Annex 2:
Summary of thematic discussions
Matrix presentation of thematic discussions
Matrix of discussions from M & E workshop
Summary of thematic discussions

A. Pastoral Conflict

What are special challenges about working in this thematic area?
The group composed of representatives of organizations working in Kenya, Uganda, and Sudan all had immense knowledge and experience on pastoral conflict. The groups discussed how pastoral conflict has changed with time. Most pastoralist communities in East Africa the group noted find themselves situated and migrating across national boundaries thereby complicating national security arrangements. In Kenya and Uganda, tackling cross border pastoral conflict was said to be complicated due to the fact that the two countries have different style of governance. It is therefore difficult to engage the administration in peace building in such a scenario especially where negotiations around cattle theft and violent incidents is concerned. Other challenges include the traditional carrying of small arms and light weapons, conspiracy of silence amongst pastoral communities, and generally a culture of violence where outsiders are viewed with suspicion.

The group concluded that failure by successive regimes in the region to support the pastoral livelihood and the practice of deploying administrators and government officers with little regard for pastoral culture have made peacemaking difficult in these areas. The group also noted that climate changes have led to a drastic reduction of natural resources, thereby fueling armed violence between neighboring communities that are competing for resources. Also prolonged drought and flash floods have led to displacements of communities.

The imposition of alien theories of change on community processes can make the process of tracking change very challenging. Pastoral culture is a complex whole that needs to be understood within given socio-economic and cultural contexts. Any initiative targeting changes in attitude against violence and promoting peace must be patient with the slow pace of achieving results. However some development partners invest resources and expect impact within a very short time which is frustrating for local development partners.

How does the case study echo your groups’ experience? What lessons could you add to this experience?
The case study, which focused on Northeastern Kenya, was similar to situations in Sudan, Uganda, and the Karamoja part of Kenya. The group identified the need to harmonize and balance activities amongst different actors in the course of implementing development projects so that sections of the society do not feel left out and that the situation does not result in an imbalance in resources which may result to conflict. The group also learnt that there is need to focus on addressing root causes of armed violence instead of putting in place superficial peace programmes that do not yield much. Since attitude change is said to be part of the problem, it takes time to effect changes and that there is need for all parties concerned to exercise patience. Also there is a need to appreciate that interventions can
also result in conflict and require the adoption of conflict sensitive intervention strategies. One of the most effective ways of creating change is through inviting beneficiaries to learn from cases of success within their own locality or in other areas. Donor dependency can be eliminated by encouraging the identification and utilization of local resources, hence promoting ownership of the intervention by the community. The need to combine armed violence reduction and livelihood was seen as a viable strategy towards disarming the culture and much preferable to focusing on the simple confiscation of small arms and light weapons. The monitoring of socio-cultural, political and economic dynamics amongst pastoral communities is important, as all these factors have a bearing on the armed violence situation.

What is it you do that is most effective?
Alternative livelihood was one area where success has been experienced especially amongst women who integrate herding goats and sheep with farming during the rainy season, thus supplementing their diet at house hold level. Integrating armed violence reduction and restocking herds after rustling incidents and/or prolonged drought was also said to be an effective way ensuring results as it would prevent attacks motivated by retaliation or the need to restock by theft. Programmes focused on building the capacity of women were singled out as being more effective in bringing about social change since women, despite their marginalized position at the household level, often have some control over certain issues that are crucial to the survival of the family. For example, in the Karamoja cluster women encourage men to participate in cattle rustling so as to improve the welfare of the family. An alternative source of income for women would remove the incentive for supporting this kind of risky behavior. Communities like projects they can identify with and which come out of their own initiative. Building interventions on traditional practices that have been tested and approved by society gives the community the confidence to engage actively. The use of local role models encourages those in deprived situations to crave for positive change thus impacting on their way of life.

How do you know? (Monitoring impact?)
A number of ways were identified as means of monitoring impact: recording reduced numbers of violent incidents in violence-prone areas; and recording the occasions when people that are usually armed with sophisticated weapons hand them over to government authorities voluntarily. The unconventional use of land by pastoral communities, such as in growing food crops, indicates they have benefitted from a successful capacity building process. Another measure of impact is when communities convene focused group discussions without the influence of external facilitators. This indicates that they are indentifying positively with the intervention.

In your work, how do you link Armed Violence Reduction & Development?
Armed violence within pastoral communities is an undeniable reality which has had far reaching negative implications from the individual to the community level and has drawn the attention of regional players such as Inter Governmental authority on development (IGAD) and the East African community (EAC). Clearly such violence leads to a reduced level of
development in these areas. Poverty, lack of infrastructure including roads, schools, hospitals and cattle dips have been some of the more conspicuous attributes of pastoral areas in eastern Africa. Others include trauma, fear and lack of confidence at the individual level which also impact on how one would want to participate in effecting change in society. Armed violence and under development cannot be separated. Promising interventions include: provision of alternative livelihoods which would prevent gun violence and give room for implementation of development processes; the creation of social contracts out of negotiations for resource sharing; and organizing visits to situations where armed violence reduction programmes have paved the way for successful development.

What policies would you recommend to Government and UN agencies?
The UN and governments are important actors in the quest to eliminate armed violence. Governments should harmonize their national policies on disarmament into regional strategies that would ensure that the movement of illicit arms in the region is curtailed. Currently, Kenya and Uganda carry out disarmament at different times using different strategies and border communities conspiring to hide arms and temporarily halt the trade every time disarmament is announced.

States should implement the Geneva Declaration on armed violence, the Oslo commitments and other regional and international instruments such as the Nairobi declaration on small arms and light weapons since they spell out strategies through which armed violence reduction can be achieved. Other practical policy strategies include: registration of arms; marking of guns; recording the production of ammunition and tracing its use by the security machinery; deployment of police in the place of military in security zones; in-depth analysis of reasons for civilian armament and the design of people-friendly development interventions that will dissuade them from possessing guns.

The UN should work closely with local organizations to implement interventions that can be sustained after a mission has ended. For example, in Lokichogio, Kenya the UN constructed schools, roads, an airstrip and hospitals. When they shifted base to Juba after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, these facilities started dilapidating and caused ownership conflicts between individuals, the local council and the government. The UN should be more proactive and responsive to needs and avoid being bogged down by bureaucratic bottlenecks. Finally, the MDGs cannot be achieved in situations of violence and therefore the UN should consider including armed violence reduction as one of the MDGs.

B. Disarmament and reconciliation

What are special challenges about working in this thematic area?
This small group included participants from Kenya and Burundi who are active in the nexus between small arms control, security, reconciliation and development. They agreed that the struggle to establish credibility and legitimacy both with the general public and the national government in dealing with disarmament issues, which heretofore were the prerogative of government. Perhaps, due in part to traditional political practices, civil society actors have
had poor access to information from national governments and have found it difficult to establish trust between themselves and government.

On a more practical level on the ground the continuing high level of violence and consequent lack of safety in communities has made it difficult to promote non-violent approaches to security as an alternative to the current reliance by both government and civilians on guns. Establishing a security dialogue with civilian stakeholders has been difficult, especially so with youth in urban criminal and armed groups. Civil society work on security policy is still not fully appreciated by government stakeholders and the result is a lack of collaboration between civil society organizations and government.

**How does the case study echo your groups’ experience? What lessons could you add to this experience?**

The participants agreed that it is important to develop strategies that will open communication channels and involve all stakeholders. The involvement and support of local leaders in decision making is crucial to success and it is equally important to engage and involve ex-combatants. Generally, the practical institutional focus has been on the organization and empowerment of community groups, especially at the local level, to conceive and implement programming that effectively links community safety and disarmament. The resulting programmes are usually based on initial research and mapping activities related to armed violence and insecurity.

It is important to learn how to conceptualize peace work in a way that is comprehensive, understandable to the wider public and sufficiently proactive to convince all stakeholders that it is a practical and effective component of community security plans. This means that civil society organizations have to focus on developing strategies that link existing projects in a clear and coherent structure.

Once this work is underway, then the focus shifts to creating political will at the local and national levels to establish a consensus about the links between security, arms control, reconciliation and development. The aim is to ensure that government will take up and implement the recommendations of best practices identified by civil society at ground level.

**What is it you do that is most effective?**

The participants identified three broad areas of success. The first was the establishment of political will to support the normalization and implementation of integrated security, reconciliation and development programming. The second was the ongoing identification, adoption and promotion of best practices in programming. Third, civil society groups have begun to promote the understanding of linkages between development and security programming.

**How do you know? (Monitoring impact?)**

The participants listed a variety of ways that they use to assess the effectiveness of their work. They first emphasized the importance of establishing relevant indicators and targets and developing the capacity to effectively deliver on these goals. They support a shift toward
better quantification by NGOs of the desired behavior change on the part of the public. For example this would include measuring the decrease in deaths due to armed violence as a result of specific policy and programming measures. It would also be important to monitor the acceptance and action by government on recommendations made by relevant civil society and government bodies. Finally it is crucial to base all policy and practical programming on an active dialogue (surveys, public meetings, awareness campaigns, etc.) with local people.

**In your work, how do you link Armed Violence Reduction & Development?**

Participants made it clear that the wide and longstanding involvement in the region with development methodology has been usefully applied to the new work on AV&D. Local organizations are already guided by the principle that “Without peace there cannot be development and without development there cannot be peace.” This was well established in earlier development programming across the region and has formed a useful basis for current work on AV&D. Moreover, some organizations are already applying specific development indicators in their policies. As a positive and practical integrating device, locally established peace committees have become a recognized part of local development structures. The familiar development practice of emphasizing participatory processes has been followed by groups who have worked to bringing on board marginalized groups such as tribal/ethnic minorities, ex-combatants, women, children and youth.

**What policies would you recommend to Government and UN agencies?**

**Government level:**
- Reforms should focus on the needs of the community;
- Include civil society organization in policy planning;
- Establish clear national policies on disarmament and small arms control;
- Recognize the value and of civil society work and include its views in national policy;
- Open civil society access to decision makers in planning and implementation with a recognition that there can be no development if there is no peace;
- Include the views and participation of youth in all programming; and
- Adjust the education system so as to empower the young people with skills that enable them to contribute to development and security goals.

**C. Armed violence reduction in conflict areas & fragile states**

**What are special challenges about working in this thematic area?**

This small group consisted of eight organizations based in Kenya, Somalia and DRC and conducting active field programmes relevant to armed violence and development in Somalia and the DRC. They identified a number of specific challenges that condition their work in countries experiencing frequent armed violence, unreconciled conflict and an absence of effective government. The most immediate effect of these conditions is a lack of easy, safe physical access to many communities. Even when areas are open to transportation and communication, then the threat of violence leads NGOs to base their management at a considerable distance from projects, sometimes even outside the country, and this in turn
lessens their knowledge of conditions. The violent atmosphere also tends to strengthen ideological barriers between and within communities.

In addition the continuous violence weakens social and political structures, creates high population mobility; and confuses efforts toward state-building. The legal structure makes the enforcement of rights-based work difficult. The lack of structure makes it easier for NGOs to initiate programmes but much harder for them to sustain them. The ongoing chaos erodes the capacity to maintain or build institutions or to retain institutional memory. It reduces the level of resources available for making positive change and weakens the basic family and social structures that underpin more formal institutions. This downward spiral changes public and personal attitudes, encouraging short term thinking at the expense of long term planning, disempowering groups and lessening their will to engage in new programming. In a situation where anything is possible, it is difficult to build trust. Meanwhile donors increasingly take on an “emergency” perspective that emphasizes humanitarian response rather than longer term development funding.

How does the case study echo your groups’ experience? What lessons could you add to this experience?
Some aspects of armed violence reduction require a basic level of community stability. It is not possible to do community safety programming in a war zone. Nevertheless, programs can be successful if they select a clear and limited entry point from which they can later develop wider programming as conditions permit. Many programmes focus on youth, given their large numbers and susceptibility to being recruited into armed groups. Similarly, the easy escalation of conflict into armed violence leads many programmes to include components on conflict resolution training and capacity building.

The chosen focus of most programmes is at local level. In a fragile state governments come and go but community stays. So investment in communities is crucial. In turn this brings with it an emphasis on empowerment and inclusion which help to insure that everyone in the community participates and is represented. Partnership structures, which support the capacity building of local organizations, are commonly chosen by intervening organizations.

Many participants noted the importance of working on programs that generate income and support households. They advocated the need to create a bridge from a humanitarian agenda to a peacebuilding one that would integrate development activities into conflict recovery. They recognized that this requires long term engagement from donors in addition to their more immediate crisis response.

What is it you do that is most effective?
The participants recognized that they are most successful in work at the community level but this has led to a very limited influence with national or global decision makers. They see their participatory emphasis – often accompanying rather than leading their partners – has been effective in empowering communities to take action and ownership of their own development. In general, they have had much easier access to youth, women and children and clear success with these demographic groups in promoting a craving for positive
change. But access to these populations has been based on convincing local (older, male) power structures that such programming does not challenge their political control.

**How do you know? (Monitoring impact?)**
The participants’ experience with monitoring and evaluation is still largely focused on collecting fairly simple kinds of evidence: compiling activity reports (many using log-frame analysis and in-house monitoring systems) and creating visual (photographic) documentation along with commentary based on maintaining strong communication links to the communities with whom they work. Several participants agreed that when they see a community start to take its own initiatives and analyze its own situation then these are clear signs of success. Some local committees have begun reporting on numbers and types of violent incidents. But they caution that shifting the norm from listing log-frame outputs to assessing quantitative impact will take considerable time. There is some limited experience with (and wider curiosity about) the development of baseline and participatory impact assessment related to armed violence. Specifically in Somalia there is an interest in working with UNDP in the use of victimization surveys and other means to begin creating a snapshot of current levels of violence.

**In your work, how do you link Armed Violence Reduction & Development?**
Many of the participants recognized that their organizations have chosen approaches that explicitly link development and security issues. In one case (DDG) the organization has directly adopted the standard development methodology used by its parent organization (a faith based development NGO) for use in its programme to promote community security dialogue and planning. Another group (CAPI) has built on a successful model of local community economic development and has converted this to a peace focused programme (in the process evolving their Change Agents into Change Agents for Peace). A number of programmes support the establishment of local “peace committees” which respond to immediate conflict situations and then in many cases have grown organically to include development functions and goals. This evolution has been driven by local perceptions of the links between violence and under- or mal-development.

All of the participants emphasized the use of participatory community development principles in their work. They routinely base programming on needs clearly identified by the host communities and share this information with other NGOs. Also, they cautioned that scarce access to resources in communities can spark conflict and that, while development initiatives can also improve security, it may be difficult to isolate and measure their security impact without new methods of evaluation.

**What policies would you recommend to Government and UN agencies?**

**Government level**
- Promote more coordination and recognition of grass root initiatives, so that governments do not intervene and “overrule” civil society initiatives.
- Facilitate coordination of NGO efforts without controlling, and wherever possible link development and armed violence reduction programming.
• Open up political and institutional space in which community-based actors can have an influence on government policies.

• Develop a more thorough integration of policy and practice related to armed violence and development, and consolidate this with the "reality on ground" as interpreted by local communities.

• Create more donor awareness of and capacity for armed violence reduction and its links with development programming.

**UN level**

• UN agencies should take up a clear and active role in connecting government and civil society.

• Understand and promote the establishment of comprehensive, bottom-up, participatory approaches and partnerships in AVR work.

• Promote the inclusion of armed violence reduction as a cross-cutting issue in process related to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).