms (IRIN, 2009).

These types of events are rarely registered by formal recording systems, such that information on the number and the identity of victims is often difficult to obtain (Alvazzi del Frate, 2010). Data on events of this kind tends to be collected and reported by non-governmental and international organizations that are mandated to investigate human rights violations. Fact-finding missions may be deployed by the United Nations or other organizations to document or verify the circumstances of such events, as was the case after the above-mentioned incident in Jonglei state in 2013.

Whether and how a recording system registers these types of clashes and the victims they claim depends partly on the definitions it applies and the criteria that must be met for incidents to qualify as ‘conflicts’. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program, for instance, sets intensity thresholds for conflicts, recognizing only the ones that cause at least 25 deaths per year. It would record the above-mentioned events in its database as ‘non-state conflicts’, as none of the parties involved were the government of a state (UCDP, 2013, p. 2).

Author: Anna Alvazzi del Frate
social isolation, which can limit access to neighbours, institutions, and resources, including the police, medical facilities, and the legal system (Beyer et al., 2013, p. 286).

**Populations without borders**
The roots of conflict over borders can be traced to a variety of factors, including ethnic divisions, intolerance, long-standing grievances, and nationalist or secessionist claims. A review of more than 200 armed conflicts that took place between 1946 and 2005 finds that one-quarter of them involved secessionist movements (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min, 2009, p. 327). Another study argues that similar ethnic characteristics on two sides of a border can fuel contagion effects, promoting the spread of armed violence from one state to its neighbour (Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008, p. 230).
Yet border conflicts can also be linked to the pursuit of resources. For pastoralist communities, such as those in the Horn of Africa, the crossing of borders may be an inevitable aspect of the search for water and pasture for their herds. As a result, disputes may arise with rival tribes, over land tenure, or with regard to the agricultural vs. pastoral use of land (Wepundi and Lynge, 2014). Such disputes can escalate into armed violence and tensions with security providers (see Box 4.5).

In these contexts, the documentation and monitoring of lethal violence is hampered by various factors, including the nomadic lifestyle of the communities, uncertainty regarding the jurisdiction of local authorities, and the remoteness of locations where clashes may take place. As a result, the violent deaths associated with such conflicts are not always captured by national recording systems; the full extent of the burden of armed violence, especially in pastoral communities, thus remains elusive.

**Minorities**

Disaggregated data on racial or ethnic backgrounds can also shed light on the unequal distribution of risk among communities in non-conflict settings.

Data from the United States, for example, highlights that different ethnic groups are exposed to varying rates of victimization. In 2012, blacks and whites each accounted for 49 and 47 per cent of all homicide victims respectively. Yet given that blacks represent only 14 per cent of the US population, the data points to a significant imbalance in terms of risk distribution (CDC, n.d.).

Moreover, the use of firearms in homicides is more common if the victim is a minority. Guns are involved in 80 per cent of cases with black victims vs. 60 per cent of cases with white victims. In fact, the homicide rate among blacks is 18 per 100,000 population, which is six times higher than the rate of 3 per 100,000 among whites. The difference is even greater when it comes to young men: black 15–24-year-olds account for ten times more homicide victims than their white peers, or 70 vs. 7 per 100,000 population, respectively (CDC, n.d.).

Table 4.1 presents US data on victims and perpetrators of homicide by race. It shows that the vast majority of perpetrators kill people of their own race. It shows that 84 per cent of homicides committed by whites have white victims, while more than nine black victims out of ten are killed by another black person (FBI, n.d.c).

Papachristos and Wildeman (2014) examine the factors that influence the likelihood of being killed in high-risk communities. Using police records, they analyse a sample of high-risk individuals in Chicago’s black community. As a proxy for the proneness to engage in risky behaviour, the authors restricted the sample to individuals who had previously co-offended (been arrested with someone else). They find that homicide victimization was prevalent among criminal offenders in the community, as 85 per cent of individuals who were killed with firearms had previously been arrested at least once, roughly half of them within the previous five years (Papachristos and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race of perpetrator</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Race of victim</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.1** Victims and perpetrators of homicide in the United States, by race, 2012

*Note:* Totals may not add up to 100 per cent due to rounding.

*Source:* FBI (n.d.c)
Wildeman, 2014, p. 144). This finding highlights that physical proximity to hot spots is not the only factor affecting the vulnerability of high-risk populations. The relationship between victims and perpetrators and the social context around them also shape patterns of lethal violence.

**Conclusion**

The provision of detailed information on the patterns and dynamics of lethal violence represents a step towards a more comprehensive understanding of its causes and consequences. Statistics disaggregated by different territorial units, socio-demographic characteristics of victims and perpetrators, instruments used, and circumstances related to lethal events are diagnostic tools that can guide effective policy-making. They help to define priorities for interventions and to identify targets for programmes and assistance at the local level.

In the context of violence reduction programming, urban centres are increasingly relevant as they can represent hubs of criminal activity while simultaneously offering resources and infrastructure. The analysis of lethal violence patterns at the municipal level can shed light on various dynamics at the micro, meso, and macro levels, unpacking drivers that may be concealed at the national level. It also allows for a relatively accurate assessment of the effectiveness of interventions and programmes, not least because the local monitoring institutions that carry out such evaluations tend to have closer ties to stakeholders as well as communities affected by lethal violence.

The availability of reliable quantitative and qualitative data is key to the effective measuring and monitoring of lethal violence as well as to evidence-based violence reduction programming. While the past few years have seen an increase in the availability of local and disaggregated data on lethal violence, that increase is largely limited to settings where institutions have both the mandate and the resources to establish lethal violence monitoring systems. Coverage thus remains patchy and mostly limited to the developed world. Proposals for the post-2015 development agenda call for a global commitment to the gathering and sharing of detailed, quality data to monitor progress towards the sustainable development goals and affiliated targets. Enhanced cross-sectoral coordination—such as among the criminal justice system, public health sector, and violence monitoring systems—along with the promotion of good practices and minimum standards of data quality would help to expand the availability of data to inform violence reduction policies and programmes.

**List of abbreviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GBAV</td>
<td>Global Burden of Armed Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIS</td>
<td>Geographic information systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KWCO</td>
<td>Kingston West Crime Observatory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Endnotes**

1. For more information about the unified approach, see Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2011, pp. 44–51).
2. See, for example, ACLED (n.d.), Humanitarian Tracker (n.d.a), Iraq Body Count (n.d.), and UCDP (n.d.); see also Box 1.4.
3. This holds true in countries including Australia (QP, n.d.), Canada (CPS, n.d.; SPS, n.d.), and the United Kingdom (Home Office, n.d.a).
4. Public health statistics on causes of death are generally classified according to the International Classification of Diseases, which is continually revised by the World Health Organization. According to the latest version, intentional lethal violence is classified as “assault” (codes X85–Y09) and includes homicide and injuries inflicted by another
person with the intent to injure or kill by any means; injuries due to legal interventions and operations of war are excluded. See WHO (n.d.).

5 The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights reported 1,162 fatalities while the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence documented 1,133 deaths, 3,500 injuries, and nearly 120,000 destroyed properties (KNCHR, 2008; CIPEV, 2008, pp. 334, 345–46). Estimates of the number of displaced persons ranged from 260,000 to 350,000 (OHCHR, 2008; KNCHR, 2008, p. 8).

6 Estimates of Karachi’s contribution range from 25 to 70 per cent of Pakistan’s GDP (Yusuf, 2012, p. 4; ICG, 2014, p. 24i).

7 The National Plan for Public Security increased the rate of municipal guards per capita by 246 per cent (Cerqueira, 2010, p. 52).

8 Between 1997 and 2008, the Brazilian army destroyed nearly 1.9 million weapons, which accounted for an estimated 15 per cent of all civilian-held weapons in Brazil (Instituto Sou Da Paz, 2010, p. 11).

9 The analysis excludes municipalities with fewer than 100,000 inhabitants due to a lack of relevant data.

10 The Guerrero municipalities are Acapulco de Juárez (with a homicide rate of 143 per 100,000 population), Zihuatanejo de Azueta (65 per 100,000), Iguala de la Independencia (64 per 100,000), Chilpancingo de los Bravo (44 per 100,000), and Taxco de Alarcón (42 per 100,000). The Morelos municipalities are Cuernavaca (73 per 100,000), Cuautla (50 per 100,000), Temixco (49 per 100,000), and Tlayacapan (41 per 100,000).

11 In Colombia and the United States, 35 and 33 per cent of homicide victims are under 24, respectively (FBI, n.d.b; Mancera, 2012, p. 124).

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Fuente: <http://www.deohlhonomoestatuto.org.br/downloads/biblioteca/DECLARA%CF%81O_PARA%CF%81O_U%CF%81CO.pdf>


Every Casualty. n.d. ‘About Every Casualty.’ <http://www.everycasualty.org/about>


