‘INSECURITY is also a WAR’

AN ASSESSMENT of ARMED VIOLENCE in BURUNDI

A study by the Small Arms Survey

By Stéphanie Pézard and Savannah de Tessières

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Geneva Declaration Secretariat
c/o Small Arms Survey
47 Avenue Blanc
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Copy-edited by Tania Inowlocki
Maps by Cédric Rapaille and MAPgrafix

Layout by Janine Vigus, Janine Vigus Design
Translated into English by Patricia Brutus
Translated into Kirundi by René-Claude Nyonkuru
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADDF</td>
<td>Association pour la défense des droits de la femme (Association for the Defence of Women's Rights)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APRODH</td>
<td>Association pour la protection des droits humains et des personnes détenues (Association for the protection of human rights and the rights of prisoners)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BINUB</td>
<td>Bureau intégré des Nations Unies au Burundi (United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDCPA</td>
<td>Commission nationale de désarmement de la population civile et de lutte contre la prolifération des armes légères et de petit calibre (National commission for the disarmament of the civilian population and action to combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENAP</td>
<td>Centre d'alerte et de prévention des conflits (Centre for early warnings and the prevention of conflicts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNPK</td>
<td>Centre neuropsychiatrique de Kamenge (Kamenge Neuropsychiatric Centre)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNTB</td>
<td>Commission nationale des terres et autres biens (National Commission for Land and Other Assets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>DanChurchAid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRR</td>
<td>Demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBU</td>
<td>Franc burundais (Burundian franc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDN</td>
<td>Force de défense nationale (National Defence Force)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNL</td>
<td>Forces nationales de libération (Forces for National Liberation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender-based violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSS</td>
<td>Institut national de sécurité sociale (National Institute of Social Security)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>Mines Advisory Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCVS</td>
<td>Mécanisme conjoint de vérification et de suivi (Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médecins sans frontières (Doctors without Borders)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUB</td>
<td>Opération des Nations Unies au Burundi (United Nations Operation in Burundi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palipehutu–FNL</td>
<td>Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu–Forces nationales pour la libération (Hutu People’s Liberation Party–Forces for National Liberation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMPA</td>
<td>Partis et mouvements politiques armés (Parties and armed political movements)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNB</td>
<td>Police nationale du Burundi (Burundian National Police Force)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNR</td>
<td>Service national de renseignement (National Intelligence Service)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACO</td>
<td>Taback–Coupland method</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
</tr>
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</table>
The Geneva Declaration

The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, endorsed by more than 105 countries as of this writing, commits signatories to supporting initiatives intended to measure the human, social, and economic costs of armed violence, to assess risks and vulnerabilities, to evaluate the effectiveness of armed violence reduction programmes, and to disseminate knowledge of best practices. The Declaration calls upon states to achieve measurable reductions in the global burden of armed violence and tangible improvements in human security by 2015. Core group members include Brazil, Guatemala, Finland, Indonesia, Kenya, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, and the United Kingdom with the support of the United Nations Development Programme.

Further information about the Geneva Declaration, its activities, and publications is available at www.genevadeclaration.org.

The Small Arms Survey

The Small Arms Survey is an independent research project located at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. Established in 1999, the project is supported by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and by sustained contributions from the Governments of Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The Survey is also grateful for past and current project support received from the Governments of Australia, Denmark, France, New Zealand, Spain, and the United States, as well as from different United Nations agencies, programmes, and institutes.

The objectives of the Small Arms Survey are: to be the principal source of public information on all aspects of small arms and armed violence; to serve as a resource centre for governments, policy-makers, researchers, and activists; to monitor national and international initiatives (governmental and non-governmental) on small arms; to support efforts to address the effects of small arms proliferation and misuse; and to act as a clearinghouse for the sharing of information and the dissemination of best practices. The Survey also sponsors field research and information-gathering efforts, especially in affected states and regions. The project has an international staff with expertise in security studies, political science, law, economics, development studies, and sociology, and collaborates with a network of researchers, partner institutions, non-governmental organizations, and governments in more than 50 countries.

Small Arms Survey
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies
47 Avenue Blanc, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland
p +41 22 908 5777
f +41 22 732 2738
e sas@smallarmssurvey.org
w www.smallarmssurvey.org
This study is the result of extensive collaboration between the Small Arms Survey and various Burundian and international partners. It could not have been carried out without the generous support of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, the British Department for International Development, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

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Further thanks go to our colleagues at the Small Arms Survey who were involved in the writing, editing, and publication of the report. Ryan Murray trained the researchers and data entry personnel who worked on the household surveys that were carried out in Burundi; he also supervised the statistical analysis of the results. Jasna Lazarevic was responsible for fact-checking the final report, whose publication was supervised by Alessandra Allen and Tania Inowlocki.

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The completion of this project was possible thanks to numerous individuals who were willing to share their expertise and experience in interviews and at the validation workshop that was held in Bujumbura in August 2008. The authors therefore extend warm thanks to the representatives of the Burundian security and defence forces, of Burundian civil society, the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), the various diplomatic representations in Bujumbura, and the Burundian and international NGOs on the ground, who provided their assistance, and—of course—the 1,563 anonymous individuals who took the time to answer the questionnaire.
Incamake

Incamake

birkwanisho bicira umuriro biraccha inkumbi mu Burundi, bigahitana abantu ku bwinshi buri mwaka. Nk’uko bimeze no mu bindi bihugu bivuye mu ntambara, ukurangira kw’intambara ntikwama kuzana umutekano nyakuri, haba mu ngiro canke mu vyiyumviro vy’abantu, canke ngo bihagarike ubugizi bwa nabi hakoreshejeje ibirwanisho. Ikigo cinzihine kugira amatohoza ku birwanisho bito bito (Small Arms Survey), cifadikanije n’Umurwi w’igihugu ujejwe gukura ibirwanisho mu minwe y’abanyagihugu babitunze batabifitiye uruhusha, Umuhari uharanira agateka ka zina muntu ITEKA, Umugambi w’Ishirahamwe mpuzamakungu witaho iterambere, PNUD, Ishirahamwe ny’Amashengero ryo mu gihugu ca Danemareke (Dan Church Aid) n’abashakashatsi bigenga bo mu burundi, ryarutanganiye ivyigwa vy’ukwibutwabo kurusha mu bijanye n’ubugizi birasa canke n’iyivugira ujejwe gukura ibirwanisho n’intumbero ku vyokwitabwaho kurusha mu mugambi wogugabanura no kurwanyana ubwo bugizi bwa nabi. Ivo vyigwa vyashimikyeye ku buhinga bwinshi bukoreshwa mu bijanye n’ubushakashatsi, harimwo itohozwa ryakoziwo ku ngo zirenga igihumbi n’amajana (1500) mu ntara zitandatu z’igihugu, ibiganiro n’abantu n’ubugizi birasa canke n’iyivugira ujejwe gukura ibirwanisho n’intumbero n’abilimbwa kuri rugero rw’ubugizi bwa nabi hakoreshejeje ibirwanisho n’ingar uka zabwo mu Burundi.

a) Ingene ubugizi bwa nabi hakoreshejeje ibirwanisho bwifashe mu Burundi

Ubwoko bw’ubugizi bwa nabi

Ibugi kibarabari kugwa mu gihugu cy’irwamwe agahitana abantu mu bwinshi buri mwaka. Nk’uko bimeze no mu bindi bihugu bivuye mu ntambara, ukurangira kw’intambara ntikwama kuzana umutekano nyakuri, haba mu ngiro canke mu vyiyumviro vy’abantu, canke ngo bihagarike ubugizi bwa nabi hakoreshejeje ibirwanisho. Ikigo cinzihine kugira amatohoza ku birwanisho bito bito (Small Arms Survey), cifadikanije n’Umurwi w’igihugu ujejwe gukura ibirwanisho mu minwe y’abanyagihugu babitunze batabifitiye uruhusha, Umuhari uharanira agateka ka zina muntu ITEKA, Umugambi w’Ishirahamwe mpuzamakungu witaho iterambere, PNUD, Ishirahamwe ny’Amashengero ryo mu gihugu ca Danemareke (Dan Church Aid) n’abashakashatsi bigenga bo mu Burundi, ryarutanganiye ivyigwa vy’ukwibutwabo kurusha mu bijanye n’ubugizi birasa canke n’iyivugira ujejwe gukura ibirwanisho n’intumbero ku vyokwitabwaho kurusha mu bijanye n’ubugizi birasa canke n’iyivugira ujejwe gukura ibirwanisho n’intumbero n’abilimbwa kuri rugero rw’ubugizi bwa nabi hakoreshejeje ibirwanisho n’ingar uka zabwo mu Burundi.
Umuhari Iteka watohoje bwakozwe hakoreshejwe ibirwanisho bicira umuriro. Mu Burundi kandi hibonekeza urugero runini rw’ikoreshewa ry’amagerenade mu bugizi bwa nabi (urugero rwa mirongo ibiri na kabiri kw’ijana – 22% - dutfatye ku vyatohojwe n’Ikigo gikurikiranira hagufl ivy’ubugizi bwa nabi hakoreshejwe ibirwanisho). Ibirwanisho bikoreshwa bigenda birahinduka bivanye n’ubwoko bw’ubugizi bwa nabi bukozwe hamwe n’ababukoze.

I bikorwa bibi vy’ubusuma bikorwa ku rugero runini hakoreshejwe ibiranisho bicira umuriro mu gihe bigaragara ko ibindi birwanisho bidacira umuriro bikunzwe gukoreshewa mu yandi matati yo mu miryango. Ubwoko bw’ibirwanisho bwakoreshejwe kenshi burafitaniye isano n’ingaruka mbi z’ububisha bwakozwe: urugero rwa mirongo indwi kw’ijana (70%) rw’ubugizi bwa nabi hakoreshejwe ikirwanisho gicira umuriro nk’uko vyatohojwe n’Umuhari Iteka mu mwaka wa 2007 bwarahitanye ubuzima bw’abantu bashika ku gihumbi na mirongo ine n’icenda (5049) bwongera bukomeretsa abagera ku gihe kuri mirongo itandatu na babiri (1262) mu mwaka wa 2008; ni ukuvuga urugero rwa cumi na kabiri n’ibice bitatu (12,3) ku bantu ibihumbi ijana dutfatye ku birwanisho bicira umuriro, ibiranisho bisanzwe canke biturika. Twisunze ibitigiri bishikirizwa n’Umuhari Iteka mu mwaka wa 2007, ubugizi bwa nabi hakoreshejwe ibirwanisho rwahitanye abanyagihugu basanzwe (abasivile) ku rugero rwa mirongo umunani n’icenda kw’ijana (89%). Ubwoko kandi bukunze guhitana abagabo: mu mwaka wa 2007, urugero rwa abakenyezi n’abigeme bahitanywe canke bagasinzikazwa n’ibirwanisho rwagera kuri mirongo ibiri na batandatu kw’ijana (26%).

Ariko rero abakenyezi n’abigeme nibo bahitanwa canke n’ububisha bwo gufata ku nguvu. Urugero rwa mirongo icenda n’indwi kw’ijana (97%) ku bantu igihumbi n’amajana ane na mirongo itatu na batanu (1435) bashikiwe

Abahitanwa n’ibirwanisho

Nk’uko bishikirizwa n’Ikigo cishinze gutohoza ibijanye n’ubugizi bwa nabi hakoreshejwe ibirwanisho, ubwo bukozi bw’ikibi bwahitanye ubuzima bw’abantu bashika ku gihumbi na mirongo ine n’icenda (5049) bwongera bukomeretsa abagera ku gihe kuri mirongo itandatu na babiri (1262) mu mwaka wa 2008; ni ukuvuga urugero rwa cumi na kabiri n’ibice bitatu (12,3) ku bantu ibihumbi ijana dutfatye ku birwanisho bicira umuriro, ibiranisho bisanzwe canke biturika. Twisunze ibitigiri bishikirizwa n’Umuhari Iteka mu mwaka wa 2007, ubugizi bwa nabi hakoreshejwe ibirwanisho rwahitanye abanyagihugu basanzwe (abasivile) ku rugero rwa mirongo umunani n’icenda kw’ijana (89%). Ubwoko kandi bukunze guhitana abagabo: mu mwaka wa 2007, urugero rwa abakenyezi n’abigeme bahitanywe canke bagasinzikazwa n’ibirwanisho rwagera kuri mirongo ibiri na batandatu kw’ijana (26%).

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A man brandishes a shotgun during an arms collection ceremony organized by an association of ex-combatants in the province of Muramvya, May 2006. © Pézard and Florquin

Photo
AN ASSESSMENT OF ARMED VIOLENCE IN BURUNDI

INCAMAKE

n’ako kabi bakiriwe n’likigo Seruka rwaru rugizwe n’abakenyezi n’abigeme, hagwiriymewo ndetse abana n’abigeme batarashika mu bigero.

Ariko rero ikumirwa rya cane rigirirwa abantu bafashwe ku nguvu mu Burundi rishobora kuba ryaratumyume iki giti giri kiba gito, na cane cane ku bakenyeyezi bakuze kumbure bahitamwo kutavugira hejuru ku bafashwe ku nguvu’.

Abakora ubwo bubisha

Ku ruhande rw’abantu bakora ubwo bugizi bwa nabi, anahini ni abagabo bafise munsyi y’imyaka mirongo itatu. Ku bw’libitigiri bitangwa n’igipolisi c’uburundi, iyvaha vyatororokanijwe mu mwaka wa 2006 vyakozwe n’abagabo ku rugero rwa mirongo icenda n’indwi kw’ijana (97 %), ica kabiri cabo bakaba bari bafise imyaka iri hagati ya cumi n’icenda na mirongo itatu.

Ikigo cishinze gukurirana ubugizi bwa nabi hakoreshejwe ibiwansho cerekana ko, hagati ya myandagaro na kigarama 2008, ica kabiri (49,5 %) c’libikorwa vy’ubugizi bwa nabi vyakozwe, hanyuma ababikoze bakamenekeka, vyakozwe n’abbarwanyi ba PALIPEHUTU FNL, urugero rwa mirongo itatu na kane n’ibice indwi kw’ijana (34,7 %) bikorwa n’abanyagihugu basanze (abasivile), urugero rw’icenda kw’ijana (9 %) vyakozwe n’abapoliisi hamwe n’urugero rwi munsyi na gatandate n’ibice bitandatu kw’ijana (6,6 %) vyakozwe n’abasirikare.

Ariko abasuma nabo baravuzwe kensi n’abantu barenga igice c’abitavye amathojo yo ku ng (umuntu umwe n’ibicere kanu, mu gatandatu kw’ijana). Amahera yo kwivuza ibikomere vyahindutse mu nzira nziza: n’izo ntara kandi, hana uyandagaro na kigarama, ku bw’ihezo ciyambaro kokwibagira no kuvuga ko abasubijwe mu buzima busanzwe.

Uburyo bukenerwa mu gihe ubwo bukozi bw’ikibw’iburyo

Ibloharuro bijanye n’iterambere irarwa bishira Ubunzi mu mirongo w’ijana na mirongo itandatu n’indwi ku rutonde rw’ibihugu iri kuzaye na mirongo indwi n’indwi. Ku lw’Ibigaba mupumamakungu, intara zasinzikajwe n’intambara, nka Bubanza na Bujumbura rural, taza zabhandanze gusinzikazwa n’ubukene muri iki kiringo. Ni n’izwi natara kandi, hanyineyeke Igisagara ca Bujumbura, hagwiriymewo ubugizi bwa nabi hakoreshejwe ibiwansho.

Ku rugero rwa muntu, kugurirwa nabi hakoreshejwe ibiwansho bituma hakoreshewa uburyo bw’abantu haba muri kugurira n’ubw’ukwiyambaro kuburyo ruguro rwa mirongo itandatu n’abaganga b’igahutsho abanyagihugu, na cane cane kw’uburyo bw’abantu haba muri kugurira n’ubw’ukwiyambaro kuburyo ruguro rwa mirongo itandatu n’abaganga b’igahutsho abanyagihugu.

b) Uko ivyiyumviro vy’abanyagihugu ku bijanye n’umutekano vyagiyi biratera imbere (2005 – 2008)

Kuva hatunganjiye ivygwa ku vyerekeye ibiwansho bitoto mu Burundi vyakozwe mu mwaka w’ibihumbi bibiri na gatanu (Pezard et Florquin, 2007), hariho ibintu vyinshi vyahindutse mu nzira nziza:

Ivyiyumviro vy’abantu ku bijanye n’ibiwansho vyahindutse kuva mu mwaka wa 2005, abantu benshi mu babajijwe babona yuko ari ikintu kibi gishobora bakukwega hakuba isoko ryo kwikingira umutekano.

Ivvyavuye mw’itozo vyerekeka ivyiyumviro bidahindagurika ruva mu mwaka wa 2005, ico abantu benshi mu babajijwe babona yuko ari ikintu kibi gishobora bakukwega hakuba isoko ryo kwikingira umutekano.

Iviyumviro vy’ibiri gishobora bidahindagurika ruva mu mwaka wa 2005, ico abantu benshi mu babajijwe babona yuko ari ikintu kibi gishobora bakukwega hakuba isoko ryo kwikingira umutekano.

Ivyo vyiyumviro ibiri bikorwa vy’igorekeje ruva mu mwaka wa 2005, ico abantu benshi mu babajijwe babona yuko ari ikintu kibi gishobora bakukwega hakuba isoko ryo kwikingira umutekano.

Ivyo vyiyumviro ibiri bikorwa vy’igorekeje ruva mu mwaka wa 2005, ico abantu benshi mu babajijwe babona yuko ari ikintu kibi gishobora bakukwega hakuba isoko ryo kwikingira umutekano.

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c) Hokorwa iki kugira ubugizi bwa nabi hakoresheje iibirwanisho burwanye?

Kugirango ako kabili karwanye, hari vyinshi vyokorwa: ni ngombwa gukomiza za inzego z’umutekano n’ubutungane, kwitaho cane abanyagihugu babagamwabo kibo ry’umurwi no gukurikirana, 1990, urefu abagirizwa bari mu gushikiranye n’ubwobora uzurageyeye kuri umutekano. Abagiriwe ayo mabi bagize inguvu zo kwiturwa ubutungane, imanza zirateba cane abandize abasirikare. Agisoro abasabahasa na abahutanga abasubijwe mu buzima busanzwe, amabi ashimikiye ku gitsina ageze ku rugero ruteye umutima uhagaze mu Burundi. Utwigoro two guhimiriza abanyagihugu no gushigikira abakorewe ayo mabi dutegezera kubandanya kugira ngo abo vyashikiye bvice inyuma bwa nabi bivo kuze kibizi no kubisira kubruziye. Izyitabu gishasha c’amategeko mpanavyaha cemejejwe n’Inama nshikiranji mu kwezi kwa munyonyo 2008 categezera kuba igikoreshe nyaco mu bishikira no kwitaho ukubagize bwa nabi n’ubwobora.
AN ASSESSMENT OF ARMED VIOLENCE IN BURUNDI

vy’amatongo n’ayandi matungo uronswa uburyo buhagije kugira ngo utorere umutu amatati ahasanzwe. Ihunguka ry’impunzi naryo nyene rivamwo iso ko ry’izindi ngorane, ziza ziyongera ku zindi zari zihasanze mu bijanye no kurangura ibikorwa vy’uwo murwi, bigorana kubera uburyo buke.

Birihuta kandi korohereza abanyagihugu mu bijanye no kwivuza. Muri kino gihe, benshi mu basinzikazwa n’ubugizi bwa nabi hakoreshejwe ibirwanisho nitbashobora kuvurwa mu bitara, kubera kubura uburyo. Amavuriri no mato mato nayo abanyagihugu bashikira ntigira ibikoresho n’abaganga. Iyo bivuwe nabi naho, ibikomere bishobora gusinzikaza abantu, bikanagira n’ingaruka mbi cane ku magara n’ubutunzi, haba kuri bene gukomereka canke ku miryango yabo.

Kwaka ibirwanisho abanyagihugu babitunze batabifitiye uruhusha:

Icifuwo c’ishirwaho ry’umugambi wo gukura ibirwanisho mu banyagihugu caragarutse kandi mw’itozwoza ryakozwe, nk’uko ndetse hari cagiyeyi kirazubiyimwe kenshi na mbere. Ibirwanisho bicira umurero biza imbere mu birwanisho bikoreshwa mu bugizi bwa nabi, bikaba arri navyo bigira ingaruka mbi kurusha : amatozoa yazigwe n’umuhire ITEKA mu mwaka wa 2007 arerekana ko ubugizi bwa nabi bwakozwe hakoreshejwe ibirwanisho bicira umurero bwahtanye umuntu umwe canke benshi ku rugero rwa mirongo indwi kw’ijana (70 %).

Itozwoza cyabaye ku ngo mu gutegura iki cegeranyo rirerekana ko abanyagihugu badashigikireyi intungwa ry’ibirwanisho mu gihe ata gaciro babona ko bifise mu mico n’imigeno yo’abarundi (guhiga no kurasa mu n’tumbero yo kwinonora imitsi bise naho bitahabo). Abanyagihugu basanzwe batunze ibirwanisho bavuga ku bobo babitumwa n’imvozo kw’ikwindi ku giti. Kugarunaka umwizero kenshi biragoye kandi bifata umwizero mure mure, arri bishobora kunyaruka mu gihe hobeke amashezisheyo y’amahoro n’umuhire wa nyuma ukitanze na Leta, agakurikirwa no kuwimiziro mu nzego ahabwanyi z’ubugizi na kuweza ku gahanga. Abanyagihugu birayiye ku banyagihugu kandi abangamiye kurusha baba bene kuyatunga (abikwa mu nzu kandi ukuntu agenda arononeka bishobora gitsina y'irtutsa) canke abagasho bayatwa. Amagerenade ojise ubushobozi bume n’ubwirisho bicira umurero mu bijanye no gutera ubwoba canke ukonona, arito yoyo arazimbutse kandi ashobora kwice canke gukomeretsa abantu benshi icarimwe. Ibitero vyabaye ku nzu ninyishi z’ubudandaji mu gisagara za Bujumbura mu mwaka w’2007, vyakozwe hakoreshejwe amagerenade.

Mu kurangiza, buri mugambi wo gukura ibirwanisho mu gihugu utege-reza kw’ikwindi kub ingiriyo riri hatari y’igisagara ca Bujumbura n’izindi ntara. Abanyagihugu bo mu gisagara ca Bujumbura, babona ko ibirwanisho arri ubuhyo bwiza bwo kw’ikwindire, bashigikireyi ku wo mugambi wotunganya ku banyagihugu bose icarimwe. Ubwo budasa ni nabwo bwo kigisirirakwa mu gihugu hagehe kivyumvura izohabwa abanyagihugu mu kubahimizira gusubiza ibirwanisho batunze (ibikoresho canke amafaranga). Mu gisagara ca Bujumbura, abanyagihugu bitawo bitawoza bavuzwe kenshi gusumba ahadi ku ubushomeri no kuruba akazi mu rwaruka bira nu ngorane nyamukuru zibangamiye amakaritiye n’imitumba. Mu n’tara abanyagihugu bidodgeye cane canke ingorane zo kwiyunguruza hamwe n’ingorane z’amatongo.

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Executive Summary

In Burundi, armed violence still claims thousands of victims every year. As in other post-conflict environments, the official end of the war in Burundi has not guaranteed security for the population, whether real or perceived, nor has it signalled an end to acts of armed violence. The Small Arms Survey—in collaboration with the Burundian National Commission for Civilian Disarmament and Prevention of Weapons Proliferation; the Ligue Iteka, a Burundian human rights organization; the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); DanChurchAid; and independent Burundian researchers—has carried out a study of armed violence in Burundi with the aim of providing an analysis of the situation that may inform violence reduction programming. The study made use of several methodological tools, including a survey that was administered among 1,500 households in six provinces, individual interviews and focus groups, and an analysis of the existing institutional data on the characteristics and effects of armed violence in the country.

Characteristics of armed violence in Burundi

Types of violence

The various forms of armed violence encountered in Burundi are not uncommon in post-conflict countries that have not yet completed the transition to peace. In Burundi, the most frequently observed type of armed violence is linked to banditry. Of those interviewed by the Small Arms Survey and the Ligue Iteka, 88.4 per cent (x=532, n=602) cited armed robbery and burglary as the most common acts of armed violence in their colline, or neighbourhood. The Observatory of Armed Violence confirms this perception: between August 2007 and December 2008, 50 per cent of the 1,867 recorded acts of armed violence were identified as ‘banditry’. Acts of armed violence relating to land disputes are a distant second (5.6%), followed by domestic disputes (4.9%), acts connected to the last active rebel group, the Palipehutu–Forces nationales de libération (Forces for National Liberation, FNL) (4.2%), and police blunders (2.6%). Political violence, be it in the form of threats or targeted assassinations, features regularly in the local news. Finally, the Seruka Centre, run by Doctors without Borders—Belgium, the most important medical centre treating rape victims in Burundi, estimates that 14 per cent of rapes are committed under the threat of a weapon.

Geographic distribution of violence

The provinces most affected by armed violence are the capital Bujumbura-Mairie, Bubanza, and Bujumbura Rural. Media analysis using the Taback–Coupland method shows that, unlike in other African countries such as Uganda and Nigeria, where violence occurs mainly in the street, in Burundi acts of armed violence tend to take place at night inside the victims’ homes. More than 40 per cent of survey respondents said that they did not feel safe in their homes at night.

The weapons

When asked about the types of weapon held by their fellow citizens, respondents cited automatic rifles, grenades, and handguns. In 2008, nearly 60 per cent of acts of armed violence recorded by the Observatory were committed with a firearm. Armed violence in Burundi is also characterized by a high use of grenades (22 per cent of acts of armed violence recorded by the Observatory in 2008). The weapons used during acts of violence differ according to the nature of the act and the perpetrators. Acts of banditry are committed mainly with firearms, while bladed weapons are the most common weapon used in domestic violence. The lethality of such acts depends on the type of weapon used: Ligue Iteka records for 2007 show that one or more deaths occurred as a result of 70 per cent of acts of violence committed with a firearm and 61 per cent of acts committed using a bladed weapon.

The victims

Observatory data reveals that armed violence led to 1,049 deaths and 1,262 persons being injured in 2008; it also places the rate of homicide committed with guns, bladed weapons, and explosives at 12.3 per 100,000 persons. Ligue Iteka data for 2007 shows that 89 per cent of the victims of armed violence were civilians. A majority of the victims were men: in 2007, only 26 per cent of acts of armed violence involved one or more female victims. On the other hand, female victims are more affected by sexual violence: 97 per cent of the 1,435 rape victims treated by the Seruka Centre in 2007 were female, most of them minors. The strong social stigma suffered by rape victims in Burundi suggests that the real number of victims is much higher, particularly among adult females.
The perpetrators

A majority of perpetrators of armed violence are men under the age of 30. Burundian police data reveals that men committed 97 per cent of offences recorded in 2006 and that nearly half of all perpetrators of acts of violence were 19 to 30 years old. The Observatory has shown that of the acts of armed violence that were committed between August 2007 and December 2008 and for which perpetrators were identified, Palipehutu–FNL committed nearly half (49.5 per cent), civilians were responsible for 34.7 per cent, police officers committed 9 per cent, and soldiers fewer than 6.6 per cent. Bandits were, however, identified as the principal source of insecurity by more than three-quarters of all survey respondents (76.0 per cent, x=576, n=758), followed by rebels, police officers, and ex-combatants. The boundaries between these categories are relatively fluid, as some armed bandits sometimes wear army or police uniforms in order to deceive their victims about their identity. Nevertheless, many reports and witness statements denounce members of the Burundian army, police, and intelligence service who occasionally take part in armed violence. Finally, ex-combatants seemed to be more stigmatized by the population in 2008 than they were in 2005, which may be a consequence of the relative failure of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programme.

The costs

The Human Development Index ranks Burundi 172 out of 179 for the year 2006 (UNDP, 2008c). The International Monetary Fund reports that the provinces that were most affected by the war, such as Bubanza or Bujumbura Rural, were also most impoverished during the war. These provinces (with Bujumbura-Mairie) now record the highest number of acts of armed violence.

For individuals, armed violence represents heavy medical, legal, and social costs. The medical expenses incurred as a result of one bullet wound can reach about USD 400, and a lawyer charges an average of USD 200–500 to defend a client—exorbitant prices in a country where between 41 and 90 per cent of the population live below the poverty line (IMF, 2008). To these costs must be added the psychological consequences of acts of violence in a country that has almost no psychiatrists or facilities for the treatment of
Changes in perceptions of security (2005–08)

Since the Small Arms Survey’s 2005 study on light weapons in Burundi (Pézard and Florquin, 2007), a certain number of positive discoveries have been made:

- Perceptions of weapons have changed since 2005: in 2008 more respondents said that weapons were a source of danger rather than a source of protection.
- The results of the new study show that opinions regarding disarmament are relatively stable, with as many people wishing to take part in a disarmament programme in 2008 as in 2005.

These two factors suggest that now is a more appropriate time than ever to invest in a programme to disarm the civilian population.

Yet this report also sheds light on major difficulties that remain, and on new problems that have appeared in the last three years:

- While both surveys suggest that the population broadly supports the disarmament of civilians and would support such a programme unreservedly, other factors indicate that there must be a relative return to security before people will be willing to participate.
- In spite of the progress that has been made towards a final settlement of the conflict between Palipehutu–FNL and the Burundian government, the situation remains volatile, creating a climate of uncertainty in which feelings of insecurity thrive. Acts of banditry are committed by men in uniform who might be members of the army, rebels, or simply civilians who wish to be taken for members of one or the other.
- Ex-combatants (commonly known as démobilisés) are significantly more stigmatized in 2008 than they were in 2005. More than 40 per cent of survey respondents identified them as a group in possession of firearms, even ahead of the army and the police. These ex-combatants, for whom socio-economic reintegration is difficult, are accused of resorting to banditry, of offering their services and weapons to criminals, of acting as hired assassins, and more generally of being a major source of insecurity. While difficult to verify, these allegations mean that demobilized combatants, who form a distinct group, are marginalized and no longer considered to be ordinary ‘civilians’. Meanwhile, the police force and the army are downsizing and negotiations are under way to demobilize the combatants of the FNL; since these two measures are bound to increase the number of demobilized individuals, programmes that target this at-risk group must urgently be developed.

What can be done to combat armed violence?

Action to improve the situation can be taken on several fronts: the institutions responsible for security and justice need to be strengthened; the vulnerability of populations at risk must be decreased; and measures should be taken to reduce the number of arms in circulation among the civilian population.

Strengthening the capacities of institutions with responsibility for security and justice:

- The national police force (PNB) should have fewer officers, and those retained should be better paid and better trained. A smaller workforce would be easier to manage and would make it possible to impose disciplinary sanctions more effectively. If the police were better paid, certain officers would be less tempted to take the risk of supplementing their salary by using their weapons illegally. If officers were better trained, the public at large would have more confidence in the police, and the chances of meeting the objectives of the PNB strategic plan for 2007–17 would be improved. The plan aims to turn the police into a ‘republican, modern, professional, community-based’ institution (Nzosaba, 2008b).
- The fight against the impunity enjoyed by certain perpetrators of acts of violence must become a priority. Victims are often reluctant to press charges due to the costs of taking such action and for fear of reprisals. When the victims have both the courage and the resources to bring a case before the court, they face long delays and the final judgement is often inadequate. In order to combat these obstacles, the police should learn to play a role in the community, judicial structures should be strengthened, and victims assisted when they take action. Perpetrators should be punished in a manner commensurate with the crimes committed.

Reducing the vulnerability of populations at risk:

- Gender-based violence (GBV) has reached worrying levels in Burundi. Awareness raising efforts must be continued to encourage victims to mental illness and in which society often stigmatizes the victims, especially women who have suffered sexual violence.
seek treatment, testify, and lodge complaints without fear of social exclusion. The new penal code adopted by Parliament in November 2008 should be a useful tool in the fight against GBV, which has now been stepped up.

The government has poor control over land transactions, and the resulting abuses can lead to conflict. It is therefore essential to set up a system to make land secure. The creation in March 2008 of an inter-ministerial committee charged with drawing up terms of reference for land reform is a step in the right direction. The National Commission for Land and Other Assets, which is charged with settling land disputes, urgently needs more resources. Burundians who sought refuge in Tanzania are now coming back on a regular basis and represent an additional burden.

Access to health care must be improved without delay. At this writing, many victims of armed violence could not be treated in hospital due to a lack of resources. The public health centres are poorly equipped and are in need of doctors. If not treated properly, wounds resulting from violence have serious after-effects, with dramatic human and economic consequences for the victims and their families. **Disarming the civilian population:**

- There have been repeated calls for a programme to disarm civilians; the need for disarmament is reconfirmed by the results of this survey. Firearms are used more than any other type of weapon in acts of armed violence, and they have the most tragic consequences for victims. As noted above, Ligue Iteka records for 2007 reveal that 70 per cent of acts of violence committed with a firearm resulted in one or more deaths.

- The household survey shows that the population has a very negative view of weapons, which do not have a cultural or traditional value in Burundi (hunting and shooting as a sport are almost unknown). Civilians who have weapons seem to keep them for personal protection. Rebuilding a climate of confidence will be a long and delicate process. It may be facilitated if a peace agreement can be reached with the last rebel group in operation, if the members of this group can be included in existing institutions, and if the climate of civil war, which leads the army to mobilize and endangers the populations of the regions concerned, can be brought to an end.

- The Burundians surveyed say almost unanimously that they are ready to take part in a disarmament programme (more than 95 per cent of respondents replied ‘definitely’ or ‘probably’ to this question). This figure is close to the one recorded in 2005, which shows that the window of opportunity that existed three years ago, when the new government was enjoying what might be called a ‘grace period’, is still open. The disarmament of civilians is therefore still on the agenda, in spite of lower levels of confidence in the government and a higher degree of political uncertainty due to the prospect of elections in 2010.

- When disarmament of the civilian population takes place, particular attention will have to be paid to the collection of grenades, of which civilians own many, and which pose grave risks to their owners and to potential targets (they are often stored in houses in an advanced state of deterioration, which means there is a serious risk of accidental detonation). Grenades have the same dissuasive and coercive powers as firearms but cost less and have the capacity to kill or wound many people simultaneously.

- Finally, any disarmament programme must also take account of differences between Bujumbura, the only truly urban centre in Burundi, and the other provinces. The survey reveals that the people of Bujumbura-Mairie, who see weapons more as a means of protection than do people in the other provinces, would be particularly receptive to ‘inclusive disarmament’, i.e. disarmament targeting the whole population. These differences between town and country must also be taken into account when selecting incentives to be offered to participants in exchange for their weapons (goods or money). More often than elsewhere, the surveyed respondents in Bujumbura-Mairie cited unemployment and the lack of opportunities for young people as the main problems affecting their neighbourhood or colline. Respondents in other provinces complained mainly about the lack of public transport and problems associated with land.
Introduction

Burundi and the Geneva Declaration

Burundi is emerging from a long civil war that killed and displaced hundreds of thousands of people. The war led to a proliferation of light weapons, estimated to be in excess of 100,000 (Pézard and Florquin, 2007, p. 2). Despite the signing of peace agreements, the holding of democratic elections, and the setting up of a UN peace consolidation strategy, the country is still witness to numerous acts of armed violence. The source of the violence varies according to whether the environment is rural or urban, and according to the province. For example, Bujumbura-Mairie has a high rate of criminality, while Bujumbura Rural is still experiencing the final jolts of the war, largely due to the presence of the Palipehutu–FNL.

In 2007 Burundi signed the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, which requires the signatory countries to considerably reduce the human cost of armed violence by 2015 (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2006). The declaration defines armed violence as ‘the intentional use of illegitimate force (actual or threatened) with arms or explosives, against a person, group, community, or state, that undermines people-centered security and/or sustainable development’. One of the pillars of the Geneva Declaration process is the measurability of the impact of armed violence on development, the aim being to increase awareness of the costs of violence. Produced mainly for policy-makers, Burundian civil society, and the international community, this report examines questions that are key to a better understanding of the link between armed violence and development and to suggest possible ways of reducing armed violence.

- Who are the victims and perpetrators of armed violence?
- What is the geographic distribution of armed violence?
- Under what circumstances are acts of armed violence committed and what are the risk and resilience factors?
- What instruments are used in armed violence?
What are the consequences and costs of armed violence—physical, mental, psychosocial, and economic—for individuals and communities?

Methodology

To map patterns of armed violence and assess its repercussions on human security and development, several methodological tools were used: (1) a household survey; (2) focus groups; (3) interviews with experts; and (4) an analysis of media coverage using the Taback–Coupland method.

(1) The survey covered 1,567 households in six provinces: Bujumbura-Mairie, Bujumbura Rural, Cibitoke, Mwaro, Bururi, and Ruyigi. The Ligue Iteka, a Burundian human rights organization, conducted the survey and recruited the statistician who managed the sampling, the researchers, and the data entry personnel. The Ligue Iteka also supplied the logistical support necessary for the survey. The researchers and data entry personnel were trained in Bujumbura in January and March 2008 by Ryan Murray, a statistical analyst with the Small Arms Survey. The survey questionnaire (see Appendix I), which was drafted in French and Kirundi, covers three main areas: security (including perceptions of the level of security and degree of victimization), weapons, and disarmament. Ryan Murray also analysed the survey data (for details on the methodology used, see Appendix II).

The sample of households interviewed was chosen by Emmanuel Nindagiye, a statistician, on the basis of demographic information for 1998 and 2002 supplied by the Burundian Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (ISTEEBU). A random sampling of six sous-collines (sub-sub-districts) per district was carried out, and five households were chosen at random in each of the 312 sous-collines to be studied. In Bujumbura-Mairie, the basic unit chosen was the urban district, which was treated as the enumeration unit. The 1,567 questionnaires were completed in the six provinces between 16 February and 16 March 2008. After the removal of questionnaires that were found to contain errors, the final sample size was n=1,487.

The six provinces chosen are the same as those chosen for the survey on light weapons that was conducted in Burundi in 2005 (Pézard and Florquin, 2007). In order to identify changes in the replies given to certain questions between 2005 and 2008, the same sous-collines (or population enumeration units) were covered by the two surveys (but the five households interviewed in each sous-colline or population enumeration unit were not necessarily the same in 2005 and 2008).

(2) Focus groups of eight to ten people were organized in five provinces. The purpose of these groups was to stimulate a discussion about perceptions of the level of security, the level of armed violence, the prevalence and use of weapons in the community concerned, and possible solutions to the problems of armed violence.

Six focus groups were held in January 2008 by the authors of this report with:

- a group of men and a group of women in Bujumbura-Mairie;
- a group of men and a group of women in Cibitoke;
- a group of men and a group of women in Mwaro.

Five other focus groups were held between February and March 2008 by Adam Forbes, head of DanChurchAid–Burundi, with:

- a group of men and a group of women in Gitega;
- a group of men and a group of women in Makamba;
- a group of ex-combatants in Bujumbura-Mairie.

Moderators, a note-taker, and an interpreter were also present at the focus groups.

(3) The authors of this report conducted 60 interviews with key informants in Bujumbura, including members of Burundian civil society, representatives of
the security forces (army and police), government representatives, representatives of regional and international organizations in Burundi, independent Burundian researchers, and members of foreign diplomatic representations. A further five interviews were carried out in February 2008 by Adam Forbes, head of the programme for DanChurchAid—Burundi, with the police, local administrators, members of civil society, and representatives of the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) in Gitega and Makamba.

(a) The Taback–Coupland (TACO) method involves a data analysis grid in which incidents of armed violence reported in the media are recorded and broken down per type, perpetrator, victim, and context. This method reveals patterns and changes in armed violence. A TACO analysis for Burundi for the period from 1 January to 31 March 2008 was carried out by Christina Wille of the Small Arms Survey. It includes 246 incidents of armed violence (Wille, 2008). The analysis used the same sources of information as the Observatory of Armed Violence, namely public and private local radio stations (RTNB, RP, RSF-Bonesha, Isanganiro, and Radio France Internationale), the local and international print and online media (ABP, Net Press, Agence de presse Burundi Réalités, Agence France Presse, @ribNews, Panapress, and ReliefWeb), reports from the BINUB security cell, and the Ligue Iteka Web site.

In addition to these four tools, statistical data from several Burundian and international sources was analyzed. Sources included the 2006 activity report of the PNB; the activity reports for 2006 and 2007 of the Ligue Iteka; the reports of the human rights division of the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) and BINUB; and the monthly reports of the Observatory of Armed Violence. Finally, studies on specific aspects of armed violence (land disputes as well as violence relating to security forces and to the Palipehutu–FNL) were commissioned from Burundian researchers.

Is Burundi a post-conflict society?

Since its independence in 1962, Burundi has seen a succession of ethnopolitical conflicts that have had dramatic consequences. The most recent crisis lasted ten long years, between the assassination in 1993 of the first president to be democratically elected, Melchior Ndadaye, and the global ceasefire that was signed in 2003 by the main rebel group, the CNDD–FDD. Between these two dates, the fighting between the army (with a majority of Tutsis) and the six rebel groups (Hutus in the majority), and the acts of violence committed against civilians, claimed around 300,000 victims and caused the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people.

The negotiations conducted under the aegis of Presidents Julius Nyerere and Nelson Mandela led, in August 2000, to the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, which laid down the basis for a reform of the security sector through the creation of a new police force and a new army. This agreement also provided a framework for the creation, in November 2001, of a government of national unity and transition—initially led by a Tutsi president, Pierre Buyoya (2001–03), then by his Hutu vice-president, Domitien Ndayizeye (2003–05). In August 2005, the former leader of the CNDD–FDD, Pierre Nkurunziza, was elected president; that same year, via referendum, 90 per cent of the electorate approved a new constitution instituting rule by a government whose members would be 60 per cent Hutu and 40 per cent Tutsi (HRW, 2005; RoB, 2005, art. 129).

The Arusha Agreement stipulates that the combatants of the former armed forces and the former rebel groups—known as PMPA—are to be demobilized (Arusha Agreement, 2000, Protocol III, ch. II, art. 21). However, the disarmament, rehabilitation, and reintegration (DRR) programme, which was intended to demobilize and reintegrate 55,000 combatants, was not launched until December 2004 (World Bank, 2004, p. 8). The purpose of the programme was also to support the rehabilitation of 20,000 Gardiens de la Paix (Peace Guardians), a pro-government militia formed during the war, and of 10,000 Militants Combattants (Militant Combatants), a pro-CNDD–FDD rival militia (MDRP, 2008a). During the disarmament phase 11,500 weapons were recovered from former members of the PMPA (Pézard and Floraquin, 2007, p. 18). By August 2008, more than 26,000 people had been demobilized, but only 14,800 had been reintegrated (MDRP, 2008b).

The launch of the DDR programme coincided with the deployment of ONUB, the UN force that replaced the African Mission in Burundi, which had been set up in 2003 by the African Union (AU), but with limited financial, human, and logistical capacity. In February 2007, ONUB was replaced by BINUB. For the international community in Burundi, this marked a switch from a peacekeeping role to one of providing assistance for the reconstruction of the country (BBC, 2008a; BINUB, 2006). At the same time, the UN Peacebuilding Commission, which was created in 2005, chose Burundi as one of the first two target countries for its activities (UN, 2005; 2007). An integrated strategy intended to promote peacebuilding and prevent a return of the conflict was launched at the beginning of 2007 (RoB and UN, 2007; UN, 2007, para. 18). Government donors support Burundi with crucial development aid; in 2007, funding rose to USD 310 million, or about half of the state budget (Mora, 2008, p. 12). In January 2009, Burundi also benefited from the cancellation of 92 per cent of its foreign debt, or about USD 1.4 billion (AFP, 2009).
In spite of this progress towards democracy, a last rebel group, the Palipehutu–FNL, did not take part in the peace process in 2003, preferring to continue its activities in the north-west of the country. Under the aegis of South African Minister for Safety and Security Charles Nqakula, who was appointed by the regional initiative, the two parties met for the first time in Dar es Salaam on 29 May 2006 and a ceasefire agreement was signed on 7 September 2006 (ICG, 2006, p. 4; 2007, pp. 3–6). This agreement provided for the creation of the Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (MCVS), the provisional immunity of the leaders of the Palipehutu–FNL, the release of political prisoners, and for the combatants of the Palipehutu–FNL to be identified and brought together with a view to their being integrated into the Burundian defence and security forces or demobilized.

In July 2007, given the government’s failure to implement the provisions of the agreement, the Palipehutu–FNL delegation left the MCVS, bringing the negotiations to an end (ICG, 2007, p. 1). The security situation deteriorated until, in April 2008, violent fighting resumed between the army and the Palipehutu–FNL (AFP, 2008d; BBC, 2008b; IRIN, 2008a). On 26 May 2008, the two parties finally signed a joint declaration of cessation of hostilities (BINUB–DDH, 2008e, p. 1), and in December 2008 they arrived at a compromise on their main points of disagreement at a summit attended by the heads of state from the Great Lakes countries.

In recent years, Burundi has also been affected by waves of political violence. In July 2006, the Burundian police arrested seven people, including a former president, Domitien Ndayizeye, accusing them of conspiracy (ICG, 2006, p. 2). In addition, grenade attacks on individuals and businesses (mainly bars) have multiplied since the dry period in 2006. In August 2007 and March 2008, members of parliament and politicians who had expressed their dissatisfaction with the government were the victims of similar attacks (HRW, 2008a).

The household survey reveals under which circumstances Burundians feel insecure. While this report defines ‘insecurity’ as a climate in which individuals are afraid of becoming a victim of armed violence, Burundians often use the term with reference to crops and the food supply. In one of the focus groups, for instance, a woman from Mwaro said: ‘insecurity is not only related to arms but also to the fear of an empty stomach…. The crop is depleted, food prices increase overnight just when the people are penniless. This is a very great source of insecurity.’

In fact, only 13.2 per cent (x=196, n=1,482) of respondents mentioned ‘problems related to the use of arms’ as one of the main problems affecting their neighbourhood or colline. Far more common responses were the lack of infrastructure (52.0%, x=771, n=1,482), unemployment (39.3%, x=583, n=1,482), criminality (37.6%, x=557, n=1,482)—which may be partly associated with the problems related to the use of arms—and the inadequacy of the health infrastructure (34.5%, x=512, n=1,482). The ‘Other’ category, chosen by 74.6% (x=1,105, n=1,482) of respondents, mainly covers access to drinking water, poverty, and agricultural problems (lack of seed, fertilizer, and land, as well as diseases affecting crops). Thus, Burundians are mainly concerned with development problems—in the broadest sense of the term, covering questions of poverty and lack of infrastructure.

With respect to the risk of becoming a victim of armed violence, it is interesting to note that the feeling of insecurity has often been described as, at least in part, ‘contagious’. Participants in focus groups in Mwaro and in Cibitoke mentioned the role of the media, particularly the radio, in aggravating their own feelings of insecurity. One of them said: ‘We live in constant fear because of the constant flow of bad news on the radio. Even when we have peace here, if we listen to the radio, we are afraid and expect our turn to come.’ Moreover, these focus groups also highlighted a general feeling that there was less respect for human life, particularly since the end of the war. According to one participant, killing ‘has become no more than a game’;
another stated ‘because of the war situation that we have been suffering for so long, people are no longer human’. A woman from Mwaro said, ‘insecurity is also a war’. Analysis of the records of 13 hospitals and health centres in four provinces (Bujumbura-Mairie, Gitega, Ngozi, and Bururi) shows that the number of deaths and injuries caused by armed violence remained relatively stable between 2005 and 2007 (see Graph 1). This stability suggests that the situation is ‘frozen’ at a post-conflict level that remains high (Dalal and Nasibu Bilali, 2008, p. 22).

However, these figures are only a rough estimate of the total number of deaths and injuries caused by armed violence. Indeed, according to police sources, fewer than ten per cent of those wounded reach the hospitals, either because they die on the spot or on the way to the hospital, or because they prefer not to go to hospital—because they do not have enough money to pay the deposit demanded by some hospitals, or because they fear police investigations (Dalal and Nasibu Bilali, 2008, p. 3).

**Changes in the perception of security (September 2007–February 2008)**

Perceptions of the level of security over the six months prior to the survey (conducted in February–March 2008) vary considerably depending on the provinces observed (see Graph 2 and Map 3). Provinces where insecurity levels tend to remain low—such as Bururi, Mwaro, and Ruyigi—show a dramatic increase in people’s perception of security over those six months.

**Insecurity: perception and reality**

*Geographic distribution of armed violence*

The perceived and real intensity of the armed violence varies considerably across the provinces.

With a little more than 250 acts of armed violence recorded in 2008, Bujumbura-Mairie is the most violent province in the country (see Graph 3). The provinces of Bubanza (218 acts) and Bujumbura Rural (180) follow close behind (UNPF, 2008).
The provinces of Mwaro and Karuzi registered the lowest number of acts of armed violence in 2008 (30 and 25, respectively). Almost nobody in Mwaro feels ‘not very’ or ‘not at all’ secure in his or her house during the daytime; in Bujumbura-Mairie, however, these answers were chosen by more than one in ten respondents. The perception of the level of security seems worse in Bujumbura Rural than in the other five provinces, which is probably a consequence of Palipehutu–FNL activity (and, therefore, of the army and intelligence service) in this region. Almost 20 per cent of the respondents in Bujumbura Rural feel ‘not very’ or ‘not at all’ secure when travelling during the day compared with around ten per cent in Bujumbura-Mairie. A similar difference is observed for nighttime travel: 72.6 per cent in Bujumbura Rural compared with 45.9 per cent in Bujumbura-Mairie.

The particularly problematic nature of Bujumbura Rural also appears when the survey questions relate to actual acts of armed violence. In Bujumbura Rural, almost three out of four people (73.7%, x=238, n=323) said that acts of armed violence were liable to occur in their village, colline, or neighbourhood compared to less than one out of two in Bujumbura-Mairie (48.2%, x=163, n=323) —which is in second position—and one out of four in Mwaro and Bururi (24.9%, x=44, n=177 and 24.8%, x=65, n=263, respectively) (see Graph 4 and Map 2).

Nevertheless, Bujumbura-Mairie leads all other provinces in terms of armed violence and criminality. With approximately 500,000 inhabitants, the capital has a population density that ensures a certain anonymity, one that allows offenders to easily escape the law while offering an abundance of potential criminal gains (Small Arms Survey, 2007, p. 167). During the first survey conducted by the Small Arms Survey and the Ligue Iteka, respondents in Bujumbura-Mairie said that the inhabitants of their neighbourhood or colline were the most armed: 16.1 per cent of respondents replied that ‘many’ or ‘the majority’ of households had a firearm (Small Arms Survey, 2007, p. 215). In 2006, based on PNB figures, almost one-third of the 10,598 offences recorded nationwide were committed in Bujumbura-Mairie. These were mainly aggravated theft (34% of all offences), fraud or breach of trust (24%), and common theft (9%) (PNB, 2007a, pp. 6–9).

Perceptions of security vary according to the districts of the capital. Generally, inhabitants feel most secure at night in ‘mixed’ districts (Buyenzi, Buterere, and Bwiza) and in those with a majority Tutsi population (Kinindo, Nyakabiga, and Musaga) (see Graph 5).

The household survey showed that respondents in the well-off district of Rohero most frequently replied that ‘certain types of weapon may be useful to protect you or members of your household’ (46.2%, x=12, n=26). Only 7.4 per cent (x=2, n=27) of respondents gave a similar reply in the less well-off district of Kinama and 13.0 per cent (x=3, n=23) in the district of Kamenge. Yet Kamenge is the district where 91.0 per cent of the people who agreed to answer the question said that the inhabitants of their neighbourhood possessed weapons. Perceptions regarding the presence of weapons vary considerably according to the district. Ngagara and Kamenge are the neighbourhoods where the greatest number of respondents said that the inhabitants of their neighbourhood possess weapons and explosives (Ngarara: 82.6%, x=14, n=17); the inhabitants of these two districts said...
they did not feel very safe. Kinindo shows a different pattern: even though 73.7 per cent (x=14, n=19) of respondents said that there were weapons in that district, 64.0 per cent (x=16, n=25) of them said they felt ‘totally secure’ at night. This paradox may be explained by the fact that Kinindo is a neighbourhood where many army officers and important people live under uniformed protection.

The Observatory of Armed Violence set up in 2007 shows that between August 2007 and April 2008 the number of acts of armed violence did not change significantly, with an average of 77 acts per month. However, in May 2008 and over the next five months there was a sharp increase in the number, which reached 201 in September. The number of incidents recorded in Bujumbura-Mairie rose in March 2008; this trend was confirmed in April with renewed shelling of the capital by the Palipehutu–FNL (UNPF, 2008). The provinces of Bujumbura-Mairie and Bujumbura Rural both experienced a peak in acts of armed violence in September 2008, due mostly to the very sharp increase in the number of incidents of banditry during the same month (see Graph 6).

**Timing of acts of violence**

The household survey shows that the feeling of insecurity is highest during the night: 41.9% (x=622, n=1,481) of respondents felt ‘not very’ or ‘not at all’ safe when travelling at night. More surprisingly, people hardly feel any safer
inside their homes at night (39.8%, x=590, n=1,485), which suggests a strong fear of burglaries and nighttime attacks on homes (see Map 4). To a certain extent, these fears seem to be justified: the TACO analysis of 246 violent incidents between January and March 2008 shows that 59 per cent of them occurred during the night and that more than half occurred inside a building—the victim’s home in 75 per cent of cases27 (Wille, 2008, pp. 5–6).

The women questioned in the focus groups in Makamba and Gitega said that they did not feel safe in their homes at night: they feared burglaries, which are frequently accompanied by rape and murder.

Types of crime

Of all the respondents, 42.8 per cent (x=633, n=1,480) reported that acts of violence occurred in their village, colline, or neighbourhood. When these individuals were asked ‘What type of armed violence takes place in your village/colline/neighbourhood?’, 95.7 per cent (x=602, n=629) of them identified armed robbery and burglaries. Respondents also selected the following replies, in this order: murders (41.3%, x=260, n=629), attacks (37.8%, x=238, n=629), and rapes committed under threat of a weapon (20.7%, x=130, n=629).

This predominance of theft and burglary is confirmed by the PNB data for 2006. ‘Aggravated thefts’ represent the biggest category of offences (almost 28% of the 8,961 offences recorded), ahead of ‘assault and battery’ (PNB, 2007a, pp. 70–74). If certain offences are aggregated (see Graph 7), homicides—including complicity and attempted murder—represent only three per cent of recorded offences (294 cases). Once again most of the offences committed are thefts (38% of the total).

Because PNB figures only mention the type of offence and not the motive, some categories of violence may be underestimated. Offences relating to land disputes, for instance, seem to represent only about one per cent of all offences, but many of them are probably included in other categories, such as murder or assault and battery.

Some categories are also ambiguous: ‘membership in an armed gang’ could include membership in a gang of bandits or of the Palipehutu–FNL. This confusion, however, reflects the fact that the line between banditry and rebellion is often blurred: the members of the Palipehutu–FNL sometimes use violence to extort food and equipment, and some bandits unreservedly pretend to be members of the Palipehutu–FNL in order to do the same.28

Between August 2007 and December 2008, the Observatory of Armed Violence recorded 1,867 acts of armed violence, of which almost half were acts of banditry. This is followed by various types of violence, all more or less at the same level (between 2% and 6% of the total): land disputes; domestic disputes (which include family quarrels and violence relating to accusations of witchcraft); violence relating to the Palipehutu–FNL; police blunders; and rape under the threat of a weapon. This last category, which is extremely important in understanding the role that weapons play in violence against women, is not usually recorded: the databases rarely distinguish between...
cases where the rapist used a weapon and cases where he did not. In this respect, the Observatory offers a higher degree of precision than the other databases studied (PNB statistics and the Ligue Iteka).

Whereas banditry is the main reason for the violence in all provinces, secondary motives vary (UNPF, 2007; 2008). The conflict between the Palipehutu–FNL and government forces is a source of violence particularly in Bujumbura Rural. While acts of armed violence related to political violence and police blunders are more predominant in Bujumbura-Mairie, those related to land conflicts are more numerous in Gitega and Ngozi, and rapes committed under the threat of a weapon are more numerous in Gitega and Bubanza.

**Identifying the victims**

It is very difficult to gather systematic data on victims and to create a standard profile. Nonetheless, it is possible to highlight a few general characteristics.

Men are the most common victims of violence. The statistics of the Ligue Iteka show that 224 acts of armed violence out of the 310 recorded in 2007 involved one or more men (Ligue Iteka, 2008, app. I). The 2007 report of the Ligue Iteka also shows that, in 89 per cent of cases, the victims were civilian. The TACO analysis of incidents of violence between January and March 2008 confirms that they were the main victims of one-sided armed violence (Wille, 2008, p. 7). It also shows that they are only slightly involved in multi-sided acts, suggesting that they generally do not defend themselves when they are attacked by armed individuals.

**Graph 8** Main motives for committing acts of armed violence, per province

![Graph showing the main motives for committing acts of armed violence per province.]

*Note:* Only the motives mentioned by five per cent or more of respondents in at least one province are cited here. The ‘Other’ category is not shown in this graph.

*Source:* Small Arms Survey and Ligue Iteka (2008)

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The household survey reveals that ‘being rich’ is seen as making a person more likely to become a victim of armed violence: this reason was chosen by 96.1 per cent of respondents (x=546, n=568). The three following replies are also related to the possession of money: being a businessman or -woman (74.5%, x=423, n=568), being employed (40.1%, x=228, n=568), and being a civil servant (32.2%, x=183, n=568). Administrators, such as neighbourhood leaders, feel particularly vulnerable; 20.2% of respondents (x=115, n=568) claimed that being a politician was a risk factor. Being a widow or a woman were also mentioned as risk factors by 13.6% and 12.7% of respondents, respectively (Small Arms Survey and Ligue Iteka, 2008). In this context, it is
useful to note that women are the largest group of victims of sexual and domestic violence in Burundi, and in 2007 they represented 97 per cent of rape victims treated at the MSF–Belgium Seruka Centre. According to the manager of this centre, 14 per cent of the victims—about 195 individuals—had been raped under the threat of a weapon. Lastly, belonging to a particular ethnic group was cited as a risk factor by 10.7 per cent of respondents (x=61, n=568).

Identifying the perpetrators

The PNB figures for 2006 show that the perpetrators were mostly men under the age of 30—the usual profile of perpetrators in most other countries (Small Arms Survey, 2006, pp. 296–97). According to statistics collected from nine provincial police stations, men committed approximately 93 per cent of the recorded offences. Most of the perpetrators were between 19 and 30 years of age (46% of offences), but those over 30 are close behind, representing almost 44 per cent of the perpetrators (PNB, 2007a, pp. 75–85). The Ligue Iteka database for 2007 shows that one or more female perpetrators were involved in only 12 per cent of the 140 acts of armed violence for which the perpetrators were identified; almost one-third of those cases involved infanticide.

Survey respondents were asked to identify groups of people whom they perceived to be the cause of insecurity in Burundi. The hierarchy of categories varies according to the province, except for bandits, who are always in the lead (see Map 5). The rebels are the second most-cited group in Bujumbura Rural

This data must be put into perspective with the data gathered by the Observatory of Armed Violence. Between August 2007 and December 2008, the perpetrators of 630 acts of armed violence (34% of total) were identified: 49.5 per cent of these acts were committed by the FNL, 34.8 per cent by civilians, 9.0 per cent by the PNB, and 6.6 per cent by the FDN (UNPF, 2007; 2008). The Ligue Iteka’s data differs slightly, with 37 per cent of acts of armed violence recorded in 2007 committed by civilians, followed by armed bandits (10%), members of the Palipehutu-FNL (10%), police officers (5%), and military personnel (2.3%) (Ligue Iteka, 2008, app. I). In close to 40 per cent
of the cases, the perpetrators could not be identified, which means that many acts of armed violence remain unpunished.

The Ligue Iteka also recorded 105 acts of torture in 2007; 44 per cent of these were committed by police officers, 19 per cent by civilians, 11 per cent by local administrators (leader of the area, colline, or neighbourhood), 10 per cent by military personnel, and 4 per cent by members of the Palipehutu–FNL. Compared to the 2006 figures, those for 2007 reveal a clear drop in the number of the acts of torture committed by the military and an increase in those committed by the police and civilians.40

There was a sharp increase in the number of acts of armed violence committed by civilians and the Palipehutu–FNL during August and September 2007, which probably reflects the Palipehutu–FNL’s withdrawal from negotiations in July 2007.41 The people of the provinces affected by the rebellion, such as Cibitoke, also experienced a new outbreak of acts of banditry during this period.42 The other significant event of this period is the increase in acts of violence committed by the Palipehutu–FNL in April 2008—when the large-scale confrontation between the group and government forces began—prior to the signature of the ceasefire agreement on 26 May. Finally, the last wave of acts of armed violence committed by the FNL in August 2008 was accompanied by a sharp rise in the number of acts of banditry that same month.  

Photo - A demobilization centre for former government soldiers in Gitega, 2006. © Martin Roemers/Panos Pictures
II. Types of Armed Violence

The Observatory of Armed Violence divides acts of armed violence into five categories whose relevance was confirmed in many individual interviews and focus groups, namely: banditry; political violence (including fighting between the army and the Palipehutu–FNL); violence linked to state security forces (army and police); domestic and sexual violence; and land disputes. These different types of armed violence are typical of countries in post-conflict situations (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008, ch. 3).

In practice, however, the lines between the various categories are often blurry. Certain categories overlap, for example, when police officers use their police weapon in committing acts of banditry or rape. The conflict with the Palipehutu–FNL also has ramifications for insecurity: in addition to the incidents between the army and rebels and the acts of violence committed by the army and the Palipehutu–FNL against the civilian population, the conflict creates an atmosphere of chaos and lawlessness, which is conducive to banditry and criminal activity of all kinds. Many crimes are committed by individuals in uniform—though it is not possible to tell whether they are really soldiers—who subject civilians to extortion rackets, demanding money in exchange for so-called protection.

Banditry

Context

Banditry is the main reason for acts of armed violence recorded in Burundi, according to all the sources used. The PNB statistics show that aggravated thefts and ordinary thefts in 2006 accounted for nearly 43 per cent of all recorded offences, to which other categories should be added, such as theft of small and large livestock and pickpocketing (PNB, 2007a, pp. 70–74). For the Ligue Iteka, theft is also the main motive behind acts of armed violence (36 per cent of acts of violence whose motive is known) (Ligue Iteka, 2008, app. I). The Observatory of Armed Violence draws the same conclusion, attributing 50 per cent of acts of armed violence recorded between August 2007 and December 2008 to banditry.

Banditry, and in particular nighttime burglaries, were widely cited in the focus groups as a major source of anxiety. The bandits’ aim is not usually to kill their victim: they use their weapons for intimidation purposes and usually use them to inflict harm only if the victim resists or is armed (Forbes, 2007, p. 8). The TACO analysis shows that criminals wound their victims more often than they kill them, which suggests that their intention is to steal rather than to kill (Wille, 2008, pp. 10–11). However, sometimes burglaries go wrong and the perpetrators kill their victims if they are afraid they have been identified. In many cases, the women present in the house are raped during attacks. Another category of armed violence that is linked to banditry is the targeted assassination of individuals for reasons such as revenge, land disputes, or disagreements remaining after a matter has been heard in court.

In the interior of the country, according to the interviews carried out in Gitega, Cibitoke, and Mwaro, people who live near roads or in the town centre feel more secure than those who live in the hills, as attacks are more common in the country and peri-urban areas. Other participants in focus groups cited poor communication between police stations in rural areas as a source of danger for the inhabitants, and of impunity for the perpetrators of violence. While the concentration of rich people in towns may attract thieves, the greater number of police officers was clearly dissuasive. As a result, the spaces between urban and rural areas, such as the districts around Gitega, are often more affected by violence in that province.

 Victims

As noted above, having a regular income or carrying even a modest sum of money is a risk factor. Entrepreneurs, traders, and peasants who have just sold some of their crops or livestock are often targets. Small shops in rural areas are also frequently targets of attacks, as are people who possess vehicles, such as taxi drivers (of cars or motorbikes). The focus group also identified those who have exterior signs of wealth as potential victims of armed violence, further demonstrating that Burundians associate armed violence mainly with theft. One participant said: “I am safe because I am poor. When I go to work and gather the crops there is nothing to find in my home!”

Finally, since September 2008, a new category of victim has been particularly targeted, namely albinos. Several have been savagely murdered, most often with firearms, and particularly in the province of Ruyigi. Their bodies, which some people believe have magical properties, were then cut up and sold, usually in Tanzania.
Perpetrators

In the household survey, ‘bandits’ were thought to be the category most likely to be a source of insecurity, but the boundaries of this category are fluid. In the focus groups, police officers, soldiers, and members of the National Intelligence Service (SNR) were cited as perpetrators of violence several times. Furthermore, there were several reported cases that involved persons in possession of firearms (soldiers, police officers, or civilians) renting their weapons to criminals.

When thieves are arrested, they sometimes claim to be members of the Palipehutu–FNL—especially if the group is present in the area—in order to be considered political rather than ordinary prisoners, meaning they can hope to be pardoned or be allowed to participate in a reintegration programme, assuming the government and the rebel group finally reach an agreement. It also seems that the police and the authorities are less inclined to prosecute members of the Palipehutu–FNL, considering that ‘political’ matters are not part of their remit.

Demobilized combatants were often said to be particularly involved in cases of theft, which they sometimes committed in their old uniforms. This perception is very different from the view that was prevalent in December 2005, which was much more positive (Pézard and Florquin, 2007, p. 45). At that time, only 4.1 per cent of respondents cited them as one of the categories responsible for insecurity (Small Arms Survey and Ligue Iteka, 2006). At the beginning of 2008, this figure had more than quadrupled to 16.9 per cent (x=128, n=758). Certain members of the focus groups thought that former rebels—who were accustomed to stealing in order to survive during the war—had not been ‘re-educated’, had not been able to find work, and now survived by the same means. They generally spoke of the criminality of the demobilized combatants as a result of the gaps in the DRR programme, pointing out that the sums received by the beneficiaries ‘were of no use’ because they had not been enabled to set up income-generating activities. In his third report on the activities of the BINUB, the Secretary-General of the United Nations found the reintegration efforts to be unsatisfactory: adding to the poor current economic situation, the relative failure risked pushing the ex-combatants into ‘violent crime’ or into the ranks of the armed movements (UNSC, 2008a, para. 95). The demobilized combatants were also accused of selling their services as paid assassins (Forbes, 2007, p. 9). In addition, it seems that some of them are involved in acts of political violence (Burundi...
**AN ASSESSMENT OF ARMED VIOLENCE IN BURUNDI**

**TYpES OF ARMED VIOLENCE**

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In just over two years, demobilized combatants have therefore become a separate category in Burundi; they are no longer considered to be civilians like other people. In fact, in the registers of most of the prisons, ‘demobilized combatants’ are listed in a separate category.

**Possible solutions**

An astounding 93.4 per cent (x=582, n=623) of respondents to the household survey think that it is possible to do something to combat the armed violence that affects their community. The first solution, according to one quarter of respondents (24.9%, x=146, n=586), would be to settle the conflict between the government and the Palipehutu–FNL (see Graph 10). This suggestion came up many times in the focus groups conducted in the districts of Makamba, Gitega, Bujumbura, and Cibitoke. Other participants in the focus groups said that the members of the Palipehutu-FNL should be confined in order to prevent them from committing acts of violence against ordinary people, and because once such people had been removed from the population, it would be easier to identify criminals.

‘Disarm the population’ (23.2%, x=136, n=586) is in second place, followed by ‘Increase law enforcement activities’ (17.6%). This willingness to see more police officers and soldiers was also expressed in the focus groups, although paradoxically the police is often deemed to be inefficient, or even dangerous. A little more than six per cent (6.3%, x=37, n=586) of respondents stressed the need to ensure that the judiciary work efficiently, reflecting a desire to change a perceived climate of impunity that seems to be observed by most of the population. In fact, according to the World Bank, Burundi scored poorly with respect to the rule of law and the control of corruption in 2007: -1.16 and -1.06, respectively, on a scale from -2.5 to +2.5 (Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2008). Some also see poverty and unemployment as a source of insecurity, pushing individuals into criminal activity in order to survive.

 Asked about measures of personal protection that they had taken for themselves or their families, 91 per cent (x=537, n=590) of respondents replied that they had not taken any. This proportion is valid for nearly all the provinces except for Bururi, where 25 per cent (x=16, n=64) of respondents said that they had taken some protective measures (mainly organizing patrols or night watchmen, often involving individuals living in the same neighbourhood). The measures taken fall into several categories:

- **Increased surveillance.** This approach may involve keeping watch at night, which leads to fatigue and lower productivity the next day. In Makamba and Bururi, people sometimes organize night patrols—a practice that began during the war. Sometimes individuals mistakenly become targets during these patrols. An alternative, for those who have the resources, is to hire guards.

- **Increased self-defence capabilities.** Such measures may involve purchasing firearms and machetes.
## Reducing one’s own vulnerability. People may do so by not going out at night; by keeping lamps and lights burning all night; by avoiding restaurants and nightclubs that might be attacked. In some areas, the local authorities require bars to close at 6 p.m. for fear that the grenade attacks on bars that occurred in August and September 2006 might start again. Other preventive measures consist of avoiding the most dangerous communities; building walls and putting up barbed wire fences around houses; or putting bars on windows. Finally, one tactic to limit the impact of acts of banditry on one’s own family and one’s own person is to give burglars what they want, without offering any resistance, and not to report witnessed crimes.

## External sources of protection. Some individuals (senior civil servants, businessmen) ask the police to provide a protection service. Focus group participants said that they would call on the police if they were attacked. However, some also said that, due to the problems of impunity, they were sometimes afraid to report criminals as they knew that they would not spend very long in prison and would come back to take revenge. Others resorted to prayer, which was often cited. Finally, in order to limit the acts of banditry that might be committed by the forces of law and order, one member of a focus group in Bujumbura recommended creating a police force to monitor the police force in order to improve discipline within the security forces and to prevent soldiers and police officers from going out in the evening in the same places as civilians with their uniforms and weapons. Another person recommended housing the police in barracks.

### Violence related to the final stages of the conflict

#### Context

Although the fighting is much less intense than it was during the crisis years, armed violence is still undermining Burundi, particularly in the regions where the Palipehutu–FNL is still active (Bujumbura Rural, Bubanza, and Cibitoke).

#### Victims

The population of these provinces is subject to different types of extortion. The local population is the main source of supplies for the armed group and is therefore obliged to supply them not only with food and money, but also with labour. Members of the Palipehutu–FNL sometimes oblige civilians to fetch wood or carry munitions. The group also collects a ‘tax’ from civilians, who receive a receipt that is supposed to provide them with protection from the movement. The representatives of the authorities and particularly of the local authority (colline and sector heads and district administrators) and other prominent people are particularly likely to be the victims of kidnappings or murders committed by the Palipehutu–FNL.

In 2006, at least 22 individuals in Bujumbura Rural and one in Bubanza were executed by the Palipehutu–FNL under the pretext that they were collaborating with the army (Ligue Iteka, 2007a, app. I). This information is contested by the Palipehutu–FNL, which claims that “the Palipehutu–FNL never attacks civilians.” Civilians are also subject to brutality at the hands of the military, who accuse them of collaborating with the enemy. The 13 cases of torture recorded by Human Rights Watch in 2006, which were attributed to the SNR, involved persons suspected of collaborating with the Palipehutu–FNL (HRW, 2006b, p. 22). The data provided by the Ligue Iteka shows that in 2006, 13 individuals who were ‘presumed members of the FNL’ or supporters of the movement were killed by the FDN and the police (Ligue Iteka, 2007a, app. I). During the wave of fighting in April and May 2008, more than 300 presumed members of the Palipehutu–FNL were arrested, and many people were detained illegally, without any charge being made against them (HRW, 2008c). The reports of the human rights division of ONUB and then BINUB show that physical violence against individuals arrested and detained is frequent, particularly at military posts, places of illegal detention, and in the isolation units in police stations.

Civilians are also indirect victims of the conflict through the displacement of the population triggered by each new outbreak of fighting between government forces and the Palipehutu–FNL. In September 2007, 700 families—nearly 4,000 people—fled their homes subsequent to attacks committed by presumed members of the Palipehutu–FNL. At the time, the spokesperson for the movement admitted that acts of violence had been committed by its troops, pointing out that food, clothing, and medicine promised in the negotiations had not been provided (IRIN, 2007c). In addition, the most recent wave of hostilities between the two parties (April–May 2008) led to the displacement of thousands of people (UNSC, 2008a, para. 12) and caused certain authorities, schools, and shops to close (AFP, 2008b).

It is not known how many members of the Palipehutu–FNL died during the fighting, even if, according to the PNB, in 2006 ‘1900 FNL gave themselves up or [were] captured’ (PNB, 2007a, p. 176). It is also difficult to obtain reliable
data on the losses suffered by the regular army, which often provides underestimates. According to Agence France-Presse, 120 people died in the fighting in April and May 2008 (AFP, 2008d). Other sources report that between 17 April and 7 May, 100 FNL lost their lives against 10 FDN soldiers and 3 PNB officers (UNSC, 2008a, para.12).

Perpetrators

Those who commit conflict-related acts of violence fall into three categories: members of the Palipehutu–FNL, dissidents from the Palipehutu–FNL movement, and the regular security forces.89

The Palipehutu–FNL

The Palipehutu–FNL, Burundi’s last active non-state armed group, is the armed wing of the Palipehutu political movement. The ‘rebels’ are identified by nearly 35.9 per cent of the Burundians surveyed (x=272, n=758) as the primary source of insecurity in the country (Small Arms Survey and Ligue Iteka, 2008). According to the Observatory of Armed Violence, they were responsible for about half (49.5%) of the acts of armed violence committed between August 2007 and December 2008 and for which the perpetrator or perpetrators could be identified.

The violence committed by the Palipehutu–FNL has changed in recent years, in both form and scope. According to the statistics of the Ligue Iteka, the number of homicides committed by the Palipehutu–FNL fell from 224 in 2005 (including 159 individuals executed in the massacre at the Gatumba refugee camp90) to 40 in 2006, before rising again to 96 in 2007 (Ligue Iteka, 2006, p. 12; 2007a, p. 41; 2008, p. 14). In the past the members of the Palipehutu–FNL rarely committed rape; according to a Human Rights Watch report, the group’s discipline was inspired by religion and rapists could be sentenced to death (HRW, 2004a, p. 7; Small Arms Survey, 2008, p. 23). This relative taboo seems to have been abandoned: in February and March 2008 several collective rapes were committed by Palipehutu–FNL combatants (BINUB –DDH, 2008b, p. 7; 2008c, p. 3). Since the fighting stopped at the end of May 2008 and the peace process resumed, the FNL combatants have been waiting to enter the assembly area at Rubira in the province of Bubanza in order to benefit from the DDR programme or begin the integration process. The fact that the combatants must wait to be cantoned creates a climate of insecurity: inhabitants of various districts of Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural say that they have been victims of pillaging (Burundi Tribune, 2009c).

Estimates of the number of members of the Palipehutu–FNL vary. The FNL officially stated that the armed group had 21,100 combatants (IRIN, 2008c). According to the International Crisis Group, they number between 2,000 and 3,000 (ICG, 2007, p. 6). According to an official Burundian source, the government expects to host between 5,000 and 6,000 members in dedicated camps, due to recent mass recruitments. With each step in the negotiations, new recruits or young people turn up voluntarily wishing to join the security and defence forces or participate in the demobilization programme (Burundi Tribune, 2009b).

The ‘dissidents’

In September 2007, in the district of Buterere, fighting broke out between Agathon Rwasa’s Palipehutu–FNL and 300 dissidents from the movement who apparently wished to give up the armed combat, under the watch of regular forces. These hostilities caused a displacement of the population (Studio Tubane, 2007a). At the end of September and the beginning of October, those faithful to Rwasa shelled the dissidents several times (Studio Tubane, 2007b; 2007c). During these two months the Observatory of Armed Violence recorded a clear spike in incidents of ‘FNL/FNL’ armed violence.91 Some dissidents turned against the local population, accusing them of supporting Rwasa’s movement. Civilians were physically attacked and houses wrecked (Studio Tubane, 2007d).

Little is known of the identity of these dissidents, who seek to be integrated into the Burundian security forces.92 They may be recent recruits of Palipehutu–FNL who, attracted by the prospect of being demobilized and integrated into the security forces, rejoined the movement in 2006, at the time of the ceasefire, and who refused to fight when the Palipehutu–FNL left the MCVS. At the beginning of 2008, the AU force recorded 2,740 presumed dissidents (UNSC, 2008a, para. 54). They are divided between the camps at Randa and Buramata.93 Those living in the Randa camp have been disarmed and are under the control of the AU forces, while those in Buramata have kept their weapons and are more or less under the control of the FDN. The people living in the areas around these camps are not reassured by the presence of armed men in their region.94 One source claims that the dissidents at Buramata are guilty of theft and ambushes.95 At Randa, the dissidents, who are armed, have become a source of insecurity for the people living in the surrounding area (Burundi Réalités, 2007).

Possible solutions

Given the number of acts of armed violence that derive, directly or indirectly, from the ongoing conflict between the Palipehutu–FNL and the government, it is essential that the declaration on the cessation of hostilities that was
signed on 26 May 2008 be respected. In the short term, in order to stop the
criminal acts that are being committed by certain members of the FNL against
the population, the movement’s combatants must be kept apart from the
rest of the population and must be able to swiftly enter into the process of
demobilization and reintegration. The government must also keep two
promises: (1) its promise to release political prisoners, which was made at
the time of the ceasefire agreement in September 2006 and reiterated at
the time of the summit of the Heads of State of the Great Lakes Region in
December 2008; and (2) the promise to integrate the Palipehutu–FNL
combatants within national institutions and the security forces while
ensuring that the ethnic balance of those forces is respected. Finally, the
Palipehutu–FNL undertook to register as a political party under another
name (Heads of State of the Great Lakes Region, 2008).

It is all also important to devise a more effective DDR programme, for
example by respecting the timetable of the different stages so that the
beneficiaries may obtain the assistance for reintegration immediately after
the reininsertion stage. With this end in mind, in January 2009, the Burundian
government presented a document on the strategy for the sustainable
socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants to the Group of Special
Envoys (GSE, 2009). This will perhaps prevent ex-combatants from inflating
the number of demobilized combatants who have not managed to find an
income-generating activity. In order to decide whether this programme
should also be open to the dissidents (an option to which Palipehutu–FNL is
formally opposed), a commission was set up by decree in August 2008. Made
up of officers from the defence and security forces, the group is tasked with
verifying the combatant status of the dissidents from the Palipehutu–FNL
movement in Randa and Buramata and with preparing lists of persons to be
demobilized and of those to be integrated into the army and the police force
(RoB President’s Office, 2008).

Violence related to the armed forces

In February 2008, in a press release on the security situation in the country,
the Government of Burundi urged ‘those with responsibility for the defence
and security forces to continue to impose exemplary sanctions upon their
officers who, in certain cases, were parties to or perpetrators of acts
involving breaches of human rights’ (RoB, 2008). The statement was an
explicit acknowledgement of the acts of violence committed by certain
elements within the FDN, the PNB, and the SNR, often with impunity.

Context

The army was long dominated by the Tutsi minority, for whom it provided a
guarantee of security while forming the basis of their political power. The
reform of the defence and security forces was therefore a major element in the
Burundian conflict, with the PMPA, which were Hutu in the majority, claiming
an important place within these institutions (Small Arms Survey, 2008, p. 4).
The Arusha Agreement established the principle that the new defence and
security forces should be balanced: no ethnic group may represent more than
50 per cent of the FDN or of the PNB (Arusha Agreement, 2000, Protocol III,
arts. 14.1.g, 2.e). These agreements and the overall ceasefire agreement of
2003 also provided for the reform of the army, the police, and the intelligence
service, which were to be professionalized. The highest-ranking rebels were
mostly integrated into the army (which enjoys particular prestige in Burundi),
while the others were directed towards the PNB.

Created in December 2004 as part of the reform of the security sector, the
police force consists of four divisions: the internal security police; the criminal
investigation department; prison officers; and the police dealing with air
travel, the borders, and foreigners. The PNB is made up of 41 per cent former
police officers, 34 per cent former members of the PMPA, 15 per cent former
soldiers, and 10 per cent police officers (HRW, 2008b, p. 22). Consequently,

Perceptions of the uniformed services

The household survey shows that the population has little faith in the ability
of the security forces to combat crime (see Map 7). Just over 20 per cent of
respondents (20.7%, x=307, n=1,485) said that the public authorities were
‘quite’ or ‘a little bit’ effective against crime, while 13.5 per cent (x=201,
n=1485) said they were ‘not at all’ effective (Small Arms Survey and Ligue
Iteka, 2008). In Mwaro, for example, respondents accused the police of
acting slowly when they did take action, saying that sometimes they did not
even bother to come. The TACO analysis shows that when members of
the security forces intervene during a violent incident, they are more often killed
or wounded by the criminals than the other way round. Nevertheless, the fact
that few civilians were wounded during such incidents proves that the
security forces are able to help and protect the civilians present when they do intervene (Wille, 2008, p. 11).

A comparison with the results of the survey carried out by the Small Arms Survey and the Ligue Iteka in 2005 shows that the people’s confidence in the capacity of the authorities to combat crime saw a sharp decline in two years (Pézard and Florquin, 2007, p. 45). The provinces in which the people’s confidence declined most are Bujumbura-Mairie, Cibitoke, and Mwaro (see Graph 11).

The citizens of Bujumbura-Mairie have the least faith in the capacity of defence and security forces. About one-quarter (24.9%, x=85, n=342) of them say that these forces are ‘not at all’ effective against crime. As the data of the Observatory of Armed Violence and the PNB show, Bujumbura-Mairie is also the province in which armed violence is the most widespread and where the population feels least secure.

A certain number of Burundians even see the police and the army as sources of insecurity. In reply to a question on this subject the police are in third position, with 17.8 per cent (x=135, n=758) of respondents seeing them as a source of insecurity, after the bandits and the rebels. These perceptions are confirmed by the survey of 400 individuals that was carried out by CENAP in 2007. The CENAP study shows that 14 per cent of respondents identify the police as a source of violence, in third position after armed bandits (22%) and the Palipehutu–FNL (19%) (CENAP, 2007, p. 18). This distrust of the police may explain why 63.4 per cent (x=553, n=872) of Burundians interviewed said that they would first ask their neighbours or friends for help if they felt threatened, the police and the military being their second and third choices (52.3%, x=456 and 36.7%, x=320, respectively, for n=1,768).

Clearly, the population’s attitude to the security forces, particularly the PNB, is rather ambivalent. While the people of Burundi view the police as a source of insecurity and armed violence, they would nevertheless rather seek help from the police rather than the military in the event of problems. They would also prefer to hand over their weapons to the police within the framework of a disarmament campaign.

Perpetrators and victims

Some members of the three security forces have committed serious human rights violations. Victims of such abuses must therefore face the difficult option of complaining to the very institutions that violated their rights.

The statistics from the prison administration show that in December 2007, 4.6 per cent of prisoners—388 individuals—were members of the military or police officers (RoB, Prisons Department, 2008, p. 10). A Burundian human rights group reports that in 2006 soldiers and police officers committed 44.7 per cent and 39.5 per cent, respectively, of the 152 acts of torture recorded by the organization (APRODH, 2006b, pp. 29, 31).

The FDN

The FDN’s capacity to fulfil its mission is often said to be much better than that of the police. Respondents cite the military as the fifth most serious source of insecurity (8.2%, x=62, n=758). In a survey carried out by CENAP, respondents say that the FDN is better able to respond to security problems than the PNB (CENAP, 2007, pp. 15, 27). In general, the army has a better image than the police given that, according to one interviewee, ‘it is invisible’; military personnel are housed in barracks and thus have less contact with the general population. Moreover, one of the projects of the Peacebuilding Fund provides for the restoration of 14 barracks, which should make it possible to ‘withdraw the members of the FDN from very densely populated neighbourhoods and thus reduce friction’ (UNSC, 2008a, para. 51).

The military are usually kept under much better control than the police. The FDN, for example, severely punishes soldiers who steal or lose their weapons; indeed, more soldiers are court-martialled or appear before the war council for this offence than for any other (one-third of cases in 2007) (RoB MND, 2007). According to the Observatory of Armed Violence, soldiers are responsible for only 6.6 per cent of the acts of armed violence that occurred between August 2007 and December 2008 (UNPF, 2007; 2008).
The deployment of soldiers on the ground, however, leads to an increase in extortion activities and in the number of violent acts against the civilian population. Sometimes soldiers force civilians to work for them without pay and under duress (ONUB–OHCHR-B, 2006d, p. 3; 2006e, p. 3; 2006f, p. 3). This type of incident occurs particularly in the provinces of Bujumbura Rural, Bubanza, Cibitoke, Bururi, and in certain areas around Bujumbura-Mairie; that is, in areas where the soldiers are deployed to combat the Palipehutu-FNL (Small Arms Survey, 2008, p. 11).

The number of acts of armed violence committed by the FDN seems to follow the evolution of the conflict with the Palipehutu–FN very closely. According to the monthly reports on the human rights situation in Burundi produced by ONUB and then BINUB, the FDN was the force responsible for by far the greatest number of violations committed by the defence and security forces (76%) between March and September 2006, trailed by the SNR and the PNB. The great majority of cases attributable to the soldiers appear to be summary executions or acts of torture against members of the Palipehutu–FNL or its presumed collaborators (ONUB–OHCHR-B, 2006c–e, g–h, j). Just a month after the signing of the ceasefire in September 2006, however, the distribution changed radically, with the PNB being held responsible for more human rights violations than any other defence and security force; specifically, the PNB was held responsible for 74.2 per cent of the cases involving life-threatening assaults and violations of physical integrity between October 2006 and July 2007, while the military was held responsible for only 15.7 per cent of these violations.

In 2007, the military court and the war council heard 195 cases (RoB MND, 2007). One-third of the cases initially scheduled never went to court, which suggests that the military judicial system is inefficient or lacks resources. One-third of the cases heard in 2007 involved the loss of a weapon through negligence, 11.3 per cent involved desertion, 10.3 per cent murder, 8.7 per cent assault and injuries, 6.7 per cent rape, and 3.0 per cent aggravated theft. These figures show that most cases involve breaches of discipline rather than human rights violations. Sometimes, political pressure may cause certain cases to be dropped, increasing the perception that the climate of impunity is widespread among the population.

The police

According to the Observatory of Armed Violence, police officers were responsible for nine per cent of the acts of armed violence recorded between August 2007 and December 2008 (UNPF, 2007; 2008). Between 2006 and 2008, 119 cases of torture committed by police officers were referred to the NGO Avocats sans frontières (Lawyers without Borders) (HRW, 2008b, p. 31). In a study on torture carried out in the provinces of Bujumbura-Mairie, Bujumbura Rural, Bubanza, and Muramvya by the Ligue Iteka in November 2007, police officers were cited as perpetrators of torture by 86 per cent of respondents (Ligue Iteka, 2007b, pp. 8–14).

The reasons for torture seem to vary according to province. According to respondents, torture is mainly used as ‘punishment’ in Muramvya, Bubanza, and Bujumbura Rural. In Bujumbura-Mairie, 50 per cent of respondents said that torture was used to extract confessions, 35 per cent said it was used as punishment, and 15 per cent said it was used to obtain information (Ligue Iteka, 2007b, p. 15). In October 2007, police officers working for the Rapid Mobile Intervention Group tortured 20 individuals whom they suspected of belonging to the Palipehutu–FNL (HRW, 2008b, pp. 9–11).

Since police officers live among the population rather than in barracks, they have much more freedom to act than soldiers. The salaries of PNB officers increased in 2007, but the lowest ranks still earn only around FBU 40,000 (USD 35) per month, which is barely sufficient to pay for housing. Poorly paid, barely supervised, and armed, some members of the police commit acts of banditry. Even if authorities acknowledge that such acts take place, it is often difficult to identify the perpetrators with any certainty, as some civilians put on military or police uniforms when they commit their crimes (Small Arms Survey, 2008, p. 11); at the same time, some members of the security forces do not wear their uniforms when committing crimes. When a series of searches was carried out and weapons seized at the beginning of 2008, the police found police and military uniforms in civilians’ homes on several occasions.

The National Intelligence Service

In October 2006, Burundi’s president admitted that the SNR was guilty of mistakes during interrogations, acts of corruption, and abuses of power (Butoyi, 2006). The same year, SNR agents were suspected of committing 38 extra-judicial executions and at least 13 cases of torture (HRW, 2006b, pp. 13, 24). Formerly known as the ‘Documentation nationale’ (National Information), the SNR, which was created by law in 2006, is directly accountable to the president. The agency is generally perceived by the population as the state’s instrument of repression (Small Arms Survey, 2008, p. 17). It is often accused of various abuses: arbitrary arrest and imprisonment; brutal interrogations; and non-compliance with procedures. Victims are generally afraid to complain, as the SNR has friends in high places (Small Arms Survey, 2008, p. 17).
The SNR has played an important role in the fight against the Palipehutu–FNL, particularly by holding prisoners arbitrarily—sometimes in secret places and often well beyond the legal time limits. The Ligue Iteka has shown that in 2006, most of these detentions took place in the northern neighbourhoods of Bujumbura-Mairie and the province of Bujumbura Rural (Small Arms Survey, 2008, p. 19). During their detention, the presumed rebels are sometimes tortured by being struck with truncheons, metal bars, belts, or electric wires (Small Arms Survey, 2008, p. 18; Ligue Iteka, 2007a, p. 46). According to the Ligue Iteka, the SNR was involved in seven per cent of all recorded cases of torture in 2006 (Ligue Iteka, 2007a, app. III).

The SNR is also suspected of being responsible for the most recent waves of political violence, which occurred in August 2007 and March 2008, during which several politicians were targeted (HRW, 2008a). On 8 March 2008, the homes of three members of parliament were attacked with grenades. They were among the 46 members of parliament who had signed, two weeks previously, a request for protection that was sent to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-Moon (AFP, 2008a; HRW, 2008a).

The UN Peacebuilding Fund, with the support of the BINUB, is financing a project to reform the SNR with the aim of helping the SNR ‘become a service that protects the population’ through training in law, criminal procedure, professional ethics, and human rights, among other areas (JSC, 2007, p. 2).

Possible solutions

Demobilization

With the assistance of the International Center for Transitional Justice, the PNB is currently counting its members in order to ensure ‘better management of its human and material resources’ and to improve ‘relations between the police and the public’ (RoB and ICTJ, 2008). A count of the FDN is also under way with financing from the World Bank. At this writing, the army estimated its strength at 27,900 people (with a margin of error of about 300 individuals).

These counts will show how many soldiers and police officers will have to be demobilized in order to reach the targets of 25,000 members for the FDN and 15,000 members for the PNB. This initiative should also make it possible to reduce the state’s security budget and enhance control over these institutions. The demobilization of these forces is an extremely sensitive subject, as it must take account of the balance between the various ethnic groups. Matters may be further complicated by the imminent integration of certain members of the Palipehutu–FNL—who are mainly Hutus. The population views the preservation of the ethnic balance as a guarantee of peace. Resistance to demobilization is also related to the prestige and regular income enjoyed by the military, combined with the fact that the reintegration programme is not seen as particularly attractive; between November 2007 and May 2008, 990 members of the FDN refused to comply with the forced demobilization (UNSC, 2008a, para. 53). Another factor is the lack of willingness, on the part of the higher echelons, to reduce the size of the defence and security forces, ‘as evidenced by measures to improve the living conditions of the men in uniform, notably salary increases, which clearly run counter to a reduction in personnel’.

The battle against impunity

It seems that the condemnation by human rights organizations and the media of certain human rights violations committed by the security forces has borne fruit. For example, since these violations were widely exposed in the Burundian media and NGO reports, the number of cases of forced labour imposed by the military has decreased (Small Arms Survey, 2008, p. 11). More than two years after the events, the conviction in October 2008 of 15 soldiers for the massacre at Muyinga is, according to Human Rights Watch, ‘an important blow against impunity in Burundi’ (HRW, 2008d).

The government encourages the defence and security forces to dismiss members ‘who are guilty of disrupting the security of the country’ (Burundi Réalités, 2008). In December 2007, 20 members of the PNB were dismissed and certain members of the FDN charged with human rights violations (UNSC, 2008a, para. 62). In January 2008, according to a high-ranking police officer, more than 300 members of the police service (253 lower ranks, 50 non-commissioned officers, and 20 officers) were dismissed for various offences, desertions, and gross misconduct. They were not demobilized and their weapons and police effects were confiscated. The Ministry of the Interior has also set up a police disciplinary body to oversee police conduct, but it has few resources and does not even have the capacity to travel into the interior of the country (Powell, 2007, p. 14). Moreover, there still are no internal regulations or code of police conduct (PNB, 2007a, p. 196).

Professionalizing the uniformed services

The PNB lacks the resources to carry out its basic missions (Powell, 2007, pp. 13–14). Police training is inadequate: some PNB members do not know, for example, that torture is illegal (Powell, 2007, p. 14). Many international players are committed to improving the situation. The Belgian development
programme aims to improve police ethics by providing training for PNB personnel and support for a specialist commission (Powell, 2007, p. 15). The French are concentrating on training higher-ranking officers. The Dutch provide support for the PNB in terms of strategy and equipment (provision of equipment and construction of infrastructure). ONUB and then BINUB and many NGOs and specialist organizations have also organized training for members of the PNB, particularly on human rights and international humanitarian law. According to Powell, these various initiatives are complementary but lack coordination, which risks creating redundancies and pointlessly overloading the police administration (Powell, 2007, pp. 17, 21).

A high-ranking officer within the PNB reported that the police still follows ‘an outdated model of prevention/repression’. A new command structure has been set up and the force’s strategy rethought to create a community police force, but this process is still in its infancy. The goal is to improve the image of the security forces among the general public, which is mostly unaware of police duties and powers (Powell, 2007, p. 14).

The FDN has also received aid from various sources. Belgium provides training with a view to harmonizing this force, which consists of different groups with a variety of different capabilities. France and the Netherlands, which are helping the army to improve its infrastructure, also provide training. Finally, China is developing military cooperation with Burundi (Powell, 2007, p. 25). Out of the USD 35 million set aside by the Peacebuilding Fund for Burundi, nearly USD 13 million have been allocated to the reform of the security sector through five projects: (1) the disarmament of the civilian
an assessment of armed violence in burundi

population and the fight against the proliferation of light weapons; (2) the renovation of barracks for the military; (3) the promotion of discipline within the FDN; (4) the reform of the SNR; and (5)—the biggest budget item—support for an ‘operational national Burundian community police force’. In June 2008, most of the projects had begun but were seriously behind schedule.126


domestic and sexual violence

text context:

burundian society is very patriarchal and women suffer many forms of discrimination. according to bariyuntura and nindorera (2003), ‘the weight of tradition is such that discrimination is accepted or tolerated, whether consciously or not, including by women, particularly in rural areas’. women are more likely to be victims than perpetrators of acts of armed violence.127 out of the 310 acts of armed violence reported by the ligue iteka in 2007, at least 81 included women among the victims (ligue iteka, 2008, app. i).128 most acts of armed violence that are known to have been committed against women involved accusations of witchcraft or were committed in the course of thefts, the settling of scores, or family quarrels.129 these figures do not include sexual violence, which is recorded separately by the ligue iteka. in 2007, it recorded 1,013 rapes in total (ligue iteka, 2008, p. 106).130 this information does not reveal whether the sexual violence involved the use of a weapon.

the level of gender-based violence is high in burundi, but little is known of this phenomenon as it often goes unreported. during the war, women in particular were the targets of abuse and violence (acat and woat, 2008, p. 13); rape was commonplace in the provinces most affected by the fighting (ntiranyibagira, 2005). the highest rates were observed in the areas around military positions (armed forces and rebel).131 rape was widely used as an act of war (ai, 2007), often under the threat of a weapon. in a survey of 79 victims of sexual violence carried out in 2005, the ligue iteka notes that a little more than one-third of the wartime victims said that ‘they did not resist because the rapist [was] armed’ (shaka muhoza, 2004, p. 9). in a survey of households carried out in 2008, more than 20 per cent of respondents who said that acts of armed violence had taken place in their neighbourhood, colline, or village (x=130, n=629) cited ‘rape committed under the threat of a weapon’ as one of these acts (small arms survey and ligue iteka, 2008).

although much less common now than during the war, the incidence of rape under the threat of a weapon remains high in burundi.

victims

domestic violence

domestic violence generally only comes to light when the victim is seriously wounded and needs medical treatment (acat and woat, 2008, p. 20). this type of violence includes forced abortions following assaults, assaults with wounding, cruel and degrading treatment, and conjugal rape (acat and woat, 2008, p. 18). the observatory of armed violence recorded 69 cases of armed domestic violence—including family conflicts and armed violence relating to witchcraft—in 2008 (unpf, 2007; 2008). fifty per cent of these acts were committed with a bladed weapon, 27 per cent with a grenade, and 18 per cent with a firearm (unpf, 2008).

in 2007, 356 women benefited from a programme to combat violence against women and children that was run by the ligue iteka. according to the organization, this figure is ‘illustrative’ as the majority of victims, particularly those living in the country, dare not report domestic violence. they fear reprisals or the consequences of making a complaint; being totally dependent on their husbands, they would lose their means of subsistence if he were to be incarcerated. even if they wished to lodge a complaint, they may not know the required procedure, or if they do, they do not always have the resources to take such action.

sexual violence

rape is the most common form of sexual violence in burundi (irin, 2008b); it remains a source of serious stigmatization and exclusion. the word ‘rape’ does not have an equivalent in kirundi (lebrun and derderian, 2007, p. 50); the well-known impunity enjoyed by the many individuals who committed rape during the war has only encouraged this crime (ai, 2007, p. 8; acat and woat, 2008, p. 15). in 2006, the ngo ntirengaho sheltered 74 girls who had been rejected by their families due to rape or early pregnancy (ntirengaho, 2007a, p. 6). the great majority of rape victims are female; 97 per cent of individuals treated by the seruka centre in 2007 were women (msf–belgium, 2008). male victims are usually children.

the victims are usually very young: the seruka centre statistics show that out of the 1,435 rape victims treated by the centre in 2007, 64 per cent were under 19 years of age, 33 per cent were under 12, and 15 per cent were under 5 (msf–belgium, 2008).132 this very high number of rapes of children does not mean that adults are not affected. according to a psychologist who serves as the field coordinator for médecins sans frontières (doctors without borders, msf), it is much more stigmatizing for a man or woman to admit to having been raped than to say that his or her child has been raped, which partially
explains why it is mainly children who arrive at the centre. The real number of rape victims in Burundi is therefore probably much higher than the number reported. In a survey of households carried out in 2003 in Mwaro Province, respondents said that victims did not report their aggressors for the following reasons: for fear of being marginalized (51%); for fear of reprisals (29%); because they were not able to identify their aggressor (14%); and because they assumed that no penalties would be imposed (6%) (Habimana, Nduwabike, and Butoyi, 2004, p. 27). MSF reports that in Africa generally, only one rape in 36 to 50 is reported to the health services (Bolle, 2007).

In 2007, only 15 per cent of rape victims treated by the Seruka Centre asked for a medical certificate, which is essential for anybody wishing to lodge a complaint (MSF–Belgium, 2008). This suggests that at most 15 per cent of the victims intended to bring legal proceedings. In fact, the impunity enjoyed by perpetrators of sexual crimes and gender-based violence was specifically mentioned in Resolution 1791 of the UN Security Council (UNSC, 2007, para. 7).

It has also been shown that when Burundian women wish to initiate legal proceedings, they encounter more obstacles than men (ACAT and WOAT, 2008, p. 10). The police authorities take little interest in reports of rape, and a complaint lodged by a woman is subject to far more delays than a complaint lodged by a man (ACAT and WOAT, 2008, p. 10). In addition, Burundian women are not entitled to inherit and only rarely have any money of their own; dependent on their husbands, they do not often have the financial resources to bring legal proceedings. The weakness of the judicial system and the weight of tradition usually push victims and their families to come to an amicable arrangement with the perpetrator of the rape. In some cases the victim may even be encouraged to marry her aggressor.

**Perpetrators**

Statistics from Burundian prisons reveal that 13.5 per cent of male prisoners in December 2007 had been accused of rape. It is the second-most common reason for imprisonment after aggravated theft. Although not perfect, Burundian law does have the means to punish rapists who, under the new penal code adopted by Parliament in November 2008, may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment ranging from five years to life (HRW, 2008d), while the maximum sentence was previously 20 years.

According to the head of the Seruka Centre, until mid-2005 rapists were often men in uniform (which corresponds to more than 100 victims in 2005) (Ligue Iteka, 2007a, app. IX). The resumption of fighting between the army and the Palipehutu–FNL in April–May 2008 triggered a new rise in the number of rapes in the regions concerned, before the number declined again with the cessation of the fighting (IRIN, 2008b).
have laid emphasis on the importance for the victim to complain to the police, and to go to a medical centre within 72 hours of the rape. They have also stressed the fact that bashinganyatahe (local traditional judges) have been prohibited from attempting to seek amicable settlements in rape cases (ONUB–OHCHR-B, 2006b, p. 6; 2006c, p. 5).

As part of its new community policing strategy, the PNB should be able to more effectively prevent gender-based violence, which often occurs in a domestic setting (Powell, 2007, p. 19). In addition, in order to combat the armed violence committed by the security forces, the Association of Women Lawyers, Niturengaho, and UNIFEM have developed training and awareness raising initiatives (Kandanga, 2007; Nturengaho, 2007a). The reform of the penal code and the Code of Criminal Procedure represents a significant step forward, as the proposed texts explicitly mention domestic violence and provide new measures to protect women. A recent report notes: ‘With respect to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment within the home, a penalty equal to that laid down for torture (10 to 15 years’ imprisonment) is demanded’ (ACAT and WOAT, 2008, p. 12). The Burundian Parliament adopted the code in November 2008; however, the Senate is still hesitant. The implementation of the code will be an indispensable step towards a reduction in the level of sexual violence, and its prevention. The new code also specifies that in the case of rape, carrying, threatening to use, and using a weapon are aggravating factors (RoB MoJ, 2008, par a. 555).

Violence relating to land disputes

Context

Burundi has a large population given the size of the country: more than eight million inhabitants in an area of a little more than 27,000 km², with a population density of nearly 300 inhabitants/km² (IRIN, 2007b). The economy is dominated by the primary sector: more than 95 per cent of the population is dependent on agriculture for a living (IFAD, 2008, p. 2). The demographic expansion of the country and the deterioration in the quality of some soil due to excessive or inappropriate exploitation have led to shortages, particularly in the provinces of Kayanza in the north of the country and Rutana in the south-east (BINUB–DDH, 2007e, p. 2). In addition to these problems, the country also suffers from disputes over property rights, in which individuals and families are in conflict over the possession of exploitable land (ICG, 2003, p. 1).

Land disputes take many forms. Among other causes, CENAP cites: challenges to sales contracts concluded during various Burundian crises,
AN ASSESSMENT OF ARMED VIOLENCE IN BURUNDI

not always known, and the victims are sometimes accused of something difficult to quantify acts of violence relating to land conflicts as the motive is which most transactions are not recorded formally (CENAP, 2006). It is very number of heirs; and the difficulty of asserting land rights in a system in division of parcels of land that are too small between an ever-increasing often in the absence of owners who had been forced to flee; disputes over the division of parcels of land that are too small between an ever-increasing number of heirs; and the difficulty of asserting land rights in a system in which most transactions are not recorded formally (CENAP, 2006). It is very difficult to quantify acts of violence relating to land conflicts as the motive is not always known, and the victims are sometimes accused of something quite different by those who covet their land—such as witchcraft (see Box 3)—so that they are subject to ‘popular justice’ (Niyonkuru, 2008, p. 13).

The land problems facing returnees fall into two categories: the despoilment of land and the problems of the ‘landless’.

Despoilment of land: returnees sometimes find that the local authority allocated their land to someone else in their absence. Often, conflicts arise within families when refugees return to find that those who remained behind sold or appropriated their land. The government itself encouraged the sale of the land, as each transaction is taxed and is a source of income for the state and the district. Finally, returnees sometimes find that their neighbours appropriated some of their land.

The problem of the ‘landless’: returnees who do not possess any land in Burundi are referred to as the ‘landless’. The term can also apply to individuals who have been rejected by their family, particularly if there is only a small amount of land available. This includes many cases of widows rejected by their husband’s family, refugees with a new wife and children who are rejected by the rest of the family, children born abroad, and orphans. The situation became more tense when the Tanzanian government made it known that it would close all refugee camps on 30 June 2008.

Some returnees arrive in groups to physically occupy the land they claim (actions referred to as ‘sittings’). It is not unusual for disputes of this type to be settled by violence, which has become more extreme since 2007. Formerly, hostile exchanges occurred during the day and were mostly verbal, even if force was sometimes used. Today violence is increasingly taking place at night and the adversaries may have recourse to arms—often grenades— which they might use to destroy houses or injure whole families.

Victims

When violence occurs in connection with land disputes, the victims are usually heads of families (mainly men) or eldest sons (who are to inherit the land). Women, however, may be targeted when they have a usufructuary right to the land (Niyonkuru, 2008, p. 8). When entire families are targeted, women and children are also often victims of the violence, as are day labourers who work the land and may also be attacked (Niyonkuru, 2008, pp. 8–9).

Women are a particularly vulnerable group under Burundian property law since they may not inherit land from their fathers (unless they do not have brothers, which is rare) (RCN, 2004, p. 56). They are therefore dependent on their parents or their husband and his family for their survival. A law has been drafted that would allow women to inherit, but the government has decided to submit it to the general public for consultation rather than to parliament, which does not bode well for its chances of success as Burundians seem to be generally hostile to this reform.

The land problem particularly affects returnees, who are in a very precarious financial situation and often are not very familiar with Burundian law. In 2008, more than 94,000 refugees returned to Burundi (UN News Centre, 2008). Burundi saw several waves of forced exodus. The first was in 1972, when many Hutus, mainly from Nyanza-Lac and Rumonge in the south, had to leave the country. Their land, which was particularly fertile as it was at the

Box 3  Witchcraft as a pretext for violence: those accused of witchcraft are sometimes really victims of land disputes

Accusations of witchcraft, which are not rare in Burundi, conceal the most varied motives, which vary from personal vengeance to land disputes. Accusations are sometimes linked to the fear of strangers, and by extension to the return of refugees. In Ruyigi and other provinces, it is rumoured that the communities returning from Tanzania will bewitch those who remained. This may explain the disproportionately high number of accusations of witchcraft recorded by the Ligue Iteka in the province of Cankuzo (16 cases of the violation of the right to life in 2006 were linked to questions of witchcraft).

The Ligue Iteka data also shows that in a certain number of cases, couples or entire families were attacked, in which case the perpetrators mainly used grenades, which can kill or wound several people at once. A person accused of witchcraft is generally attacked (and often killed) by a crowd. In 2006, people were lynched for this reason in provinces as diverse as Bubanza, Cankuzo (two cases), Kayanza, and Makamba. Finally, the majority of victims of this type of aggression are women, although men are not immune to attack. Out of 30 violations of the right to life relating to accusations of witchcraft recorded by the Ligue Iteka in 2006, for which the sex of the victim was known, 17 of the victims were women and 13 men (57% and 43% of the victims, respectively).

Sources: PNB (2007a); Ligue Iteka (2007a, app. I, IV)
edge of the lake, was rapidly redistributed by the local authority to those who remained (RCN, 2004, pp. 8–9; ICG, 2003, p. 1). Many Burundians also left the country during the 1993–96 crisis, but their return to their land has in general been easier than for the returnees who left in 1972; having been away for a shorter time, the community is more likely to consider them the ‘legitimate owner’ of the land (RCN, 2004, pp. 24–27).

Perpetrators

The victims and perpetrators of the violence (or those who order it) are often related, but this is not always the case. Many conflicts arise between returnees and those who began to occupy their land when they left. They may be former neighbours or individuals who arrived more recently (Niyonkuru, 2008, p. 9).

Acts of violence linked to land disputes are often committed by intermediaries; these individuals have no interest in the conflict themselves but commit acts of violence ‘under contract’ (Niyonkuru, 2008, p. 4). Demobilized combatants as well as active members and ex-combatants of the Palipehutu–FNL are often suspected of acting as ‘hired assassins’ in land disputes (Niyonkuru, 2008, pp. 4–5), although it is not possible to be certain about the accuracy of these accusations.

Possible solutions

Land disputes are particularly difficult to settle due to the lack of clarity surrounding title deeds. The Land Code only came into existence in 1986, and the registration of land at the land registry is not compulsory. Furthermore, searching for title deeds (when they exist) or having such deeds drafted is a long, complicated, and costly procedure. For example, a title deed for a house with three or four rooms in a low-income neighbourhood of Bujumbura will cost FBU 800,000 (USD 700), which explains why few people choose this option. In the absence of a solid legal basis by which property rights could be determined, the population in general relies on ‘knowing’ to which family a particular plot of land belongs. Conflicts must therefore be settled locally, by individuals who know the parties to the conflict and the land in question.

When refugees who left the country in 1972 come back, they face the fact that the families who are occupying their land have been there for several generations and are not planning to move anywhere else. The small size of the plots means that dividing the land between the old and new owner is not usually a viable solution (RCN, 2004, p. 18). Under these circumstances, the most common solution is to compensate the former occupier and allow him to set up house elsewhere (RCN, 2004, p. 22); however, this approach may pose serious cultural problems and often provokes resistance.

Various associations attempt to settle the problems through mediation to keep the parties from going to court. The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), for example, has a success rate of around 35 per cent in its mediation efforts. Other conflicts are settled through bashingantahe, who deliver traditional justice based on consensus and reconciliation. The Law of 20 April 2005, relating to the organization of district administration, provides that the bashingantahe should work with the elected representatives of the district in order to resolve community conflicts, including land disputes.

The action of the National Commission for Land and Other Assets (CNTB), which is focused on mediation at the local level, reflects this willingness to settle disputes without going before the courts, which are already overloaded and relatively ineffective. Created in 2006 under the aegis of the vice presidency in order to attempt to solve these problems, the CNTB is the fourth initiative (after the commissions that were set up in 1977, 1992, and 2000) that aims to help returnees recover their land and settle disputes (RCN, 2004, pp. 9, 12, 17). As the name implies, the mandate of the new commission goes beyond land disputes to take account of ‘other assets’ that the refugees and displaced persons lost when they left. These include, for example, destroyed houses, stolen vehicles, and plundered bank accounts.

The main task of the CNTB is to settle land disputes through local structures. It must also prepare an inventory of the land belonging to the state and recover land that was acquired illegally during the war in order to redistribute it to victims in need. The CNTB is still seeking to define the basis of its operation. Illegal occupants will have to return the land, but nothing has yet been decided regarding compensation (whether financial compensation or other land), if compensation can be awarded. Out of a total of 18,832 complaints lodged—of which a little more than 10,000 relate to land alone, mainly in the western provinces of the country—only 350 or 2 per cent of the total have been settled (272 by amicable settlement, 86 by decision of the CNTB) (CNTB, 2008).

The government of Burundi has also launched a proposal to reform the Land Code and set up an interministerial technical committee with responsibility for the revision. In September 2008, the committee drafted a ‘land policy letter’ whose aim was to lay down an operational strategy (Nkurunziza, 2008).
III. Costs and Consequences: Medical Treatment and Legal Support

Medical care for victims

The effects of armed violence are exacerbated by the lack of medical care available for the Burundian population—a state of affairs that is condemned by many organizations. However, despite the destruction caused by the war, there are many medical structures: the World Health Organization (WHO) reports that 80 per cent of Burundians live less than five kilometres from a health centre (WHO, n.d., p. 17). The real problem is the lack of qualified personnel and equipment, as well as the fact that most patients are unable to pay for medical care in the hospitals that have staff.

Burundi needs doctors. In 2004, there were three doctors on average per 100,000 inhabitants (UNDP, 2007, p. 250). Most of the qualified personnel left the country during the war and few have returned. Only about 30 doctors are trained each year (compared to 300 nurses) and the low salaries push many of them to work abroad. Among those who stay in the country, few agree to leave Bujumbura, as salaries are even lower outside the capital. Public health expenditure is particularly low in Burundi—0.97 per cent of the GDP in 2005—compared with 4.1 per cent in Rwanda and 2.9 per cent in Tanzania, for instance (Perspective Monde, n.d.).

WHO has begun to train a few doctors in light surgery, but the programme is insufficient to provide all victims of armed violence with the possibility of being treated. For instance, bullet injuries often cause fractures and bone injuries but the Prince Régent Charles Hospital, Bujumbura’s largest, with 600 beds, does not even have a qualified orthopedist. It has to rely on a general practitioner who has little experience in orthopedics and who is employed on an ad hoc basis. The Kamenge military hospital can treat neither the cases requiring maxillofacial surgery nor those requiring neurosurgery, and a number of bullet injuries (fractures of the jaw or facial bone, brain and spine injuries) fall into these categories. These cases have to be treated abroad, usually in Kenya or South Africa. Hospitals also need equipment, such as prostheses. Some existing equipment, such as scanners, cannot always be used because of the shortage of specialists who know how to use it.

Nor are there specific care structures for the disabled. According to a high-ranking official from the Public Health Ministry, any patient who needs a wheelchair ‘must first of all rely on himself’, either by buying it or by making a request to an NGO, such as Handicap International. Only military personnel disabled following a war injury are entitled to receive this type of appliance free of charge.

The psychological after-effects are not treated any better: the respondents in the household survey and focus groups mentioned anxiety attacks, lack of sleep, memory problems, mood fluctuations, and psychological trauma following acts of armed violence (Small Arms Survey and Ligue Iteka, 2008). Despite the considerable amount of trauma that the war caused among the population, the mental health field receives only 0.43 per cent of the total public health budget (WHO–AIMS, 2008, p. 5). In 2006, the country had only one psychiatrist and only one mental health service, the Kamenge Neuropsychiatric Centre (CNPK), which has only 65 beds (WHO–AIMS, 2008, pp. 5, 11).

Under these circumstances (and considering the prohibitive costs of medicines that must sometimes be taken for long periods), patients turn to other types of therapy: psychologists, traditional medicine, or ‘religious therapists’ who practise within evangelical churches (Vignaux, 2004). They are sometimes cared for by NGOs that provide psychosocial follow-up; one such NGO is the women’s rights group ADDF, which employs a psychologist on a part-time basis to treat victimized women. The capacity of these structures is limited, however. The ADDF can care for up to 35 women (each with two children) and 15 girls; the Nturengaho association accommodates an average of five people. The victims’ length of stay in these structures may be long—several weeks, even several months depending on the case.

The situation is even more precarious outside the capital. Together with the NGO HealthNet TPO, which has a psychiatrist, the CNPK has developed ambulatory care outside the capital; yet only 53 patients per 100,000 inhabitants make use of the service (WHO–AIMS, 2008, pp. 5, 9). More than 90 per cent of the psychologists, nurses, and therapists in Burundi work for NGOs or in private offices, which are located almost exclusively in Bujumbura (WHO–AIMS, 2008, pp. 13–14).

Medical costs

WHO reports that 90 per cent of Burundians do not have any type of medical insurance (WHO, n.d., p. 18). Since May 2006, maternity care and care for children under five years of age has been free (UNICEF, 2007). For the rest of
the population, there are several types of medical insurance: a mutual insurance company for public sector employees, a health insurance card system, and purchase orders. But the health insurance card is refused in most hospitals and purchase orders depend on the employer’s good will. According to WHO, 90 per cent of Burundians do not have any type of medical coverage (WHO, n.d., p. 18). Those without means are cared for in certain hospitals (particularly the Prince Régent Charles Hospital) until they recover, but they may then be literally imprisoned in the hospital until someone (family, friend, or benefactor) comes to pay the bills.175 The Ligue Iteka notes, for example, that on 26 January 2006, 48 people who could not pay for care were held against their will at the Kamenge university hospital centre, which was also storing 11 corpses whose families could only take them back once the bills were paid (Ligue Iteka, 2007a, p. 87).

The cost of medical care is a huge problem for most Burundians. In 2004, an MSF study assessed the number of Burundians without primary health care at one million (MSF, 2004, p. 2), or approximately 12 per cent of the population. At the Kamenge military hospital, the bill for a bullet wound amounts to FBU 450,000–500,000 (USD 380–430), including FBU 100,000 (USD 85) for the operation alone. The other costs include hospitalization, threads, dressings, care, and medicine.176 Other estimates put the cost of such an operation between FBU 300,000 and 1,000,000 (USD 260–860) in Bujumbura and between FBU 130,000 and 500,000 (USD 112–430) in the rest of the country. The cost of hospitalization depends mainly on the length of stay and on the wounds caused by weapons; injuries such as disembowelments and bone injuries that require amputation or another operation may call for hospitalization for several months. In 2007, bullet wounds accounted for 73 per cent of the medical costs borne by hospitals for wounds related to armed violence (Dalal and Nasibu Bilali, 2008, p. 24) (see Graph 13).

**Graph 13** Percentage of hospital medical costs per type of injury in 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Injury Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>73%</td>
<td>Bullet wounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16%</td>
<td>Explosives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Bladed weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1%</td>
<td>Blunt weapons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Dalal and Nasibu Bilali (2008, p. 24)177

Eleven cases examined in four provinces (Bujumbura-Mairie, Gitega, Ngozi, and Bururi) show that the costs generated by armed violence may vary considerably from one person to another (in particular, according to the type of wound to be treated), but the average medical cost for each one of these 11 people was approximately FBU 601,000 (about USD 500).178 The loss of productivity of eight of these individuals was calculated at an average of FBU 631,875 (USD 520)179 (Dalal and Nasibu Bilali, 2008, pp. 25–26). These averages reveal large differences: from FBU 181,000 to FBU 1,652,000 (USD 150–1,400) for medical costs and from FBU 120,000 to FBU 2,030,000 (USD 100–1,700) for productivity losses.

Some hospitals simply reject the patients who cannot afford to pay for their treatment. At the Kamenge military hospital, patients must pay a deposit of FBU 100,000 (USD 85) before they undergo surgery and FBU 30,000 (USD 25) for a bed. Only first aid is provided without a deposit.180 Those who cannot pay the fees are sent to the Prince Régent Charles Hospital. These practices can be partly explained by the difficult financial situation in which many Burundian hospitals and medical centres find themselves: at the beginning of January 2006, for instance, the Kamenge hospital had arrears of FBU 469,924,779 (USD 400,000) to collect (Ligue Iteka, 2007a, p. 87). Meanwhile the state only partially reimburses what it owes to the hospitals for insurance, and with long delays (HRW, 2006a, p. 69). Hospitals have a semi-public status: they are public but are managed independently. For example, the subsidies that the Prince Régent Charles Hospital receives from the state cover only about five per cent of its total budget. The remaining 95 per cent comes from bills for care and medicines.

Many patients seek help at health centres as they are cheaper and often closer to their homes than the hospital. However, the mortality rates are high there, as they lack equipment and qualified personnel. Some health centres in Bujumbura-Mairie and Bururi are managed by ordinary nurses who cannot care for the seriously injured, who are sent to the hospitals (Dalal and Nasibu Bilali, 2008, p. 3).

When the perpetrators of acts of violence have been identified and arrested, they are expected to pay their victim’s medical expenses, in addition to a fine and possibly some other criminal penalty. In all other cases, it is the victim himself or, if necessary, his family and friends who have to pay (Niyonkuru, 2008, p. 10). The perpetrator often threatens the victim with reprisals if he or she speaks, which means that in practice the victim and his or her family often have to pay the medical costs incurred on account of the injury, without any assistance.
Access to justice

In 2005, the human rights organization APRODH recorded 1,110 victims of violence; only 27.4 per cent of them initiated legal proceedings and 100 perpetrators were arrested, i.e. barely nine per cent of the total (APRODH, 2006a, p. 4).

Inefficiencies in the judicial system

Filing a complaint and obtaining justice is a real challenge. From the outset, victims are discouraged by the authorities’ lack of diligence in recording complaints, particularly in rape cases (AI, 2007, p. 5). The treatment of complaints is also hampered by the inefficiency of the PNB and lack of cooperation between the police and courts (UNSC, 2008a, para. 68).

The monthly reports on the human rights situation in Burundi by ONUB and subsequently by BINUB highlight the weaknesses of the Burundian judicial system: delays in the processing of files; incorrect classification of offences; poor knowledge of the penal code and the Code of Criminal Procedure on the part of the PNB; and the detention of suspects beyond the legal time limits. These are all frequent problems (ONUB–OHCHR-B, 2006a, p. 3). The fines set out in the 1981 penal code no longer correspond to the economic realities of the country and are often too low to be dissuasive. The inadequacy of the judicial system discourages not only victims from filing complaints but also witnesses from testifying (Niyonkuru, 2008, pp. 6–7).

A study conducted at the end of 2007 by the Prisons Department in partnership with BINUB shows that the Burundian prison population consists of 30 per cent convicted prisoners and 70 per cent prisoners on remand (UNSC, 2008a, para. 68), evidence of the slow pace of the judicial system. By comparison, the situation in France is the reverse, with 28 per cent of prisoners on remand, and 72 per cent convicted (French Republic, 2008, p. 3). According to a senior member of the Burundian prison authority, prisoners may be held on remand for periods ranging from six months to three years. Human rights observers note numerous cases of illegal and arbitrary detention every month as well as deplorable prison conditions; minors and women do not usually have separate accommodation and the registers of prisoners, when they exist, are badly kept.
Another problem is escapes from prison. In December 2007, 13 individuals escaped from six different detention centres. According to the 2006 report of the PNB, many escapes are related to ‘police officers’ ignorance of laws and regulations’ and escapes are sometimes facilitated by corrupt police officers (PNB, 2007a, p. 182). Professionals also complain of the dilapidated state of the facilities. The prison situation is therefore a cause for concern and the budget allocated each year to the authority is not enough to remedy the numerous failings in the system. The authority asked for FBU 4.5 billion (USD 4 million) in 2007 but was granted less than half that amount.

**Chronic impunity**

The weakness of the judicial system generates and encourages a culture of impunity. In the focus groups conducted in various provinces, impunity was often cited as a direct source of insecurity.

The Arusha Agreement laid the foundation for a transitional judicial system consisting of two entities: an international criminal court for Burundi and a National Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CENAP, 2008, p. 35). No progress has been made since then: while the UN opposes the granting of an amnesty, the party in power wishes to set up a commission that would favour ‘mutual pardons’ and a special court to try those who have not admitted their crimes (Burundi Information, 2007). National consultations designed to find out what Burundians expect from the transitional justice system were planned. In June 2008, the government and the joint steering committee for peacebuilding in Burundi signed a project in support of the consultations. However, these consultations have still not begun (CENAP, 2008, pp. 35–36). The fact that war crimes and numerous human rights violations committed during the conflict have not been punished or acknowledged has led many to perceive a culture of impunity.

The first to benefit from this impunity are the members of the defence and security forces, particularly the members of the SNR. By March 2008, for example, only two police officers had been convicted as a result of the 59 cases of police torture brought before the courts since 2006 with the help of Lawyers without Borders (HRW, 2008b, p. 31). If these individuals can act with impunity, it is because their victims do not dare file complaints, witnesses are afraid to testify, and public prosecutors are reluctant to take on these types of case. In 2006, the Muyinga public prosecutor was given police protection after receiving threats when he was dealing with the case of a high-ranking official of the SNR (HRW, 2006b, p. 23). According to Human Rights Watch, there is a real ‘culture of mutual protection between police officers, public prosecutors and judges’, which is often motivated by political affiliations (HRW, 2008b, p. 33). The members of the SNR should be subject to clear laws that would give them limited powers under the supervision of the judicial authorities (HRW, 2006b, p. 4).

More generally, even though 40 per cent of the victims of the 31 acts of armed violence detailed in the household survey knew their aggressor, only 3 perpetrators have been punished (Small Arms Survey and Ligue Iteka, 2008). Most victims of acts of armed violence do not file complaints as they do not know the identity of their aggressor, fear the cost of legal proceedings, or fear reprisals (BINUB–DDH, 2008b, p. 7). As noted above, the same phenomenon is observed with rape victims, who rarely file complaints, even when they know their aggressor(s).

**What are the alternatives?**

Because of the inadequacies of the judicial system and the climate of impunity, Burundians resort to other forms of justice. Vigilantism in the form of personal revenge or lynching is widespread, as is traditional justice as administered by bashingantahe. The human rights observers from BINUB and other organizations have led a campaign to raise awareness among local administrators and the bashingantahe on the dangers of reaching private settlements as a way of dealing with crimes; however, their efforts have met with little success (BINUB–DDH, 2008a, p. 4).

The Palipehutu-FNL seems to mete out its own justice in the areas where the movement is most active (CENAP, 2008, p.14). It settles disputes and punishes the guilty, at times to the satisfaction of the population, which, in some cases, prefers its more expeditious justice to that of the courts. This parallel justice may be brutal: the Ligue Iteka affirms that in Bubanza, in particular, the ‘movement purports to settle disputes by beating the accused with a stick’ (Ligue Iteka, 2007b, p. 11).

**Improving judicial competence**

The powers and resources of the judicial system need to be strengthened in order to combat the climate of impunity. In March 2008, BINUB launched two projects to achieve this objective. One aimed to ‘reduce and eliminate the settling of scores by re-launching the national programme to record and enforce court rulings and judgements’ and the other was designed to ‘restore the basic judicial system by reducing conflicts within communities through
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above fees add up to the average cost involved in taking a case to the court of first instance; the same amount must be paid again if the case is appealed at the level of the regional court and if it goes to Burundi’s highest court of appeal (Cour de Cassation). Moreover, the plaintiffs must be physically present to follow their case, which entails substantial travelling and accommodation expenses, as the regional courts are located in the provincial capitals and the highest court of appeal is in Bujumbura. These incidental expenses, plus the income not earned because the plaintiff is unable to work during the trial, quickly become an insurmountable obstacle if the trial lasts for several weeks. Furthermore, in the event of imprisonment, the victim sometimes has to pay for the prisoner or have food sent to him (ACAT and WOAT, 2008, p. 27). In the case of rape, access to the judicial system is made more difficult due to the fact that the victim has to submit a medical report that costs an average FBU 10,000 (USD 8.50). These expenses are often too high for victims if they are not helped by a local or international NGO. Consequently, victims often decide not to bring legal proceedings or to abandon proceedings before a case is resolved. Some NGOs specialize in legal aid, but the demand far exceeds their capacity.

The construction and fitting out of local courts’. BINUB also organized training to improve the competence of 520 judges, judicial officers, and court clerks (BINUB Press Service, 2008). The human rights division of ONUB, and subsequently BINUB, organized training for court personnel, local authorities, the bashingantahe, and secondary school students (ONUB–OHCHR-B, 2006b, p. 5). The enhancement of judicial competence should help to reduce the high number of prisoners on extended remand.

The cost of justice

A final element that considerably curtails victims’ recourse to justice is cost. Plaintiffs must pay their travelling expenses when they deliver a police summons to the accused, the travelling expenses of the judicial officers who serve the summons on the other party (and, if the latter is absent, the expenses of a second trip by the judicial officer), and any travel expenses incurred by judges in order to collect evidence. In addition, a lawyer charges on average between USD 200 and 500 to defend his client’s interests, in a country where per capita GDP does not exceed USD 144 (IMF, 2008). The
Even the traditional justice of the *bashiningantahe* may prove to be expensive: victims who wish to see their case settled must bring them a crate of beer or soft drinks (a custom known as the *agatutu*).\(^{192}\) If the *bashiningantahe* decide in favour of the plaintiff, he or she must bring even more drinks.\(^{193}\) Many families cannot afford this expense and thus may not even resort to this type of justice in which, in the end, the victim pays the bill.\(^{194}\) Lastly, *bashiningantahe* are the solution favoured by most people who fear that the justice rendered by locally elected officials (who may, if necessary, intervene to stop the enforcement of a judgment rendered by the *bashiganantahe*) will not be as impartial, as they are tied to a political party.\(^{195}\)

The indirect costs of armed violence

**The costs for individuals**

The costs of armed violence are significant for a country whose resources are limited. Burundi ranks 167th (out 177 countries) in terms of human development, with 72–90 per cent of its population below the poverty line in all provinces except Bujumbura-Mairie, where it is 41 per cent (UNDP, 2007; IMF, 2007, p. 14).

In this context, armed violence uses scarce resources. Indeed, it generates a whole series of costs, from medical and funeral expenses to lawyers’ fees, including indirect costs such as the drop in productivity of victims who suffer after-effects. The prevention of armed violence is also expensive: among the 8.6 per cent (\(x=51, n=590\)) of respondents who said that they had taken measures to protect themselves or their families against armed violence, almost one-quarter (23.4%, \(x=11, n=47\)) reported having spent money for this purpose (Small Arms Survey and Ligue Iteka, 2008). The replies gathered in focus groups show that even organizing night watches between neighbours has a cost: the participants need torches, warm clothing, and sometimes weapons, which weigh heavily on already modest budgets.\(^{196}\) Some people also invest in mobile phones so as to be able to contact the police in the event of a problem.\(^{197}\) In total, among those who spent money to protect themselves, 44.4 per cent spent FBU 1,000–5,000 (USD 1–5), 44.4 per cent spent FBU 5,000–10,000 (USD 5–10), and 11.1 per cent spent more than FBU 10,000 (USD 10) for this purpose (Small Arms Survey and Ligue Iteka, 2008).

Armed violence generates many indirect costs. As the victims are mainly men,\(^{198}\) and often the head of the household and breadwinner, their dependents (women, children, parents) may find themselves in a very precarious situation if the person on whom they depend is killed or if he suffers serious after-effects. Cases of homeless children and of women turning to prostitution following such attacks were mentioned in the focus groups conducted as part of this study.\(^{199}\) This problem is particularly important in the cases of armed violence relating to land disputes as family heads, being owners of the land, are the first concerned (Niyonkuru, 2008, p. 8).

The prevention of armed violence also has indirect costs. Spending the night on guard has an effect on a person’s productivity at work the next day.\(^{200}\) In other cases, particularly when individuals are involved in land disputes, threats come before the acts of violence, causing victims to take refuge far from their homes; they spend the night hidden in the forest and take all the concomitant risks for their health and security (Niyonkuru, 2008, p. 10).

The costs for companies

According to the Burundian Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the National Institute of Social Security (INSS), companies’ security costs accounted for 0.25 per cent of their turnover, i.e. a total of FBU 1.25 billion (USD 1.1 million) in 2006, a considerable amount in a country where the national budget was USD 594 million in 2008 (Panapress, 2008d). This figure only includes security companies or security guards who are properly registered with the INSS. In practice, companies use all types of private security—such as police officers who hire themselves out—and the total must therefore be much higher (Dalal and Nasibu Bilali, 2008, p. 11). The number of private security companies registered with the INSS increased from two in 1994 to 14 in 2008 (Dalal and Nasibu Bilali, 2008, p. 11).

**Table 1** Costs of security services invoiced by private security companies in USD, May 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of building</th>
<th>Locations</th>
<th>Average cost per month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Residencies and warehouses</td>
<td>Town centres</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Outskirts</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offices</td>
<td>All locations</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embassies, NGOs, banks, and insurance companies</td>
<td>Town centres</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dalal and Nasibu Bilali (2008, p. 14)\(^{201}\)
The costs of private security companies depend on the type and location of the building being protected: a premises on the outskirts of Bujumbura is more expensive to protect than one located in the city centre (see Table 1) (Dalal and Nasibu Bilali, 2008, p. 14).

Insecurity also has indirect costs; shops and warehouses, for instance, do not stay open after nightfall. When it was decided to increase the number of police on the streets of Gitega, the shops which had been closing at 5 p.m.—which led to a sharp drop in traders’ income—were finally able to stay open until 9 p.m. In addition, even though this phenomenon is difficult to assess, it is clear that insecurity discourages foreign investment. For instance, in April 2008, Brussels Airlines suspended its flights to Bujumbura for security reasons for nearly two weeks, following the renewed outbreak of fighting between the FDN and the Palipehutu—FNL (Panapress, 2008b).

Arms in circulation in Burundi

In 2006 it was estimated that 100,000 households were in possession of firearms or grenades, which means that there are more than 100,000 arms in circulation among the civilian population in Burundi, given that a single household may own several weapons (Pézard and Florquin, 2007, p. 17). Yet in August 2008, a total of only 4,139 gun licences had been issued in Burundi; most of the arms circulating in the country are therefore illegal.

The regional nature of the successive crises affecting the various countries of the Great Lakes Region of Africa, the porosity of their borders, and their many commercial, political, and human interactions push governments to cooperate at a regional level. The aim of various regional projects—such as the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region, Tripartite Plus, or the Nairobi Protocol—is to motivate and strengthen national initiatives. In order to combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the region, Burundi and about ten other countries in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa signed the Nairobi Protocol in April 2004. In 2005, the secretariat of the Protocol became an inter-governmental organization known as the Regional Center on Small Arms and Light Weapons (Huybrechts and Berkol, 2005, p. 6). In August 2008, with the support of UNDP, the Ministry for Public Security organized a study group to analyse the draft bill regulating firearms and ammunition. This bill takes account of Burundi’s international obligations to combat the trafficking, illicit manufacturing, possession, registration, and marking of firearms and to crack down on firearm-related offences (UNDP, 2008b).

At the national level, in 2006 Burundi also set up a disarmament commission, the CTDC, which became the CDCPA in 2008. A civilian disarmament programme remains to be established, however (UNSC, 2008a, para. 57).

Yet sporadic seizures of arms have been conducted by the police, with mixed results. In 2008, the PNB seized 388 small arms and light weapons and 39,228 rounds of ammunition during the course of their forced disarmament.
operations among the civilian population (Panapress, 2008e). These very modest results suggest that people were expecting these searches and had the time to hide their weapons, or that the police strategy for conducting them was ineffective. These searches have been politicized and became the subject of debate; one article even describes them as ‘a spectacle for the television channels and the international community’ (Rukindikiza, 2008). Some people have accused the authorities of targeting neighbourhoods with a majority of one ethnic group or another. There were still more seizures following the murder of a French woman who was a member of the NGO Action Against Hunger, in Ruyigi on 31 December 2007 (Libération, 2008).

The arms seized during these operations are stored at the five regional police headquarters throughout the country. Set up with the help of the Mines Advisory Group (MAG), a mobile team responsible for creating an inventory of the arms seized or surrendered to the police, and for destroying them, has been operational since August 2008. The team collected 2,090 weapons, nearly 90 per cent of which are assault rifles, mostly still in working order, and began to destroy them in December 2008. Over a five-month period, two MAG teams on the ground are to assess the weapons with which the PNB is equipped, the security at the armoury, and the level of competence of armourers. A programme to destroy the obsolete or unusable arms and ammunition of the FDN is also in progress. With the help of BINUB, the army destroyed 1,697 guns and 29 mortars during the month of January 2008 alone (UNSC, 2008a, para. 58). The weapons seized by the police provide an idea of the type of firearms circulating in Burundi. Between January 2005 and December 2007, the internal security police (which is part of the PNB) seized 1,138 weapons, mainly grenades and Kalashnikovs. Slightly more than 5,945 rounds of ammunition were also seized during this period (see Table 2).

Most of the weapons and grenades seized by the police were found in Bururi, Bujumbura-Mairie, Bubanza, Ruyigi, Muramvya, Cibitoke, and Bujumbura Rural (see Graph 14). In theory, this does not necessarily mean that these provinces are the most problematic in terms of security—the size of the province, and the number and zeal of police officers there, may also explain the variations from one province to another. In practice, this result is not unduly surprising, insofar as crime levels are particularly high in Bujumbura-Mairie, and the rebels are still active in Bujumbura Rural, Bubanza, and Cibitoke. Bururi is an anomaly in that no other source indicates that this province is particularly affected by armed violence, but, historically, it is known to have had a high number of firearms.

### Table 2: Arms and ammunition seized by the police, 2005–07

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arms</th>
<th>Ammunitions (rounds)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R45 (3)</td>
<td>5.56 x 45mm (1,736)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalachnikovs (311)</td>
<td>7.62 x 39mm (1,874)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simonovs (5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light automatic rifles FAL (26)</td>
<td>7.62 x 51mm (107)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General-purpose machine guns MAG (4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G35 (2)</td>
<td>Unknown caliber (2,080)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistols (33)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-machine guns (3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzis (1)</td>
<td>No ammunition seized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B10s (5)</td>
<td>No ammunition seized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocket launchers (6)</td>
<td>No ammunition seized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No corresponding weapon seized</td>
<td>Mortar shell 60 mm (54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No corresponding weapon seized</td>
<td>Mortar shell 82 mm (94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades (739)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total: 1,138</td>
<td>5,945</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PNB (2007b)

Note: The magazines, mines, and bayonets seized are not included in this table.

There is a risk that weapons belonging to the police or the army may find their way into civilian hands. All police officers are armed with Kalashnikov assault rifles, a weapon inherited from the war and unsuited to the daily routine tasks undertaken to maintain law and order. Handguns would be more appropriate, but Burundi does not have sufficient stocks of them.

### Weapons used in acts of violence

The 1,535 cases of armed violence recorded by the Observatory of Armed Violence in 2008 reveal that firearms are the weapon most commonly used, featuring in 58 per cent of cases. The other types of weapon used are grenades (22%), bladed weapons (18%—mainly knives and machetes), clubs (including truncheons and bludgeons), ropes, stones, and poison (see Graph 15).
Different weapons are used depending on the motive for the act of violence (see Graph 16). The number of firearms used to commit theft is disproportionately high relative to other types of weapons. According to one interview, only firearms represent a powerful enough threat for assailants to achieve their ends; bladed weapons such as machetes are less ‘convincing’ and are thus rarely used.213 The weapons used in cases of banditry are mainly automatic rifles of the Kalashnikov type, craft weapons (mugobore), and grenades.214 Yet bladed weapons such as machetes are more frequently used in acts of domestic violence or between neighbours.215 Finally, the type of weapons used to commit acts of violence varies according to the sex of the perpetrator. Women mostly use instruments of everyday life (knives, sticks, rope, poison) (Ligue Iteka, 2008, app. I), which suggests that armed violence by women remains largely confined to the private sphere, and that they probably have less access to firearms than men.

These figures also show that firearms are more frequently involved than bladed weapons in acts of violence leading to the death of one or more victims. Seventy per cent of incidents involving a firearm have resulted in one or more deaths, compared to 62 per cent of those involving a bladed weapon. Conversely, of the 211 incidents leading to at least one death, 72 involved one or more firearms (34% of cases), and 51 involved one or more bladed weapons (24% of cases).

The type of weapon used varies according to the perpetrator. According to the Ligue Iteka, civilians mainly use bladed weapons (37%), such as machetes, knives, or hoes. Next come clubs or bludgeons (15%), small arms (10%), and finally grenades (9%) (Ligue Iteka, 2008, annexe 1).

On the other hand, small arms are the weapon of choice for men in uniform, rebels, and bandits. For suicides, rope is most commonly used, and those dispensing ‘popular justice’ mostly use clubs to execute their victims. Some lynching victims have also been killed with stones or bladed weapons (Ligue Iteka, 2008, app. I). Between March 2006 and April 2008, the human rights division of BINUB recorded 143 cases of ‘popular justice’; that is, more than seven cases per month.216 In general, these acts were committed following accusations of witchcraft or theft.

The use of grenades in violent attacks is extremely common in Burundi. In 2008, the Observatory found that grenades were involved in 22 per cent of cases in which a weapon was used in an act of violence (see Graph 15). The
supported the government troops during the war—the Peace Guardians (Gardiens de la paix)—were dismantled (in exchange for a reintegration allowance of USD 100 per person) and their weapons were recovered in the military regions. An identical initiative was set up for civilians known as ‘Militant Combatants’, who had supported the CNDD–FDD. According to a list kept at the staff headquarters in Bujumbura, 4,002 arms (2 pistols and 4,000 ‘weapons’, in all probability automatic rifles) were distributed by the military regions for the purposes of civil self-defence; 3,705 of these were recovered in September 2007 (FDN, 2007). In Makamba and Gitega, however, focus group participants said that civilians and demobilized soldiers still possessed some of the weapons distributed to them during the war, a view that was shared by demobilized soldiers interviewed in Bujumbura.

Perceptions of weapons and their holders
The most common response to the question ‘Who possesses firearms in your neighbourhood/colline?’ was ex-combatants (41.4% [x=87, n=210] of the replies), ahead of soldiers and police officers. This surprising result emphasizes

Arms held by the population
The ownership of weapons in Burundi: a history
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population has so many grenades because they are particularly cheap and easy to hide, they were easy to keep after the war (Pézard and Florquin, 2007, p. 17), and they can cause extensive damage at minimal cost. In July 2008, for example, a grenade thrown during a family celebration in central Burundi killed two people and wounded 45 (AFP, 2008e). Perpetrators of acts of banditry use grenades mainly to discourage people from chasing them following hold-ups or burglaries. Grenades are sometimes thrown in several different directions during the course of an attack in order to create confusion among the forces of law and order as to which building is really under attack.217

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in their neighbourhood or colline; this response rate appears relatively low, considering how easy it is to make this type of weapon. Moreover, mugobore are often found in great numbers at the weapons collecting ceremonies that have been organized for several years by civil society organizations in Burundi.

According to 55.1% (x=109, n=198) of respondents, banditry is the main reason why individuals who are neither police officers nor soldiers possess weapons. The next most common reasons are personal protection and the protection of the family and property, followed by ‘it’s a holdover of the conflict’, which shows that the legacy of the war still weighs heavily, especially in Bujumbura Rural. The reply for the ‘protection of the community’ obtained very low scores in all the provinces, except in Bururi. Finally, ‘political protection’ and ‘it’s tradition’ were only cited as grounds for possessing a weapon in Bujumbura-Mairie.

Change in the number of firearms, 2005–08

Almost one in three survey respondents said that the number of firearms present in their community had fallen over the last two years (30.6% [x=67, n=219]). For 15.1% (x=33, n=219) of respondents, the number of firearms had remained the same. In 2005, only 4.8 per cent of respondents thought that the number of firearms had increased over the last two years. At the time, this result was hardly surprising, insofar as the country was emerging from the war, and it was to be expected that the effect of the transition from conflict to a post-conflict situation would be a reduction in the number of firearms in circulation. Three years later, this post-conflict situation seems markedly unstable, with 26 per cent (x=57, n=219) of respondents convinced that the number of weapons in their community increased during the previous two years.

As regards the types of firearm held by these population categories, according to the respondents (n=191), the majority are Kalashnikov-type automatic rifles (83.8%, x=160), followed by grenades (75.9%, x=145), handguns (49.2%, x=94), and, to a lesser extent, knives and daggers (13.6%, x=26). The same pattern is clearly seen in the six provinces covered by the household survey, with the exception of Mwaro, where there seemed to be proportionately fewer handguns than elsewhere. Certain weapons of war (such as machine guns) are also cited, although infrequently, and mainly in Bujumbura Rural (15.2%, x=7, n=46).

Craft-produced weapons (mugobore) were only cited by 3.7% (x=7, n=191) of respondents, who stated that they know that there are weapons in circulation...
Similarly, a majority of respondents expressed a negative opinion of weapons in general, stating that the possession of a weapon in the home is more likely to put people in danger (82.8%, x=1227, n=1,482) than to protect them from it (9.1%, x=135, n=1,482). These results show a change for the better since 2005, since at that time only 76.1% (x=2,343, n=3,078) of respondents considered weapons to be a danger and 18.8% (x=579, n=3,078) saw them as a means of protection. Here, too, the replies varied considerably between provinces, the belief that weapons help to protect being more widespread among the population of Bujumbura-Mairie than elsewhere (see Graph 18 and Map 9). Yet in Bujumbura Rural, in spite of the difficult security situation, there is a widely held view that weapons are dangerous, which may be due to the fear of being perceived as a member of the Palipehutu–FNL if caught in possession of a weapon. The replies to the question ‘Would you like to possess a firearm?’ confirm that opinion is moving in that direction. Indeed, 92.2 per cent (x=1,312, n=1,423) of respondents replied ‘no’, compared with 7.5 per cent (x=107, n=1,423) saying ‘yes’ (only 0.1% preferred not to reply). Here, too, Bujumbura-Mairie and Bururi are the provinces that had the highest number of positive responses with respect to weapons (see Map 10).

Prospects for civilian disarmament

Weapons: means of protection or source of danger?

The household survey included the question, ‘Do you think that certain types of weapons can be useful to protect you or members of your household?’ In reply, only 19 per cent (x=282, n=1,487) of respondents answered ‘yes’ compared to 78.7 per cent (x=1,170) who said ‘no’ (see Map 8). These results must nevertheless be interpreted with caution, as questions about weapons are always sensitive and the respondents may fear revealing that they have a positive image of them. Ownership of weapons is widely regulated, and, for the most part, prohibited by law. Nevertheless, very few people chose not to answer this question (0.7% [x=11] of respondents), which seems to indicate that those who did reply did so without fear. This gives more weight to the results in favour of a negative perception of weapons. During a women’s focus group session in Makamba, the participants emphasized the importance of raising the population’s awareness about the dangers of possessing a weapon, particularly in terms of potential accidents involving children.
The respondents who replied in the affirmative to the question ‘Do you think that certain types of weapon can be useful to protect you or members of your household?’ (n=279), gave firearms first place as ‘useful’ weapons. Of these, automatic rifles came at the head of the list (59.9%, x=167), followed by handguns (41.2%, x=115), machetes (34.4%, x=96), grenades (22.6%, x=63), and knives and daggers (21.9%, x=61). During a focus group session, some inhabitants of Mwaro confirmed that firearms played an important role, not only as a means of defence, but also as a deterrent, since they can be fired into the air to frighten away thieves.

Perceptions of disarmament

The survey results are relatively encouraging with respect to the potential outcome of a future disarmament campaign. Across the six provinces under review, 77.4 per cent (x=1,149, n=1,485) of respondents stated that they thought a disarmament programme in their neighbourhood/colline would be ‘a great success’, compared with only 3.6 per cent (x=54, n=1,485) who said that it would ‘not succeed at all’. These figures, however, mark a slight retreat in comparison with the 2005 survey, in which 88 per cent (x=2,708, n=3,078) of respondents stated that a disarmament programme would be ‘a great success’ and only 2 per cent (x=62, n=3,078) of the population said that it would not succeed ‘at all’ (Pézard and Florquin, 2007). As in 2005, slight variations between provinces were apparent in 2008. Bujumbura-Mairie remains the province where respondents are most pessimistic about the chances of success of a disarmament programme, whereas Mwaro, Cibitoke, and Ruyigi show very high rates of positive replies (see Graph 19).

The 2008 survey also shows that perceptions regarding disarmament vary according to the districts of Bujumbura-Mairie. Bwiza is the district where the population has the least faith in the success of a possible disarmament programme (see Graph 20); it is also the district that seems to harbour the smallest number of weapons. Only 8.3 per cent of respondents (n=29) stated that the people in their neighbourhood possessed weapons or explosives, compared with 90.9 per cent for Kamenge. There also seems to be a particularly large number of people holding weapons in the districts of Ngagara (82.4%, n=25) and Kinindo (73.7%, n=27). Apart from in Bwiza, however, a majority of people in all the districts of Bujumbura-Mairie have distinctly positive expectations of a possible disarmament programme, whatever the socio-economic and ethnic profile of their population.

When the question is asked in a more personal way (‘If you had a weapon, would you agree to take part in a disarmament programme?’), the majority of the replies at the national level are also positive (with 82.3% (x=1,219, n=1,482) of respondents replying ‘definitely’, and only 2% ‘definitely not’ (x=29, n=1,482), irrespective of the age of the respondent (the least enthusiastic being those aged 20–29, and the most enthusiastic being those over 50). If the replies ‘definitely’ and ‘probably’ are combined, it emerges that 95.4 per cent (x=2,934, n=3,078) of respondents in 2005 and 95.9 per cent
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I

There is one caveat, however: focus groups show that people are generally familiar with the disarmament initiatives that were undertaken in their community by local organizations and are extremely pessimistic as to the impact these programmes had in terms of reducing the number of weapons in circulation.228

Ensuring successful disarmament

According to the female respondents in Gitega and Makamba, a disarmament programme may be a success if it is well prepared and organized by the government. In particular, it is crucial that the latter should establish clearly that the surrender of weapons will not give rise to legal proceedings. The importance of raising public awareness on this issue has also been emphasized by other participants.

During these focus group sessions, the participants also emphasized the fact that a disarmament campaign would have more chance of success if the government offered something in exchange for the weapons, without specifying the nature of this ‘something’ (money or goods).229 At the time of the survey, a financial incentive came top of the list, with 28.0 per cent (x=402, n=1,436) of respondents wanting someone to buy back their weapons from them (see Graph 21). Yet 64.6 per cent (x=927, n=1,436) of the respondents asserted that they were already convinced they should take part without needing additional motivation.

The possible forms of compensation cited by the respondents are means of transport (mainly bicycles), livestock or agricultural produce, building materials or housing, jobs, foodstuffs, and arable plots of land. According to the respondents in Bujumbura, the reward offered must depend on the value of the weapon returned and meet individual needs (such as livestock for livestock farmers or fertilizer for farmers).230 Yet most of the focus group participants were conscious of the risk of creating a further motive for procuring arms if the programme were too attractive.231 The participants also emphasized that a minority of the population makes such a profit from owning weapons that no sum of money, however large, could convince them to turn them in.232

Obtaining an improved level of security as a precondition to taking part in a disarmament programme ranks even higher than the prospect of non-financial compensation, especially in Bujumbura-Mairie, where the desire for better security almost equals the wish for financial compensation. According to the women questioned in Bujumbura, ‘as long as the FNL remains active, disarmament cannot work. New weapons will come in. It’s a vicious circle.’233 Focus group participants in Makamba and Gitega also emphasized this point.

Graph 20 Percentage of respondents who say that a disarmament programme would be a ‘great success’ in their district (province of Bujumbura-Mairie)

(x=1,219, n=1,487) in 2008 gave a positive reply to this question, which shows remarkable stability. As a general rule, these results have to be approached with some caution, however, as there may well be discrepancies between what respondents say and their willingness, in practice, to surrender their weapons the day a disarmament programme is actually established.

This stated willingness to disarm also varies depending on the province. Bujumbura-Mairie records the lowest score, with 72.1 per cent (x=245, n=340) of respondents ‘definitely’ ready to take part in a disarmament programme, compared, for example, with 84.2 per cent (x=271, n=322) in Bujumbura Rural (see Map 11). It is possible that the inhabitants of Bujumbura-Mairie fear that a disarmament programme may take away their weapons while failing to recover those of criminals; inhabitants of Bujumbura Rural, who bore the brunt of clashes between the government and the Palipehutu–FNL, probably see disarmament as a wider phenomenon encompassing the demobilization, cantonment, and disarmament of the rebels as part of a future peace agreement. The type of armed violence taking place in one province or the other may therefore have a significant effect on the willingness of the population to disarm.

The focus groups generally confirm this near-total willingness to disarm the population. In the absence of such a measure, according to some female participants in Makamba, ‘people will be tempted to use their weapon every time they come into conflict with someone’.227
According to respondents in Gitega, there must first be an improvement in security so that people are convinced that they can hand in their weapons without mortgaging their future protection. ‘It’s a vicious circle because if someone hands over their weapon, and later hears gunshots, they are going to reuse the same means to get hold of weapons once again.’

This list of reasons to disarm, ranked in order of importance, is broadly similar to that revealed by the previous survey of 2005, which shows that financial compensation is still important. Yet it also shows that an improvement in the security situation remains a fundamental preoccupation for Burundians and that it is considered by many to be an essential precondition for disarmament.

As was the case in response to the 2005 survey, only a handful of respondents seem willing to surrender their weapons ‘to a political party’, ‘to a trade union’, or to ‘someone in my community’ (1% or fewer than 1%) (see Graph 22).

Likewise, the local NGOs and the UN still get relatively mediocre scores. In 2005, when the government launched a scheme to disarm the militias in return for financial compensation, respondents may have been expected to prefer this solution rather than calling on the UN or the local NGOs (Pézard and Florquin, 2007, p. 77). This explanation is, however, no longer valid in 2008; respondents show a strong preference for disarmament to be undertaken by a Burundian institution (the government, the civil authorities, or the police).

**Graph 21** Reasons cited to explain why someone might take part in a disarmament programme

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**Graph 22** Institutions to which the civilian population would agree to hand over weapons, per province

*Source: Small Arms Survey and Ligue Iteka (2008)*

**Graph 23** Institutions to which the civilian population would agree to hand over weapons, 2005 and 2008

*Source: Small Arms Survey and Ligue Iteka (2006; 2008)*

The order of preference of these institutions has changed since 2005, however (see Graph 23). Whereas at the time the military came first, followed by members of the government, then senior officials, then the police, in 2008 the police force is at the top of the list, followed by the military, senior officials, and the government. There is a remarkably similar pattern in each of the six provinces studied, perhaps because the police force is now decentralized to the district level (which was not the case in 2005) and is therefore closer to the people.
Burundi has already started to combat armed violence. Various projects directly aiming to tackle this scourge have been set up, such as the reform of the firearms law, the civilian disarmament project, the DDR programme, and the strengthening of the capacity of the uniformed services. Running in tandem with these programmes are so-called ‘indirect’ initiatives, such as peace consolidation, the struggle against poverty, good governance, care for victims, and the development of techniques for collecting data relating to armed violence. Armed violence is not the chief focus of such initiatives, but they contribute greatly to combating the phenomenon and to alleviating its effects. Nevertheless, this violence and prevention dynamic must be amplified.

In order to understand this complex phenomenon better, it is essential to develop the capacity to monitor armed violence more effectively. Under the aegis of UNDP, a ‘UN Integrated Strategy for monitoring and analysis/mapping of criminality and armed violence in Burundi’ has been established with the aim of collating the various sources of information on the subject in order to produce a clearer picture. Data on the impact of armed violence is scarce and very scattered. For example, medical records—which are indispensable in an assessment of the extent and impact of armed violence as well as its cost for the victims—remain inadequate (Dalal and Nasibu Bilali, 2008, p. 27).

The various sources used in this study show that, despite a certain improvement in the security situation since 2003, armed violence remains one of the factors inhibiting the growth of Burundi in this post-conflict period. Armed violence has a negative effect on development by drawing on financial and staff resources that are already in short supply, and by reducing their productivity. This link also operates in the other direction, since development problems help to increase the risk of armed violence.

The population perceives firearms as the main source of insecurity, and they are indeed used in most acts of armed violence. Armed banditry is a worrying phenomenon that intensified in Burundi during the last few months of 2008. This instability is exacerbated by the question of the Palipehutu–FNL. In spite of the signing of a ceasefire agreement in 2006, the situation remains unstable.
On 17 April 2008, the Palipehutu–FNL resumed mortar attacks on the capital, which were broken off some days later, when the leaders of the movement asked for the cessation of the FDN offensive, food aid for its combatants, and the reopening of negotiations (UNSC, 2008a, para. 13). The situation remained volatile until December 2008, when both parties finally agreed to take a step towards peace. The government announced the granting of 33 posts to senior officers of the Palipehutu–FNL, while the rebel movement agreed to change its name in order to be able to register as a political party. It was also announced on this occasion that the DDR programme would begin immediately, and that the government would free all political prisoners and prisoners of war (Heads of State of the Great Lakes Region, 2008). It is to be hoped that these intentions will be transformed into action and finally enable a durable peace, putting an end to the civil war that has ravaged Burundi for 15 years, fueling insecurity in the north-eastern provinces of the country.

Another source of instability is the elections scheduled to take place in 2010; each party is already preparing for the confrontations. It is therefore urgent for the various parties to speak out on the fundamental question of armed violence, and for the new Disarmament Commission to set out an action plan and obtain the political support necessary to accomplish the civilian disarmament programme, which, having failed to be implemented for several years now, is more than ever a priority. Only once these steps have been taken, five years after the official end of the civil war, will Burundians truly be able to feel that they live in a country at peace.

Appendix I

Survey questionnaire

QUESTIONNAIRE No____________________

N.B.: All the information contained in this questionnaire is confidential; you will not be asked to give your name or the name of any other person and no names will be cited. The purpose of the questionnaire is to increase understanding of the situation in your community, and to identify any problems that the community may encounter.

Q001 – Name of the researcher ________________________________

Q002 – Date of the interview ________________________________

Q003 – Time the interview began ________________________________

Q004 – Province: ________________________________

Q005 – District (commune): ________________________________

Q006 – Area (zone) ________________________________

Q007 – Colline or neighbourhood: ________________________________

Q008 – Sous-colline/avenue/unit (cellule):________________________

The surveyor has read the consent form to the respondent. The respondent has given his/her verbal agreement to reply to the questionnaire.

Surveyor’s signature: ________________________________
100 SECURITY

Q100. In your opinion, what are the main problems affecting your neighbourhood/colline?
(Several replies are possible; please put them in order of priority: put 1 in the box next to the category that the respondent cites as most serious, put 2 in the box next to the category that the respondent cites as second-most serious, etc., with respect to all the categories cited by the respondent.)

1. ☐ Unemployment
2. ☐ Criminality
3. ☐ Lack of public transport
4. ☐ Lack of opportunities for young people
5. ☐ Land-related problem
6. ☐ Insufficient educational facilities (schools, universities, etc.)
7. ☐ Roads in poor state of repair
8. ☐ Insufficient health facilities (hospitals, etc.)
9. ☐ Problems relating to the use of weapons
10. ☐ Other (specify) __________________________
11. ☐ None

88. ☐ Don’t know
99. ☐ Do not wish to reply

Q101. Do acts of armed violence of any kind occur in your village/colline/neighbourhood?

1. ☐ Yes
2. ☐ No

88. ☐ Don’t know
99. ☐ Do not wish to reply

If the reply to the last question is YES, please continue.
If the reply is NO, DO NOT WISH TO REPLY, or DON’T KNOW, go directly to Q119.

Q102. What type of armed violence takes place in your village/colline/neighbourhood?
(Several replies are possible)

1. ☐ Armed robbery/burglary committed with a weapon
2. ☐ Armed assault
3. ☐ Murder committed with a weapon
4. ☐ Kidnapping committed with a weapon
5. ☐ Rape committed under the threat of a weapon
6. ☐ Domestic or family violence committed with a weapon
7. ☐ Settling of scores or fighting with a weapon
8. ☐ Other (please be specific) __________________________

88. ☐ Don’t know
99. ☐ Do not wish to reply

Q103. In your opinion, what causes armed violence in your village/colline/neighbourhood?
(Several replies are possible; please put them in order of priority: put 1 in the box next to the category that the respondent cites as most common, put 2 in the box next to the category that the respondent cites as second-most common, etc., with respect to all the categories cited by the respondent.)

1. ☐ Marital disputes
2. ☐ Family disputes
3. ☐ Theft
4. ☐ Land disputes
5. ☐ Alcohol consumption
6. ☐ Consumption of drugs
7. ☐ Smuggling
8. ☐ Gang rivalry
9. ☐ Witchcraft
10. ☐ Rivalry between political parties

If the reply to the last question is YES, please continue.
If the reply is NO, DO NOT WISH TO REPLY, or DON’T KNOW, go directly to Q119.
11. □ Ethnic rivalry
12. □ Activities of rebel forces
13. □ Poverty
14. □ Other (please be specific) __________________________
88. □ Don’t know
99. □ Do not wish to reply

Q104. In your opinion, what is the most common form of armed violence in your village/colline/neighborhood?

1. □ Armed robbery/burglary committed with a weapon
2. □ Armed assault
3. □ Murder committed with a weapon
4. □ Kidnapping committed with a weapon
5. □ Rape committed under the threat of a weapon
6. □ Domestic or family violence committed with a weapon
7. □ Settling of scores or fighting with weapons
8. □ Other (please be specific) __________________________
88. □ Don’t know
99. □ Do not wish to reply

Q105. In your opinion, what increases the risk of being a victim of the type of armed violence that you have just mentioned?

Reply: __________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
88. □ Don’t know
99. □ Do not wish to reply

Q106. I am going to read you a list; I would like you to tell me which of these categories of people are most at risk, in your opinion, of being victims of armed violence.
(Several replies are possible; tick the box if the respondent says that this category of person is particularly at risk of being a victim of armed violence.)

1. □ A rich person
2. □ A person who has a job
3. □ An unemployed person
4. □ Someone who drinks or who has drunk alcohol
5. □ Someone who takes drugs
6. □ A young person
7. □ Someone who belongs to a particular ethnic group
8. □ A refugee or displaced person
9. □ A businessman or -woman
10. □ A public sector employee
11. □ A police officer
12. □ A soldier
13. □ A politician
14. □ A woman
15. □ A child
16. □ A widow
88. □ Don’t know
99. □ Do not wish to reply

Q107. Do you think that something could be done to reduce the type of armed violence that you have mentioned?

1. □ Yes
2. □ No
Q108. In your opinion, what could be done to reduce this type of armed violence in your village/colline/neighbourhood?

Reply: __________________________________________________________

88. □ Don’t know
99. □ Do not wish to reply

Q109. Have you taken any precautionary measures to prevent the members of your household from falling victim to armed violence?

1. □ Yes
2. □ No
88. □ Don’t know
99. □ Do not wish to reply

Q110. What type of measures have you taken?

Reply: __________________________________________________________

88. □ Don’t know
99. □ Do not wish to reply

Q111. Do these measures have a financial cost?

1. □ Yes
2. □ No
88. □ Don’t know
99. □ Do not wish to reply

Q112. How much do these measures cost you?

Cost: __________________________________________________________

88. □ Don’t know
99. □ Do not wish to reply

Q113. Are you aware of any institutions or current projects that aim to prevent armed violence in your village/colline/neighbourhood or elsewhere?

1. □ Yes
2. □ No
88. □ Don’t know
99. □ Do not wish to reply

Q114. What are the names of these projects or of the institutions that organize the projects?

Reply: __________________________________________________________

88. □ Don’t know
99. □ Do not wish to reply
Q115. In your opinion, can any of these institutions or projects be considered a success?

1. □ Yes
2. □ No
88. □ Don’t know
99. □ Do not wish to reply

If the reply to the last question is YES, please continue. If the reply is NO, go directly to question Q118. If the reply is DON’T KNOW or DO NOT WISH TO REPLY, go directly to Q119.

Q116. Which seem or seemed to be a success?

Reply: ______________________________________________________

__________________________

88. □ Don’t know
99. □ Do not wish to reply

Q117. In your opinion, what is it that has made the project(s) a success, or makes it/them seem to be a success?

Reply: ______________________________________________________

__________________________

88. □ Don’t know
99. □ Do not wish to reply

If the respondent has said that the projects (in his/her village/colline/ neighbourhood or elsewhere) have been a success, go directly to question Q119. Otherwise, continue.

Q118. Among all the projects that you have just mentioned, whether in your village/colline/neighbourhood or elsewhere, that were not a success, can you explain why they failed?

Reply: ______________________________________________________

__________________________

88. □ Don’t know
99. □ Do not wish to reply

Q119. In your opinion, how has the level of security in your neighbourhood/colline changed in the last six months?

1. □ It is more secure now
2. □ It is less secure now
3. □ There has not been any change
88. □ Don’t know
99. □ Do not wish to reply

Q120. How would you assess your degree of security when you are inside your house in the daytime?

1. □ Totally secure
2. □ Quite secure
3. □ Not very secure
4. □ Not at all secure
88. □ Don’t know
99. □ Do not wish to reply

Q121. How would you assess your degree of security when you are inside your house at night?

1. □ Totally secure
2. □ Quite secure
3. □ Not very secure
Q122. How would you assess your degree of security when you are travelling during the day?

1. [ ] Totally secure
2. [ ] Quite secure
3. [ ] Not very secure
4. [ ] Not at all secure

88. [ ] Don’t know
99. [ ] Do not wish to reply

Q123. How would you assess your degree of security when you are travelling at night?

1. [ ] Totally secure
2. [ ] Quite secure
3. [ ] Not very secure
4. [ ] Not at all secure

88. [ ] Don’t know
99. [ ] Do not wish to reply

Q124. How would you assess your degree of security at your place of work?

1. [ ] Totally secure
2. [ ] Quite secure
3. [ ] Not very secure
4. [ ] Not at all secure
5. [ ] I am unemployed

88. [ ] Don’t know
99. [ ] Do not wish to reply

If the respondent has replied TOTALLY SECURE to the five previous questions, go directly to question Q127.

Otherwise, continue.

Q125. Which categories of people do you think are most responsible for the insecurity?

(Several replies are possible; please put them in order of priority: put 1 in the box next to the category that is most responsible for the insecurity, put 2 in the box next to the category that is a bit less responsible for the insecurity, etc., with respect to all the categories cited by the respondent.)

1. [ ] Bandits
2. [ ] Rebels
3. [ ] Police officers
4. [ ] Soldiers
5. [ ] Ex-combatants
6. [ ] Militia or ex-militia
7. [ ] Neighbours
8. [ ] Family
9. [ ] Gangs
10. [ ] Private security companies
11. [ ] Other (please be precise) ______________________________________
12. [ ] I feel secure

88. [ ] Don’t know
99. [ ] Do not wish to reply
Q126. Whom would you call for help if you felt threatened or in danger? (Several replies are possible; please put them in order of priority: put 1 in the box next to the category that the respondent cites as most common, put 2 in the box next to the category that the respondent cites as second-most common, etc., with respect to all the categories cited by the respondent.)

1. □ Nobody
2. □ Family
3. □ Friends/neighbours
4. □ Police
5. □ Soldiers
6. □ Militant combatants
7. □ Militia or ex-militia
8. □ Private security companies
9. □ Other (please be specific) 
88. □ Don’t know
99. □ Do not wish to reply

Q127. Do you think that the public authorities (police, army, ...) are effective against crime?

1. □ Totally
2. □ Very
3. □ Quite
4. □ A little bit
5. □ Not at all
88. □ Don’t know
99. □ Do not wish to reply

Q128. Do you have the feeling that certain modes of transport are safer than others, in terms of the risk of armed violence?

1. □ Yes
2. □ No
88. □ Don’t know
99. □ Do not wish to reply

If the reply to the last question is YES, please continue. If the reply is NO, DON’T KNOW, or DO NOT WISH TO REPLY, go directly to Q131.

Q129. In your opinion, which mode of transport is the safest, in terms of the risk of armed violence?

1. □ Walking
2. □ Bicycle
3. □ Moped
4. □ Bus
5. □ Taxi
6. □ Personal car
7. □ None
88. □ Don’t know
99. □ Do not wish to reply

Q130. In your opinion, which mode of transport is the least safe, in terms of the risk of armed violence?

1. □ Walking
2. □ Bicycle
3. □ Moped
4. □ Bus
5. □ Taxi
6. □ Personal car
Q131. Over the last three months, have you or any of the members of your household been the victim of a violent incident in which a weapon or explosives were present?

1. ☐ Yes
2. ☐ No
88. ☐ Don’t know
99. ☐ Do not wish to reply

If the reply to the last question is YES, please continue.
If the reply is NO, DON’T KNOW, or DO NOT WISH TO REPLY, go directly to Q200.

I am now going to ask you to concentrate on the most recent violent incident in the last three months. Let me remind you that I am talking only about incidents in which weapons or explosives were present, and in which you personally, or members of your household, were involved.

Q132. How many members of your household were involved in this most recent incident?
Number: __________________________________________

88. ☐ Don’t know
99. ☐ Do not wish to reply

Q133. What type of incident was it? (If the incident included several of the following elements, tick all the relevant boxes.)

1. ☐ Armed robbery/burglary committed with a weapon
2. ☐ Armed assault
3. ☐ Murder committed with a weapon
4. ☐ Kidnapping committed with a weapon
5. ☐ Rape committed under the threat of a weapon
6. ☐ Domestic or family violence committed with a weapon
7. ☐ Settling of scores or fighting with a weapon
8. ☐ Other (please be specific) ________________________________
88. ☐ Don’t know
99. ☐ Do not wish to reply

Q134. Were any of the victims who are members of your household physically wounded in this incident?

1. ☐ Yes
2. ☐ No
88. ☐ Don’t know
99. ☐ Do not wish to reply

If the reply to the last question is YES, please continue.
If the reply is NO or DO NOT WISH TO REPLY, go directly to Q136.

Q135. What physical consequences did the victims from your household suffer? (Several replies are possible.)

1. ☐ Death
2. ☐ Total disability
3. ☐ Partial disability
4. ☐ Injury/injuries requiring surgery
5. ☐ Injury/injuries requiring a visit to a medical centre
6. ☐ Injury/injuries requiring the purchase of medicines
7. ☐ Other (please be specific) ________________________________
88. ☐ Don’t know
99. ☐ Do not wish to reply
Q136. Did this incident have psychological consequences for any of the victims who are members of your household?

1. □ Yes
2. □ No
88. □ Don’t know
99. □ Do not wish to reply

If the reply to the last question is YES, please continue.
If the reply is NO, DON’T KNOW, or DO NOT WISH TO REPLY, go directly to question Q138.

Q137. What were the psychological consequences for the victims who are members of your household?

Reply:__________________________________________

88. □ Don’t know
99. □ Do not wish to reply

Q138. Did this incident have financial consequences for the household?

1. □ Yes
2. □ No
88. □ Don’t know
99. □ Do not wish to reply

If the reply to the last question is YES, please continue.
If the reply is NO or DO NOT WISH TO REPLY, go directly to question Q141.

Q139. What was the cause or causes of these expenses? (Several replies are possible.)

1. □ Medical expenses
2. □ Hospital expenses
3. □ Funeral expenses
4. □ Replacement of items stolen or destroyed in the incident
5. □ Other (please be specific): ____________________________
6. □ Other (please be specific): ____________________________
7. □ Other (please be specific): ____________________________
8. □ Other (please be specific): ____________________________
9. □ Other (please be specific): ____________________________
10. □ Other (please be specific): ____________________________
11. □ Other (please be specific): ____________________________
12. □ Other (please be specific): ____________________________

88. □ Don’t know
99. □ Do not wish to reply

Q140. What is your estimate of the expenses incurred by the household as a direct result of this incident of armed violence?

Total expenses: ____________________________________________

88. □ Don’t know
99. □ Do not wish to reply

Q141. How many perpetrators were involved in this most recent violent incident?

Number: ________________________________________________

88. □ Don’t know
99. □ Do not wish to reply

Q142. a) To which categories of person did the perpetrators belong? (Several replies are possible.)

1. □ Bandits
2. □ Rebels
3. □ Police officers
4. □ Soldiers
5. □ Ex-combatants
6. □ Militia or ex-militia
7. □ Neighbours
8. □ Family
9. □ Gangs
10. □ Private security companies
11. □ Other (please be specific) ____________________________
12. □ Other (please be specific) ____________________________
13. □ Other (please be specific) ____________________________
14. □ Other (please be specific) ____________________________
15. □ Other (please be specific) ____________________________

88. □ Don’t know
99. □ Do not wish to reply
Q142. b) Did the victim or victims know the perpetrator or perpetrators of this violence?
   1.  ☐ Yes
   2.  ☐ No
   88.  ☐ Don’t know
   99.  ☐ Do not wish to reply

If the reply to the last question is YES, please continue.
If the reply is NO, DON’T KNOW, or DO NOT WISH TO REPLY, go directly to Q144.

Q143. How did the victim(s) know the perpetrator(s) of the violence?
Reply: ____________________________________________________________

88.  ☐ Don’t know
99.  ☐ Do not wish to reply

Q144. What type of weapon did the perpetrator(s) of the violence have at the time of the violence?
(Several replies are possible.)

1.  ☐ Knife or dagger
2.  ☐ Machete
3.  ☐ Stick
4.  ☐ Handgun (pistol or revolver)
5.  ☐ Automatic rifle (Kalashnikov, FAL, R4...): Type(s): _______________________
6.  ☐ Shotgun
7.  ☐ Sub-machine gun
8.  ☐ Machine gun
9.  ☐ Mugobore
10.  ☐ Mortar
11.  ☐ Grenade
12.  ☐ Grenade launcher
13.  ☐ Other (please be specific): ___________________________

88.  ☐ Don’t know
99.  ☐ Do not wish to reply

Q145. In what type of place did the incident occur?

1.  ☐ In the victims’ house
2.  ☐ In the perpetrators’ house
3.  ☐ At the victims’ place of work
4.  ☐ At the perpetrators’ place of work
5.  ☐ On a road or path
6.  ☐ In a vehicle
7.  ☐ Other (give details) ___________________________________________

88.  ☐ Don’t know
99.  ☐ Do not wish to reply

Q146. Did the incident take place during the day or at night?

1.  ☐ During the day
2.  ☐ At night
3.  ☐ During the day and the night

88.  ☐ Don’t know
99.  ☐ Do not wish to reply

Q147. Can you explain what happened during the incident?
Reply: ____________________________________________________________

88.  ☐ Don’t know
99.  ☐ Do not wish to reply
Q148. Have the perpetrator(s) of the incident been punished?

1. ☐ Yes
2. ☐ No
88. ☐ Don’t know
99. ☐ Do not wish to reply

If the reply to the last question is YES, please continue.
If the reply is NO, DON’T KNOW, or DO NOT WISH TO REPLY, go directly to Q200.

Q149. How have they been punished? (All the punishments should be listed for each perpetrator.)

Perpetrator no. 1: __________________________________________
Perpetrator no. 2: __________________________________________
Perpetrator no. 3: __________________________________________
88. ☐ Don’t know
99. ☐ Do not wish to reply

200 WEAPONS

I am now going to ask you more specific questions about weapons. As I explained at the beginning of the survey (and I think it is useful to repeat it now), if you do not wish to reply to any of the questions because you think they are too delicate, simply say ‘I do not wish to reply’ at the end of the question.

Q200. Do you think that certain types of weapon can be useful as a way of protecting yourself or the members of your household?

1. ☐ Yes
2. ☐ No
88. ☐ Don’t know
99. ☐ Do not wish to reply

If the reply to the last question is YES, please continue.
If the reply is NO, DON’T KNOW, or DO NOT WISH TO REPLY, go directly to Q202.

Q201. What type of weapons are you thinking of?
(Several replies are possible.)

1. ☐ Knife or dagger
2. ☐ Machete
3. ☐ Stick
4. ☐ Handgun (pistol or revolver)
5. ☐ Automatic rifle (Kalashnikov, FAL, R4...): Type(s): ______________________
6. ☐ Shotgun
7. ☐ Sub-machine gun
8. ☐ Machine gun
9. ☐ Mugobore
10. ☐ Mortar
11. ☐ Grenade
12. ☐ Grenade launcher
13. ☐ Other (please be specific): __________________________________________
88. ☐ Don’t know
99. ☐ Do not wish to reply

Q202. To your knowledge, do the people in your village/colline/neighbourhood possess weapons or explosives of any kind whatsoever?

1. ☐ Yes
2. ☐ No
88. ☐ Don’t know
99. ☐ Do not wish to reply

If the reply to the last question is YES, please continue.
If the reply is NO, DON’T KNOW, or DO NOT WISH TO REPLY, go directly to Q207.
Q203. Who possesses firearms in your neighbourhood/colline? (Several replies are possible; please put them in order of priority: put 1 in the box next to the category that the respondent cites as most likely to possess a firearm, put 2 in the box next to the category that the respondent cites as second-most likely, etc., with respect to all the categories cited by the respondent.)

1. □ Bandits
2. □ Rebels
3. □ Militia or ex-militia
4. □ Ex-combatants
5. □ Gangs
6. □ Soldiers
7. □ Police officers
8. □ Politicians
9. □ Private security companies
10. □ Anybody
11. □ Other (please be specific) __________________________________________
12. □ Don’t know
13. □ Do not wish to reply

Q204. To your knowledge, what types of weapon or explosive do they possess? (Several replies are possible.)

1. □ Knife or dagger
2. □ Machete
3. □ Stick
4. □ Handgun (pistol or revolver)
5. □ Automatic rifle (Kalashnikov, FAL, R4…): Type(s): __________
6. □ Shotgun
7. □ Sub-machine gun
8. □ Machine gun
9. □ Mugobore
10. □ Mortar
11. □ Grenade
12. □ Grenade launcher
13. □ Other (please be specific): ________________________________
14. □ Don’t know
15. □ Do not wish to reply

Q205. In your opinion, what is the main reason why the people in your neighbourhood/colline (other than police officers or soldiers) possess weapons? (Several replies are possible; please put them in order of priority: put 1 in the box next to the category that the respondent cites as the most common reason, put 2 in the box next to the category that the respondent cites as second-most common, etc., with respect to all the categories cited by the respondent.)

1. □ Personal protection
2. □ Protection of the family and goods
3. □ Protection of the community
4. □ Political protection
5. □ Work
6. □ Banditry
7. □ ’Holdover’ of the conflict
8. □ It’s tradition
9. □ To be the same as the neighbours
10. □ For reasons of prestige
11. □ Other (please be specific) ________________________________
Q209. Would you like to possess a firearm?

1. ☐ Yes
2. ☐ No
88. ☐ Don’t know
99. ☐ Do not wish to reply

300 DISARMAMENT

Q300. Do you think that a disarmament programme would be successful in your neighbourhood/colline?

1. ☐ Very successful
2. ☐ Quite successful
3. ☐ Not very successful
4. ☐ Not at all successful
88. ☐ Don’t know
99. ☐ Do not wish to reply

Q301. If you had a weapon, would you agree to take part in a disarmament programme?

1. ☐ Definitely
2. ☐ Probably
3. ☐ Possibly but not likely
4. ☐ Definitely not
88. ☐ Don’t know
99. ☐ Do not wish to reply
Q302. What might persuade you to hand in your weapon if you had one? (Several replies are possible.)

1. □ Nothing, I have already made up my mind to take part
2. □ If the authorities agreed to pay me
3. □ If the authorities agreed to give me something else in exchange (Please be specific: ________________________________)
4. □ If everybody took part
5. □ If there were less crime and more security
6. □ If there were less unemployment
7. □ Nothing, I want to keep my weapons
8. □ Other (please be specific) ________________________________
88. □ Don’t know
99. □ Do not wish to reply

Q303. To whom would you agree to hand in your weapons, if you had any? (Several replies are possible; please put them in order of priority; put 1 in the box next to the category that the respondent cites first, put 2 in the box next to the category that the respondent cites second, etc., with respect to all the categories cited by the respondent.)

1. □ To the police
2. □ To the army
3. □ To government representatives
4. □ To UN representatives
5. □ To someone in my community (Please be specific: ________________________________)
6. □ To a local NGO
7. □ To a senior official
8. □ To a political party
9. □ To a trade union
10. □ Other (please be specific) ________________________________
88. □ Don’t know
99. □ Do not wish to reply

Q400 INFORMATION ABOUT THE RESPONDENT

Q400. How old are you?

Reply: ____________________________________________

88. □ Don’t know
99. □ Do not wish to reply

If the researcher thinks that the real age of the respondent is different from the age given, tick the box below that corresponds to the respondent’s probable age:

1. □ 10–20 years old
2. □ 20–30 years old
3. □ 30–40 years old
4. □ 40–50 years old
5. □ over 50 years old

Q401. How many years of education have you completed?

Reply: ____________________________________________

88. □ Don’t know
99. □ Do not wish to reply

Q402. What is the highest level of education you have completed?

1. □ Primary school
2. □ First stage of secondary school
3. □ Second stage of secondary school
4. □ Technical school diploma
5. □ University
6. □ None
99. □ Do not wish to reply
Q403. What is your occupation? (Several replies are possible.)
1. □ Unemployed
2. □ Unskilled worker
3. □ Trader
4. □ Farmer
5. □ Businessman
7. □ Public sector employee
8. □ Student
9. □ Other (please be specific) __________________________
99. □ Do not wish to reply

THANK YOU FOR TAKING PART!

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE RESEARCHER

Q500. Time at which the interview came to end __________________________

Q501. Sex of the respondent:
1. □ Male
2. □ Female

Q502. Did the respondent sometimes look anxious when you asked the questions?
1. □ Yes
2. □ No

Q503. Did you have the impression that the respondent was preoccupied when you asked the questions?
1. □ Yes
2. □ No

Q504. Did you have the impression that the respondent was paying attention when you asked the questions?
1 □ Yes
2. □ No

Q505. In your opinion, which question or section was most difficult for the respondent and why?
Reply: ____________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________

THANK YOU FOR TAKING PART!
Appendix II

Methodology of the survey of Burundian households conducted by the Small Arms Survey and the Ligue Iteka

Ten Burundian researchers, bilingual in French and Kirundi, were given 33 hours’ training over five days. The team of surveyors consisted of ten people (two women and eight men) and two substitutes. Before the survey began, one of the female surveyors said that she wished to leave the project due to fears for her personal safety. She was immediately replaced by another female researcher who was given the same training.

The questionnaire was translated into Kirundi by Burundians who speak both French and Kirundi fluently. The various sections of the questionnaire were each translated by groups of three people, in order to encourage a discussion and thereby arrive at the most appropriate and accurate translation possible. The accuracy of the final questionnaire in Kirundi was then checked by a reverse translation into French by a bilingual Burundian who was not familiar with the project and not affiliated to the Small Arms Survey or its partners.

The surveyors’ access to the female participants was limited for cultural reasons and due to tradition, particularly when their husband or the head of the household was present. In consequence, the distribution of male and female respondents was distorted: instead of a ratio close to one man for one woman, it was closer to three men for every woman (408 women, 1,075 men, and 4 unidentified participants were interviewed). The majority of women interviewed were either heads of a household or widows.

Eight Burundians were given 25 hours’ training in data entry spread over 3 1/2 days. Ryan Murray of the Small Arms Survey supervised the two first days of the training and Emmanuel Nindagiye (statistician) the remainder. The data was entered in Excel and analyzed with SPSS software.

In order to ensure that each participant gave his/her informed consent, the researchers systematically read certain information to each individual. The information, originally drafted in French, was translated into Kirundi by a team of ten French- and Kirundi-speaking Burundians. Each potential participant was informed of the nature of the study, the tasks expected of the participant, the potential risks, and measures taken to keep the risks to a minimum (including an assurance that the interview would be conducted without witnesses, that the replies would remain confidential and anonymous, and that the data would be stored in a safe place). Participants were also informed that the survey was being carried out solely for research purposes, and that there was no link between the survey and any programmes or projects that might be developed in their community in future. The participants did not receive any remuneration, financial or otherwise, for their participation in the survey.

The rate of refusal and the number of those who did not complete the questionnaire were very low. The confidence interval for the survey was defined as 95 per cent, with a margin of error of +/- 2.5 per cent. The purging of the data made it possible to identify cases that might have compromised the validity of the measurement of the survey. Cases in which the error measure exceeded five per cent were excluded, which amounted to 80 questionnaires. The size of the final sample was n=1,487, with a general error measure of 0.73 per cent, which means that the validity of the data measurement was particularly high.
Appendix III

Maps

Map 2 Percentage of respondents who say that there are acts of armed violence in their neighbourhood/colline

Map 3 Respondents’ perception of changes in the level of security in their neighbourhood/colline during the six months prior to February 2008, per district
Map 4 Percentage of respondents who say that they do not feel ‘at all’ secure inside their house at night, per district

Map 5 Percentage of respondents who cite bandits as the category of person most responsible for insecurity, per district
Map 6 Percentage of respondents who cite ex-combatants as the category of person most responsible for the insecurity, per district

Map 7 Percentage of respondents who say that the public authorities (police, army, etc.) are ‘not at all’ effective against crime, per district
**Map 8** Percentage of respondents who say that certain types of weapon may be useful for their personal protection or the protection of members of their household, per district

**Map 9** Percentage of respondents who say that a firearm is more a form of protection than a danger, per district
**Map 10** Percentage of respondents who say that they would like to have a firearm, per district

**Map 11** Percentage of respondents who would ‘definitely’ be willing to take part in a disarmament programme, per district

**Legend:**
- Provincial border
- District border
- Provincial capital

**Legend:**
- 90–70%
- 75–90%
- 60–75%
- <60%
- Provincial border
- District border
- Provincial capital
1 Dufashe ko abantu baba mu Burundi ari imiliyoni umunani n’ibice bitanu. Tugereranije n’ahandi, urugero rwo hagati na hagati rw’abapfa rugera ku ndwi n’ibice bitandatu (7,6 %) ku bantu ibihumbi ijana. (Itangazo ry’i Genève, 2008, urupapuro rwa 5.)

2 Kenshi biroroha kwitura abaganga mu gihe uwafashwe ku nguvu ari umwana gusumba iyo ari umuntu akuze.

3 Ibiharuro vy’Ishirahamwe PNUD mu mwaka wa 2007.


5 Izo ntara zitandatu zeremeza zose ariko ko hari ubugizi bwa nabi hamwe n’ukubura ibigo vyakira abantu.

6 N represents the number of respondents who answered the question and x the number of people who chose this answer in particular.

7 Sources used by the Observatory of Armed Violence include private and public radios (RTNB, RP, RSF-Bonesha, Isanganiro, and Radio France Internationale), local and international print and online media (ABP, Net Press, Burundi Réalités, Agence France Press, @ribnews, Panapress, and ReliefWeb), BINUB security reports, and the Ligue Iteka Web site.

8 This rate assumes that Burundi has a population of 8.5 million. The average homicide rate worldwide (committed with or without a weapon) is 7.6 per 100,000 persons (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008, p. 5).

9 It is more socially acceptable for a child to seek medical or psychological help than for an adult to do so.

10 UNDP figures for 2006.

11 IMF figures for 2007.

12 The six provinces surveyed are, however, unanimous in decrying the problems of criminality and lack of infrastructure.

13 Created in 1995, the regional initiative involves Uganda, Tanzania, South Africa, Kenya, Rwanda, the DRC, Ethiopia, and Zambia (ICG, 2007, p. 3).

14 This deterioration led the BINUB security service to reclassify the country’s security situation as phase 3 (re-establishment of non-essential personnel) at the beginning of 2008. Interview with UN Department of Safety and Security, BINUB, Bujumbura, January 2008.

15 Ndayizeye and four other alleged conspirators were acquitted in 2007 by the Supreme Court (Ntiranyibagira, 2007).

16 Women’s focus group, Mwaro, January 2008. This food-related insecurity may, however, arise from other types of insecurity: war and criminality, for instance, make populations more fragile and may endanger their economic and agricultural survival.

17 Women’s focus group, Mwaro, January 2008.

18 Men’s focus group, Bujumbura, January 2008; women’s focus group, Makamba, February 2008.

19 Women’s focus group, Mwaro, January 2008.

20 Dalal and Nasibu Bilali analysed the records of eight hospitals (Bujumbura military hospital; Ngozi hospital; Prince Régent Charles Hospital in Bujumbura; Gitega Hospital; Prince Louis Rwagasore private hospital in Bujumbura; Kiremba Nord hospital in Ngozi province; Roi Khaled university hospital in Bujumbura; Bururi Hospital) and five health centres (Aga sabirwa health centre in Kinama, Bujumbura; Ubuyiza clinic in Cibitoke; Espoir health centre in Kinama, Bujumbura; Chez Asmani health centre in Kinama, Bujumbura; Korineza health centre in Bujumbura).

21 See the section on victims of banditry in Ch. 2 (p. 57).

22 Bujumbura was also a strategic point during the civil war: located near the Kibira forest, a base for several armed groups, the town was one of the targets of their attacks and a recruitment base for new combatants (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000, p. 379; Small Arms Survey, 2007, p. 202).

23 Bururi comes second with 11.6 per cent.

24 ’Aggravated theft’, according to Article 186 of Burundi’s penal code, is theft with aggravating circumstances, such as the use of a weapon or violence (Rob, 1981).

25 It should be noted that PNB figures contain numerous errors and must therefore be treated with caution; they give a general indication of the main trends but not a detailed picture. For instance, the total number of offences for 2006 is 8,961 according to the table showing the number of offences of each type per month (PNB, 2007a, pp. 70–73), but it totals 10,598 according to the tables showing the number of offences for each provincial police station (PNB, 2007a, pp. 6–69). Some categories of offence also differ in different tables (for example, one records 23 ‘serious, intentional, bodily injuries’ in 2006, while this category is never mentioned in the other table). The tables also contain numerous accounting errors.

26 The sources used for the recorded cases of armed violence are public and private local radio coverage (RTNB, RP, RSF-Bonesha, Isanganiro, and Radio France Internationale), the local and international print and online media and wire services (ABP, Net Press, Agence de presse Burundi Réalités, Agence France Presse, @ribNews, Panapress, and ReliefWeb), the reports of the BINUB security unit, and the Web site of the Ligue Iteka (correspondence with Chantal Uwimana, UNDP–Burundi, 14 May 2008). The Observatory’s use of
AN ASSESSMENT OF ARMED VIOLENCE IN BURUNDI

31 Men’s and women’s focus groups, Gitega, February 2008.

29 In 2007, the Ligue Iteka recorded 641 cases of attacks on human life and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. Of these cases, 310 involved the use of one or more weapons (defined as an instrument or a means used to inflict bodily injury) and may thus be classified as acts of armed violence (Ligue Iteka, 2008, app. 1).

32 Interview with Luk van Baelen, MSF field coordinator, Bujumbura, January 2008.

33 The nine provinces are Bururi, Cankuzo, Cibitoke, Gitega, Muyinga, Mwaro, Ngozi, Rutana, and Ruyigi.

34 When those in custody are accused of rape and aggravated theft (seven cases in all), these cases are counted as rape.

35 Percentages calculated on the basis of the annual reports of the following nine prisons: Bubanza, Bururi, Gitega, Mpimba, Muramvya, Muyinga, Ngozi (men’s prison), Ngozi (women’s prison), and Rutana. The Ruyigi and Rumonge prison reports do not provide information on the offences for which prisoners were convicted or held on remand.

36 The sole notable difference is the fact that police officers come in third position in the CENAP survey but in fourth position, after the demobilized combatants, in the Small Arms Survey–Ligue Iteka survey.

37 See the section on the perception of civilian-held weapons and those who carry them in Ch. 4 (p. 105).

38 The Observatory classifies perpetrators of violence in the following categories: civilians, FDN, PNB, FNL, or uncertain.

39 The Ligue Iteka recorded 537 cases of torture in 2007 but gives details of the weapons used in only 105 cases. Sticks are the most common weapon, but belts, rifle butts, and kicks are also mentioned (Ligue Iteka, 2008, pp. 41–44 and app. II, pp. 27–37).

40 Information was provided on 98 of the 573 acts of torture recorded by the Ligue Iteka in 2006: one-third were committed by police officers, 18.4 per cent by military personnel, and 14.3 per cent by civilians. The number of acts of torture committed by the FNL remained stable. See Ligue Iteka (2007a, app. I, IV).

41 According to Mbaye Faye, chief of BINUB’s Security Sector Reform–Small Arms section, criminality increased strongly since the Palipehutu–FNL left the global ceasefire agreement implementation process in July 2007 (interview at BINUB, January 2008). The increase in violence committed by civilians can be linked to the new outbreak of banditry fostered by the civil war climate of that period.

27 The remaining 25 per cent were mainly bars and shops, where customers were robbed of their money or mobile phone or else goods were stolen from their owners (Wille, 2008, pp. 5–6).

28 See the section on victims of conflict-related violence in Ch. 2 (p. 62).

29 In one-sided violence, the act is committed by one individual or one group against another; in multi-sided violence, the attacked individual or group responds with violence, thereby becoming both a perpetrator and a victim.

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29 In one-sided violence, the act is committed by one individual or one group against another; in multi-sided violence, the attacked individual or group responds with violence, thereby becoming both a perpetrator and a victim.
delay in the programme led to further long delays: some of the demobilized combatants waited for more than two years for their reintegration aid. In 2008, very few demobilized combatants had managed to set up a durable income-generating activity. Burundians often describe the demobilization programme as a failure, which does not encourage members of the security forces to choose this option as part of the programme to reduce their own strength.

Focus group with demobilized combatants, Bujumbura, March 2008; men’s focus group, Bujumbura, January 2008; women’s focus group, Bujumbura, January 2008.

Men’s focus group, Bujumbura, January 2008; women’s focus group, Bujumbura, January 2008.

Men’s focus group, Gitega, February 2008; men’s focus group, Bujumbura, January 2008; women’s focus group, Bujumbura, January 2008; women’s focus group, Bujumbura, January 2008. See the section on perpetrators and victims in this chapter (p. 69).

More precisely, 6.3 per cent of respondents (out of a total sample of 1,487 individuals) said that there were acts of violence in their village/colline/neighbourhood and that it was possible to do something to reduce the violence.

Women’s focus group, Gitega, February 2008; men’s focus group, Makamba, February 2008; men’s focus group, Bujumbura, January 2008.

Men’s and women’s focus groups in Makamba and Gitega, February 2008; interviews with women and demobilized combatants in Bujumbura, January and March 2008. Due to their socio-economic situation, which is particularly critical (high rate of unemployment and great poverty), Batwas are perceived as particularly likely to be involved in banditry. DCA interview with an official Burundian source, Gitega, February 2008; DCA interview with an international source, Makamba, February 2008.

This is the sub-sample of respondents who said that there were acts of violence in their village/colline/neighbourhood and that it was possible to do something to reduce the violence.

See endnote 69.

Men’s focus group, Makamba, February 2008.

DCA interviews with two Burundian sources, Gitega, and an international source in Makamba.


Focus groups with men, women, and demobilized combatants in Bujumbura (January and March 2008).


Men’s focus group, Bujumbura, January 2008.

Men’s focus group, Bujumbura, January 2008.

Men’s focus group, Bujumbura, January 2008.

Men’s focus group, Gitega, February 2008; women’s focus group, Bujumbura, January 2008.

DCA interview with a Burundian source, Gitega, February 2008; men’s and women’s focus groups, Gitega, February 2008.

Women’s focus group, Bujumbura, January 2008.

Correspondence with a member of the Palipehutu–FNL’s Directoire, October 2008.

The acts of armed violence committed by this latter category are explored in the section on violence related to the armed forces (p. 66).

In August 2004, members of the Palipehutu–FNL attacked the refugee camp at Gatumba, which is close to the border with the DRC. They massacred Congolese civilians, mostly Banyamulenge (a group often grouped with the Tutsis) (HRW, 2004b).

The Observatory recorded six acts of armed violence among FNL combatants in September and eight in October, compared with one in August and one in November (UNPF, 2007).

Interview with a Burundian source who had visited the two dissidents’ camps in December 2007, Bujumbura, January 2008.

In April 2008, after negotiations with the dissidents, UNICEF was able to move 238 children from the camps at Randa and Buramata to the demobilization centre at Gitega (UNSC, 2008a, para. 56).

Interview with a Burundian source who had visited the dissidents’ camps in December 2007, Bujumbura, January 2008.

Interview with a Burundian source, Bujumbura, January 2008.

Under the Burundian Constitution, political parties are not permitted to use a name that proclaims any ethnic membership whatsoever.

Demobilized combatants have sometimes had to wait two years between reinsertion and reintegration, which causes many of them to get into debt and leads to the failure of their economic reintegration project.

Rank was not the sole criterion used to decide who could join the army. Burundian citizenship and a technical knowledge of arms, for example, were two other important criteria. Interview with Brig. Déo Kamoso, Bujumbura, 26 August 2008.

Interview with a representative of an international agency, Bujumbura, January 2008.

Interview with a member of Burundian civil society, Bujumbura, January 2008.

Several studies confirm this finding; see, particularly, Forbes (2007) and CENAP (2007).
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102 Men’s focus group, Mwaro, January 2008.
103 See the section on real and perceived insecurity in Ch. 1 (p. 44).
104 The CENAP survey was conducted in eight districts in five different provinces: Ngozi, Bururi, Bujumbura-Mairie, Bubanza, and Bujumbura Rural.
105 The SNR was in sixth position (6%) and the FDN in ninth (3%).
106 See the section on the modalities of a successful disarmament programme in Ch. 4 (p. TK).
107 Most of the monthly reports drafted by prison directors include both police officers and soldiers in the category ‘military personnel’; as a result, it is not possible to distinguish between these two groups.
108 Interview with a Burundian source, Bujumbura, January 2008.
109 This use of barracks for housing may be a mixed blessing: a member of a focus group in Mwaro said, ‘The soldiers are not close to the population, but the police are; therefore I would call on them for assistance.’
111 Although these reports are based on extensive fieldwork and contain detailed information, the data is not always presented in a homogeneous fashion. Certain categories of human rights violations or perpetrators are present for certain months.
112 See the section on victims’ access to the justice system in Ch. 3 (p. 90).
113 This figure is an average calculated in the four surveyed provinces.
114 Interview with an official Burundian source, Bujumbura, January 2008.
115 Interview with a high-level police officer, Bujumbura, January 2008.
116 Interview with a Burundian officer, Bujumbura, January 2008. The army arrived at this figure by compiling material from different documents: data from human resources staff who receive the numbers belonging to each unit every month; lists of wages paid; workforce fed by the logistics service; and observations collected by agents who count the workforce on the ground.
117 The current workforce—between 18,000 and 22,000 men—does not seem excessive in a country with more than eight million inhabitants. By comparison, London has more than 31,000 police officers for more than seven million inhabitants. It is, however, preferable to have a smaller but better trained police force, which would be easier to control. Interview with a representative of an international agency, Geneva, May 2008.
118 Women’s focus group, Cibitoke, January 2008.
119 Interview with Madjior Solness Dingamadji, Senior DDR Specialist, Secretariat of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), Bujumbura, January 2008.
120 In July and August 2006, some people from Muyinga reported the disappearance of friends and relatives. At the same time bodies were found in the Ruvubu River (HRW, 2006b, p. 19). It was later discovered that 30 people accused of belonging to the Palipehutu–FNL had been imprisoned in the military camp at Mukoni and then summarily executed by the state security forces. It was two years before the perpetrators were brought to trial. Interview with an official Burundian source, Bujumbura, January 2008.
121 According to a survey conducted by CENAP and the North-South Institute in 2007, 45 per cent of respondents thought that giving the police training in human rights would improve the level of security and respect for human rights in their community (Nindorera, 2007, p. 18).
122 Organizations that are particularly involved are the Réseau des citoyens justice et démocratie (Network of citizens for justice and democracy, or RCN), Avocats sans frontières (Lawyers without Borders, or ASF), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
123 Interview with an official Burundian source, Bujumbura, January 2008.
124 Interview with a Burundian source, Bujumbura, January 2008.
125 Interview with an official Burundian source, Bujumbura, January 2008.
126 See UNPF (n.d.).
127 See the section on real and perceived insecurity in Ch. 1 (p. 43).
128 With respect to 21 of these acts, neither the identity nor the sex of the victims is known.
129 Certain categories have been combined: the ‘settling of scores’ includes land disputes; ‘family disputes’ include conjugal violence.
130 The 1,013 cases of rape were recorded in ten provinces, i.e. in the whole country except Bujumbura-Mairie (the data being from the Seruka Centre) and Karuzi (where the Ligue Iteka does not have an observer).
131 Interview with a representative of the Ligue Iteka, July 2007, Bujumbura.
132 A WHO study from 2005 shows that sexual abuse of children worldwide is, on average, responsible for 27 per cent of cases of post-traumatic stress disorder, 10 per cent of panic attacks, 8 per cent of attempted suicides, and 6 per cent of cases of depression, alcoholism, or excessive consumption of drugs (Andrews et al., 2005, p. 1853).
133 In his report to the prison authority that month, the director of this prison explains that ‘prison officers, ever since they were introduced here, have never wanted to work inside the prison at night. For this reason some undisciplined groups invaded the women’s section, either by climbing the wall or by tearing off the padlocks [...] This is why some of the women are pregnant’ (RoB Ruyigi Prison, 2008).
134 Interview with Luk van Baelen, MSF field coordinator, Bujumbura, January 2008.
135 Interview with Aline Ndayikeza, programme officer in Nturengaho, Bujumbura, January 2008.
136 This does not explain the fall in the number of cases between 2005 and 2006, however.
137 Women’s focus group, Bujumbura, January 2008.
138 RoB Bubanza Prison (2008); RoB Bururi Prison (2008); RoB Gitega Prison.
(2008); RoB Mpimba Prison (2008); RoB Muramvya Prison (2008); RoB Muyinga Prison (2008); RoB Ngozi Prison (2008); RoB Rumonge Prison (2008); RoB Rutana Prison (2008); RoB Ruyigi Prison (2008).

The ‘men in uniform’ are members of the PNB, FDN, or Palipehutu–FNL.

Land disputes in Burundi have been the subject of numerous reports and studies. See, for example, the reports of USAID (Niyongabo and Nsabimana, 2007; Manirakiza, Hatungimana, and Nkezabahizi, 2007; Ndihokubwayo, 2007) and of the Observatory of Government Action (Nzosaba, 2008a).

Interview with a representative of an international NGO, Bujumbura, January 2008.

The figures only include cases in which the victim was alone (as opposed to a couple or a family).

Interview with Father Aster Kana, president of the National Commission for Land and Other Assets (CNTB), Bujumbura, January 2008.

Interview with a representative of a Burundian NGO, Bujumbura, January 2008.

Interview with a representative of a Burundian NGO, Bujumbura, January 2008.

The state and district receive three per cent of the purchase price on each transaction, which represents a considerable source of revenue. Interview with René-Claude Niyonkuru, independent consultant, 26 August 2008.

Interview with Father Aster Kana, president of the CNTB, Bujumbura, January 2008; men’s focus group, Cibitoke, January 2008.

Interview with Father Aster Kana, president of the CNTB, Bujumbura, January 2008.

Interview with a representative of an international NGO, Bujumbura, January 2008.

Interview with Father Aster Kana, president of the CNTB, Bujumbura, January 2008.

Interview with a representative of a local NGO, Bujumbura, January 2008. A similar reform in Rwanda in 1999 was, however, successful (CIDA, 2007).

Interview with a representative of an international NGO, Bujumbura, January 2008.

Interview with Father Aster Kana, president of the CNTB, Bujumbura, January 2008.

Interview with Father Aster Kana, president of the CNTB, Bujumbura, January 2008.

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Interview with Father Aster Kana, president of the CNTB, Bujumbura, January 2008.

Interview with Father Aster Kana, head of the surgery department of the Prince Régent Charles Hospital, Bujumbura, 26 August 2008.

Interview with a representative of an international NGO, Bujumbura, January 2008.

Interview with Father Aster Kana, head of the surgery department of the Prince Régent Charles Hospital, Bujumbura, 26 August 2008.

Interview with Father Aster Kana, president of the CNTB, Bujumbura, January 2008.

Interview with Father Aster Kana, president of the CNTB, Bujumbura, January 2008.

Correspondence with a Burundian medical source, January 2008.

Interview with Father Aster Kana, president of the CNTB, Bujumbura, January 2008.

Interview with Father Aster Kana, president of the CNTB, Bujumbura, January 2008.

Interview with a representative of an international agency, May 2006; correspondence with a Burundian source, July 2007. In addition, doctors in Bujumbura have the possibility to do overtime in private hospitals, which do not exist in the rest of the country. Interview with Dr Basila, deputy director with responsibility for patient care at the Prince Régent Charles Hospital, Bujumbura, 26 August 2008.

Interview with a representative of an international agency, May 2006.

Interview with a Burundian medical source, January 2008.

Interview with Dr Protais Ntihogora, head of the surgery department of the Kamenge military hospital, Bujumbura, January 2008.

Interview with Dr Basila, deputy director with responsibility for patient care, Prince Régent Charles Hospital, Bujumbura, 26 August 2008.

Interview with a Burundian medical source, Bujumbura, June 2006.

Men’s and women’s focus groups, Gitega, February 2008.

Correspondence with a representative of the Association pour la défense des droits de la femme (Association for the Defence of Women’s Rights, ADDF), Bujumbura, January 2008.

Correspondence with an ADDF representative, Bujumbura, January 2008.

Interview with Aline Ndayikeza, Nturengaho programme manager, Bujumbura, January 2008.

Interview with a Burundian medical source, January 2008. In some rare cases, the district authority will issue a ‘certificate of indigence’, which enables the
176 Interview with Dr Protais Ntihogora, head of the surgery department of the Kamenge military hospital, Bujumbura, January 2008.

177 Dalal and Nasibu Bilali carried out interviews with the care personnel and searches in the registers of eight hospitals (Bujumbura military hospital; Ngozi hospital; Prince Régent Charles Hospital, Bujumbura; Gitega hospital; Prince Louis Rwagasore clinic, Bujumbura; Kirembe Nord hospital in Ngozi province; Roi Khaled University Hospital, Bujumbura; Bururi Hospital) and five health centres (Agasabirwa health centre, Kinama, Bujumbura; Ubuwumva clinic, Cibitoke; Espoir health centre, Kinama, Bujumbura; Chez Asmani health centre, Kinama, Bujumbura; Koríneza health centre, Bujumbura).

178 This estimate includes pre-hospital, hospital, and physical therapy costs. The hospital costs represented here do not include certain costs such as the cost of buildings, recurrent costs, or the salaries of the health personnel (Dalal and Nasibu Bilali, 2008, pp. 25, 27).

179 These calculations were made by multiplying the monthly income of each injured person by the number of months the individual could not work as a result of the injuries (Dalal and Nasibu Bilali, 2008, p. 26).

180 Interview with Dr Protais Ntihogora, head the surgery department of the Kamenge military hospital, Bujumbura, January 2008.

181 Interview with an official Burundian source, Bujumbura, January 2008.


183 Comment made during the study validation workshop, 26 August 2008.

184 Interview with an official Burundian source, Bujumbura, January 2008.

185 Women’s focus group, Bujumbura, January 2008.

186 Interviews with representatives of Burundian NGOs, Bujumbura, January 2008.

187 Interview with a representative of an international NGO, Bujumbura, January 2008.

188 Interview with a representative of a Burundian NGO, Bujumbura, January 2008.

189 Interview with Luk van Baelen, MSF field coordinator, Bujumbura, January 2008.

190 Interview with a representative of a Burundian NGO, Bujumbura, January 2008. The Seruka Centre of MSF–Belgium carries out these types of appraisal.

191 Interview with a representative of a Burundian NGO, Bujumbura, January 2008; correspondence with a Burundian source, 30 May 2008.

192 Interview with a Ntirengaho representative, Bujumbura, January 2008.

193 Interview with Dr Protais Ntihogora, head of the surgery department of the Kamenge military hospital, Bujumbura, January 2008.

194 Interview with a representative of a Burundian NGO, January 2008.

195 Interview with Father Aster Kana, Bujumbura, 26 August 2008.

196 Men’s focus group, Cibitoke, January 2008.

197 Men’s focus group, Cibitoke, January 2008.

198 See the section on real and perceived insecurity in Ch. 1 (p. 43).


200 Men’s focus group, Makamba, February 2008.

201 Dalal and Nasibu Bilali interviewed managers and office personnel of security companies (KKSecurity, INTERSEC, NESTEC, and PS6), Bujumbura, May 2008.


204 Correspondence with the press service of Brussels Airlines, December 2008.

205 Figure as of 26 August 2008. Interview with Gen. Déo Tutuza, Bujumbura, 26 August 2008. These gun licences, administered by the army, mainly apply to pistols, but since the 1990s an increasing number of automatic rifles have been registered.

206 Made up of Burundi, the DRC, Uganda, and Rwanda, the Tripartite Plus initiative aims to combat ‘negative forces’ in the region (Tripartite Plus Joint Commission, 2007).

207 The full name is the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control, and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa.

208 Interview with Col. Isaïe Nibizi, Principal Defence/Security Adviser, First Vice-President of the Republic, Bujumbura, January 2008.

209 Interview with Col. Isaïe Nibizi, Principal Defence/Security Adviser, First Vice-President of the Republic, Bujumbura, January 2008.

210 Correspondence with MAG, December 2008.

211 Anti-personnel mines are now a minor problem in Burundi. It is estimated that in 2008 only 0.5 per cent of the population and 4 per cent of the country’s collines were affected by their presence. Moreover, the army has destroyed its stock of 664 mines in accordance with the Ottawa Agreement (UNDP, 2008a).

212 Several types of weapon may be used during a single act of armed violence, particularly if there are several perpetrators.


216 The data concerning cases of ‘popular justice’ is missing for the months of June and August 2006, April, May, June, and November 2007, and March 2008. The calculations have therefore been carried out on the basis of 19 monthly reports that provide precise information on this subject.


218 Women’s focus group, Makamba, February 2008; men’s focus group, Gitega, February 2008.
Demobilized combatants’ focus group, Bujumbura, March 2008.

See the section on the perpetrators of acts of banditry in Ch. 1 (p. 58).

These respondents stated that they knew there were arms in circulation in their neighbourhood/colline.

Men’s focus group, Makamba, 2008.

The average based on a total of five estimates.

For a complete list of the sources and trafficking of arms in Burundi, see Pézard and Florquin (2006, pp. 19–29).

This perception may result from the fact that, being more prosperous, the population of Bujumbura-Mairie is more likely to possess arms than people in other provinces. People who do not own weapons are more likely to see weapons as a source of danger.

Men’s focus group, Mwaro, January 2008.

Women’s focus group, Gitega, February 2008; men’s focus group, Bujumbura, January 2008.

Interview with Celciius Barahinduka, Bujumbura, 26 August 2008.

See the section on the perception of uniformed services in Ch. 2 (p. 67).


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